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FBIS-EEU-92-009 CONTENTS *14 January 1992*

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BULGARIA

Government Recognizes Former Soviet Republics *[BTA]* 1
Ganev Meets Greek Counterpart; Stresses Ties *[BTA]* 1
Dimitrov, Semerdzhiev Meet Greek Chief of Staff *[BTA]* 1
    Military Reduction Plan Signed *[BTA]* 1
Ganev Departs on Visit to Germany *[BTA]* 2
Zhelev Sends Message on Macedonian Sovereignty *[DEMOKRATSIYA 6 Jan]* 2
More on Presidential-Vice Presidential Elections 2
    Zhelev Gives Preelection Briefing *[BTA]* 2
    Zhelev Victory Forecast *[BTA]* 3
    Zhelev Casts Ballot *[BTA]* 3
    Wins 71 Percent in Home District *[BTA]* 3
    Final Results on 14 Jan *[BTA]* 3
Press Reaction to Election Results Cited *[BTA]* 4
Zhelev on Party Affiliation, President's Role *[ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME 7 Jan]* 4
Zhelev Invites Vulkanov to TV Debate *[Sofia Radio]* 5
Georfiev Kuzmanov Withdraws From Race *[Sofia Radio]* 5
Interior Ministry Troops Supplement Police *[BTA]* 6
Military Appointments, Dismissals Announced *[BULGARSKA ARMIYA 7 Jan]* 6
    Navy Commander Assumes Post *[Sofia Radio]* 6
Intelligence Chief Describes Current Tasks *[BTA]* 6
Policemen Fired for Forced Turkish Name Changes *[Ankara ANATOLIA]* 7
Supreme Court Repeals Stoyan Ovcharov Sentence *[BTA]* 7
Todorov Trial in Markov Case Adjourned *[BTA]* 7
Correction to Kalugin Expected To Testify 7

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Klaus Comments on 1991 Republic Budget Deficits *[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY 9 Jan]* 8
Klaus Sees No Alternative to Market Policies *[LIDOVE NOVINY 9 Jan]* 8
ODS Rejects Havel's Electoral Reform Proposals *[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY 9 Jan]* 10
SNR Committees Reject Proposals on Elections *[NARODNA OBRODA 9 Jan]* 10
Communist Front Organizations Protest Expulsion *[CSTK]* 10
Public Opinion Poll Reveals Party Preferences *[SVOBODNE SLOVO 9 Jan]* 11
Changes in Unemployment Benefits Outlined *[NARODNA OBRODA 9 Jan]* 11
Civic Movement's Spacek Rejects Deficit Remark *[CESKE A MORAVSKOSLEZSKE ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY 11 Jan]* 11
Czech Minister's Resignation Accepted by CNR *[CESKE A MORAVSKOSLEZSKE ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY 9 Jan]* 12
Calfa Discusses Slovak Issues, Russian Visit *[VEREJNOST 11 Jan]* 12
Danco Views Slovak Tax Evasion, Laundering *[NARODNA OBRODA 9 Jan]* 13
Slovak Presidium Approves Constitutional Setup *[CSTK]* 13
Slovak Privatization Projects Process Assessed *[NARODNA OBRODA 9 Jan]* 14
Experiments Continue on Magion-3 Satellite *[Prague Radio]* 14
Calfa Views Economic Ties With CIS Republics *[LIDOVE NOVINY 10 Jan]* 14
Russian Ambassador on Relations, Need for Aid *[Bratislava Radio]* 16

HUNGARY

Foreign Ministry To Recognize SFRY Republics *[Budapest Radio]* 17
Delegation Meets Croatian Prime Minister *[MTI]* 17

Jeszenszky To Attend USSR Aid Conference *[MTI]* 17
  Ready To Represent Visegrad Triangle *[MTI]* 18
Jeszenszky Calls Nastase on Tokes Death Threat *[MTI]* 18
State Secretary Views Foreign Policy *[168 ORA 7 Jan]* 18
Border Violation Figures Published for 1991 *[MTI]* 19
  Accord To Return Violators Expected *[MTI]* 19
Antall, Estonia's Savisaar on Future Cooperation *[Budapest Radio]* 20
Antall Speaks at War Memorial Ceremony *[MTI]* 20
Official on Privatization, Plans for 1992 *[MTI]* 20

POLAND

Walesa Invites Ukraine's Kravchuk To Visit *[PAP]* 22
Walesa Meets With Diplomatic Corps in Warsaw *[Warsaw TV]* 22
Solidarity Union Stages Strike Against Prices 22
  Enterprises Launch Protests *[PAP]* 22
  Chairman Urges Increase Suspension *[Warsaw Radio]* 23
  Walesa Assesses Economic Problems *[Warsaw Radio]* 23
  Spokesman Cites Government Reaction *[Warsaw Radio]* 23
  Olszewski Contacts Solidarity Leader *[PAP]* 24
Olszewski To Broaden Cabinet 'Political Basis' *[PAP]* 24
Olszewski Comments on Budget Problems, Economy *[Warsaw Radio]* 24
Skubiszewski Explains Foreign Ministry Budget Cuts *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 10 Jan]* 25
Peasant Alliance Urges Regional Economic Approach *[GAZETA ROBOTNICZA 30 Dec]* 26
Parys: No Review of Army Careerists Planned *[PAP]* 27
Parys 'Anxious' Over Tactical Nuclear Weapons *[Warsaw Radio]* 27
Composition of New Defense Committee Detailed *[PAP]* 27

ROMANIA

Nastase Discusses Foreign Policy Targets *[ROMPRES]* 28
Nastase, CSFR's Dienstbier Comment on Treaty *[ROMPRES]* 28
Turkish President Supports Market Economy Effort *[ROMPRES]* 28
Meeting on Cooperation With EFTA Countries Held *[ROMPRES]* 28
Iliescu, Stolojan Discuss Agricultural Campaign *[ROMPRES]* 29
PUD President Stancescu Runs for Presidency *[ROMPRES]* 29
PSM Has No 'Legal Right' in Elections *[ROMPRES]* 29
FSN Names Candidates for Bucharest Government *[ROMPRES]* 29
Daily Explains Reasons for Split Within FSN *[ROMANIA LIBERA 7 Jan]* 30
Justice Ministry Roundtable on Communists' Trial *[ROMPRES]* 30
Presbyterian Bishop Protests Official 'Offenses' *[UJ MAGYARORSZAG 9 Jan]* 30
Draft Budget Based on 'Zero Growth' Issued *[ROMPRES]* 31

YUGOSLAVIA

International

EC Mission To Coordinate With UN Observers *[TANJUG]* 32
EC Spokesman Denies Snipers Targeted Observers *[Zagreb Radio]* 32
UN Official Explains Deployment of 50 Officers *[Belgrade TV]* 32
Under Secretary Protests Vatican Decision *[TANJUG]* 33
Editors Condemn 'Trickery' of Italy's De Michelis *[POLITIKA 24 Dec]* 33

Federal

Presidency Members Support Peaceful Settlement *[TANJUG]* 34
Kostic Views EC Recognition of Slovenia, Croatia *[Belgrade TV]* 34
State Committee Sees 'Progress' on UN Plan *[TANJUG]* 34
Raseta Reviews Achievements of Pecs Talks *[TANJUG]* 35
  Denies Zagreb Mission Established *[TANJUG]* 35
JNA Reports Bosnia, Montenegro Troop Movements *[TANJUG]* 35
Drop in Imports, Exports in 1991 Reported *[TANJUG]* 36

Slovenia

Assembly President Bucar Views New Constitution *[DELO 24 Dec]* 36
Economic Impact of Republic's Recognition Noted *[DELO 20 Dec]* 38
Democratic Reform Party Changes Name, Program *[DELO 21 Dec]* 39

Croatia

Tudjman Thanks Vatican for Recognition *[Zagreb Radio]* 40
Republic 'Mainly Calm'; Sides Continue Talking *[TANJUG]* 41
Slavonia Accepts Limited UN Deployment Only *[Belgrade TV]* 41
Report Views Situation, Public Opinion in Krajina *[Belgrade Radio]* 41
Mesic Calls For Economic Aid for Reconstruction *[Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG 13 Jan]* 42
Tudjman Speech to Croatian Assembly Reviewed *[VJESNIK 29 Dec]* 42
National Bank Governor Discusses Foreign Debts *[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA 19 Dec]* 45

Serbia

Milosevic Meets Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis *[Belgrade Radio]* 46
Foreign Ministry Denies Accepting EC Views *[TANJUG]* 46
Assembly Deputies Question Air Force Efficiency *[TANJUG]* 46
Serbian National Renewal Supports Krajina's Babic *[Belgrade Radio]* 47
Socialist Party Supports Vance Peace Plan *[TANJUG]* 47
Democratic Party: Draskovic Charges 'Political' *[TANJUG]* 48
Ineffectiveness of Opposition Parties Discussed *[NIN 20 Dec]* 48
Micunovic Discusses Republic's Status, Needs *[POLITIKA 25 Dec]* 50
Vojvodina Assembly Criticizes Regional Press *[BORBA 4 Dec]* 52
Pristina Editor Fined for Publishing Photo *[Tirana Radio]* 53

Bosnia-Hercegovina

Army Recruits Told to Ignore Draft Notices *[TANJUG]* 53
SDS Demands Army Deployment to Bosanski Brod *[TANJUG]* 53
Visegrad Serbs Opt to Form Autonomous Regions *[TANJUG]* 54
Objections to Republic's Recognition Viewed *[POLITIKA 25 Dec]* 54
Leaders Agree to Dissolve Paramilitary Formations *[POLITIKA 26 Dec]* 55

Macedonia

Ethnic Albanian Referendum Ends; Deemed 'Fiasco' *[Sarajevo Radio]* 56
    Tirana Reports 95.8% Turnout *[Tirana Radio]* 57
    Skopje Reports Boycott 'En Masse' *[Skopje Radio]* 57
    Authorities Deny Use of Repression *[Skopje Radio]* 57
Tupurkovski Working on Recognition in U.S. *[TANJUG]* 58
Greek Authorities Close Border to Macedonians *[TANJUG]* 58
Tupurkovski Advocates Simultaneous Recognition *[VJESNIK 22 Dec]* 58

Government Recognizes Former Soviet Republics

AU1301190492 Sofia BTA in English 1801 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Sofia, January 13 (BTA)—The Bulgarian Government decided to recognize the independence of Uzbekistan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan and Turkmenia and expressed Bulgaria's readiness to establish diplomatic relations with them. Bulgaria recognized the independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan, it was announced after today's sitting of the cabinet.

Ganev Meets Greek Counterpart; Stresses Ties

AU1201214292 Sofia BTA in English 2109 GMT 12 Jan 92

[Text] Sofia, January !2 (BTA) - Regardless of the different stands on the recognition of the Republic of Macedonia, Bulgaria and Greece will continue to act as stabilizing factors in the Balkans. They will prevent actions destabilizing the region, Bulgaria's Foreign Minister Stoyan Ganev told a BTA reporter.

Returning from Rome, Mr. Ganev had talks with Mr. Andonis Samaras, Greece's foreign minister. They discussed opportunities to schedule a trilateral meeting of Bulgarian, Greek and turkish military experts.

Mr. Ganev said that he would like Bulgaria and Greece to sign an agreement on security measures between Bulgaria and Greece. We need to further cooperation with our neighbour more than ever, Mr. Ganev said.

I believe that regardless of our stands on Macedonia's sovereignty our cooperation will continue, the Bulgarian foreign minister said. The business forum scheduled for February with the participation of the two countries is important to bilateral relations. In Athens I expressed my willingness to present arguments for the necessity of economic cooperation among the Black Sea countries, Mr. Ganev said.

Though unexpected, Mr. Ganev's visit to Athens drew the attention of many journalists. However, a team of the Greek television did not release Mr. Ganev's entire statement on the question of the name of the Republic of Macedonia and this provoked Athens's reaction.

Bulgaria's foreign minister said that Bulgaria has an area named Pirin Macedonia but we are not afraid that once the neighbour republic (of Macedonia) is recognized, someone may have territorial claims on us, similarly, we do not believe that the renaming of the Ministry of Northern Greece into Ministry of Macedonia and Thrace poses a danger of territorial claims, Mr. Ganev said.

Dimitrov, Semerdzhiev Meet Greek Chief of Staff

AU1001182792 Sofia BTA in English 1743 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] Sofia, January 10 (BTA)—"My meeting today with Colonel General Ioannis Verivakis, chief of the Greek General Staff, is a proof that the confidence between the two countries is growing deeper and stronger," Mr. Atanas Semerdzhiev, Bulgaria's vice president, told the press shortly after his meeting with the Greek guest. He stressed that the mutual willingness for cooperation is in the interest of Balkan political stability.

Mr. Semerdzhiev and General Verivakis stressed that the development of Bulgarian-Greek relations in which the military are playing a significant role does not pose a threat to other countries. It will help establish a new climate in the Balkans and is a step towards the Balkan countries' incorporation into Europe and the world.

Gen. Verivakis was received by Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov as well. During the talks Gen. Verivakis said that security and peace in the Balkans could only be achieved through cooperation. He said he believed in the professionalism of the Bulgarian officers and stressed the need for closer contacts between the two Armies.

Mr. Dimitrov expressed his belief that the Bulgarian politicians and the military will continue to cooperate with their Greek colleagues. In connection with the situation in Yugoslavia, Mr. Dimitrov said that one of the milestones of cooperation is the EC declaration. It is high time European standards became Balkan standards, he said.

The participants in the talks were unanimous that by joining their efforts the politicians and the military could make the Balkans a better place.

Military Reduction Plan Signed

AU1101191292 Sofia BTA in English 1755 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Text] Sofia, January 11 (BTA)—Bulgaria and Greece agreed to reduce the parameters of their military activities with the participation of personnel and equipment, which under the Vienna Agreements of 1990 require mutual notification, Colonel General Lyuben Petrov, chief of the General Staff of the Bulgarian Army, and Colonel General Ioannis Verivakis, chief of the General Staff of the Greek Armed Forces, said at a press conference today. In the future the two countries will notify each other in case military exercises are held in the 15-km border area with the participation of military units bigger than battalions.

The two generals were unanimous on most of the problems discussed. They did not consider political problems but only military issues. The two chiefs of staff expressed their satisfaction at the agreements reached which were materialized in the 1992 cooperation plan between the two countries' defense ministries and armed forces signed by the two generals here today. The plan envisages exchange of visits and experience in military training, planning, the organization of military exercises and the use of different arms.

The two chiefs of staff said that the development of the military cooperation between the two countries does not threaten the interests of third countries and will contribute to the peace and security in the Balkans.

Ganev Departs on Visit to Germany

AU1301153492 Sofia BTA in English 1501 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Sofia, January 13 (BTA)—Today Mr. Stoyan Ganev, minister of foreign affairs, left for Germany on a short official visit. He is accompanied by Mr. Ventsislav Dimitrov MP, an economist, and Mr. Georgi Markov MP, a jurist.

Before his departure Minister Ganev told a BTA reporter that the development of the two countries' political and economic relations based on their cooperation and friendship treaty would be in the centre of the visit. The programme envisages a visit to the East German province of Saxony-Anhalt where Mr. Ganev will read a report on the present political and economic situation in Bulgaria. In Bonn he will be received by Ms. Rita Suessmuth, president of the Bundestag.

The Bulgarian delegation will have a number of important meetings—with officials of Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Bundesbank, the German Chamber of Commerce, with the minister of finance and with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. The Bulgarian officials will try to present an updated picture of the legislative changes in Bulgaria.

Zhelev Sends Message on Macedonian Sovereignty

AU1301144892 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 6 Jan 92 p 1

[BTA report: "Bulgaria Is for a Free and Independent Republic of Macedonia"]

[Text] In reply to the message from the president of the Republic of Macedonia, Mr. Kiro Gligorov, the Bulgarian president, Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev, sent the following message:

"Dear Mr. President, thank you for the message you sent regarding the Republic of Macedonia's desire for international recognition as an independent state and fully-fledged subject of international relations. I fully share your fears of the consequences that an escalation in the conflict in Yugoslavia could bring. It is obvious that under conditions of the country's disintegration, dialogue is the only way of solving the contradictions between the nations.

"The Republic of Macedonia's readiness to take its fate into its own hands will, I am sure, create conditions to unravel one complex knot in the contradictions existing in the Balkans. Bulgaria's position in favor of a free and independent Republic of Macedonia that will cease to be a target of territorial pretensions by any of the neighboring states is well known. In this vein, I would like to recall the many times when I have expressed the Bulgarian side's readiness to recognize the legitimately expressed wish to establish the Republic of Macedonia as a sovereign state.

"The Republic of Bulgaria assesses the joint efforts of the EC member states regarding the crisis in Yugoslavia as a source of hope that the old rivalry of the European states to divide the Balkans into spheres of influence will be overcome. Bulgaria accepts and supports the approach adopted by the European Community on 16 December 1991 in Brussels of treating all the Republics of Yugoslavia that have expressed a desire to be recognized as independent equally. We also fully share the criteria cited in the adopted declaration for recognizing the new states, and we are convinced that the Republic of Macedonia meets these criteria. This is why Bulgaria will recognize the independence of the Republics of Macedonia, Slovenia, and Croatia in the near future.

"I firmly believe that the Republic of Macedonia's independence can strengthen its position under conditions of understanding and cooperation with its neighbors and by establishing relations with them free of nationalistic bearing, emotions, or prejudices.

"Bulgaria has not had and has no other designs on the Republic of Macedonia other than to see its population free and in a position to decide its fortunes itself. I see in this a prerequisite for significantly more active and comprehensive cooperation between our states and for establishing relations in keeping with the nature of the processes in Europe.

"Accept my sincere wishes, Mr. President, for the Republic of Macedonia's prosperity and for the development of our good-neighborly relations in the interests of peace and the stability of the Balkans and Europe."

More on Presidential-Vice Presidential Elections

Zhelev Gives Preelection Briefing

AU1001174592 Sofia BTA in English 1555 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] Sofia, January 10 (BTA)—Bulgarians want change in the economic and political field, in the courts, in the prosecuting magistracy and in the police, President Zhelyu Zhelev said here today upon the completion of his campaign tour. "People are ripe for change, they insist on privatization," he told journalists at his final campaign press conference. He was left with the impression that the Bulgarians are taken aback by the dimensions crime has recently acquired and insist on the restoration of death penalty.

Bulgaria's progress is impeded by the lack of appropriate laws, Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev said in response to a question. The amendment to the Land Act, the passing of the new foreign investment act and the privatization act, and the granting of tax concessions to private business are the most urgent tasks of parliament now, according to Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev.

If he is re-elected on January 12, the incumbent Bulgarian president intends to insist for every Bulgarian citizen to be given access to his police file. He believes that the decision of the former parliament (which "froze" access to the files) did not settle this problem in a democratic way.

In Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev's opinion, the law for the forthcoming presidential elections is inaccurate and imperfect. The police files of the candidates and the size of their incomes should be published and the candidates should be required to present a medical certificate.

"We are doing everything possible in order to provide preliminary diplomatic protection and support for Macedonia. It is our firm belief that Macedonia should be recognized together with Slovenia and Croatia. We are categorically against the separation of Macedonia from the other two breakaway republics," the Bulgarian president said in response to a question. He said that in Bulgaria there are plans for receiving refugees in case of hostilities between Serbia and Macedonia. "But let us hope that things will not go that far. We want the Macedonian problem to be solved by the European Community and not by deals between Skopje and Athens."

Zhelev Victory Forecast

AU1201200492 Sofia BTA in English 1757 GMT 12 Jan 92

[Text] Sofia, January 12 (BTA)—"Bulgarian sociologists argue whether Zhelyu Zhelev and Blaga Dimitrova, nominees of the Union of Democratic Forces, will win a victory by more than 60 percent of the votes," sociologist Yuriy Aslanov of the National Public Opinion Centre told BTA.

According to data supplied by the Central Electoral Commission, between 60 and 70 percent of the qualified voters have cast their ballots by 6 p.m. [1600 GMT] The turn-out is largest in Sofia (80 percent) and smallest in the town of Vratsa—60 percent.

Judging from the public opinion surveys conducted over the last two weeks, sociologists predict a victory for the Zhelev-Dimitrova team at the first round. According to them, the number of non- voters will be between 30 and 35 percent.

Zhelev Casts Ballot

AU1201134292 Sofia BTA in English 1238 GMT 12 Jan 92

[Text] Sofia, January 12 (BTA)—The incumbent President Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev, who is standing for the presidency on the Union of Democratic Forces ticket, cast his ballot at 11:30 a.m. today. Dr. Zhelev was accompanied by his wife and their two daughters. He declined to say whom he was going to vote for. A group of reporters and press photographers was waiting for Dr. Zhelev in front of his home. His next-door neighbors wished him success and said they were confident that he would win.

"Blaga Dimitrova, (Dr. Zhelev's running mate) and I decided to resist provocations. During the campaign we promised the voters only what we intend to do. We decided to avoid personal invectives and I think that we had the best style. Those who have nothing to say shower abuse on the rest. This is a sign of weakness, not of strength," he said.

The Zhelev-Dimitrova tandem adopted "trust yourselves" rather than "trust us" as their campaign motto because they believe that only a self-confident people can carry out the political and economic reforms in this country.

Wins 71 Percent in Home District

AU1201200092 Sofia BTA in English 1831 GMT 12 Jan 92

[Text] Sofia, January 12 (BTA)—Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev received 393 votes (71 per cent) in the electoral district in Sofia where he himself cast his vote. His major rival Velko Vulkanov (backed by the Bulgarian Socialist, former Communist, Party), obtained 128 votes. 33 people voted for other candidates.

Final Results on 14 Jan

AU1301203592 Sofia BTA in English 2004 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Sofia, January 13 (BTA)—After the first round of the elections the incumbent president Zhelyu Zhelev, nominated presidential candidate by the Union of Democratic Forces, has an advantage of 44.58 percent over the other candidates. Mr. Velko Vulkanov, supported by the Bulgarian Socialist, ex-communist, Party, polled 30.47 percent of the vote. Mr. George Ganchev, who ran as an independent candidate, polled 16.81 percent. These are the data obtained after processing 99 percent of the tally sheets received at the central electoral commission. The final results will be announced officially tomorrow.

According to Mr. Petur-Emil Mitev, a sociologist, Dr. Zhelev can rely on a broader electorate in the second ballot. A sociological survey shows that the people who voted for for George Ganchev are actually part of the electorate of the UDF [Union of Democratic Forces]—they are mainly business-oriented young people. The political scientist Dimitur Dimitrov explained Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev's failure to win in the first round of the presidential elections with the fact that the participation in the January 12 elections was weaker compared with that in the October parliamentary elections, with some "slightly negative effects of the rule of the UDF," whose government has got to implement unpopular measures and with Dr. Zhelev's refusal to employ an aggressive style in his campaign.

Press Reaction to Election Results Cited

AU1401141392 Sofia BTA in English 1147 GMT 14 Jan 92

[Text] Sofia, January 14 (BTA)—"DEMOKRATSIYA," the daily of the ruling Union of Democratic Forces, lays stress on the fact that the candidate of the coalition and the incumbent President Zhelyu Zhelev took the lead in the elections, while "DUMA," the opposition socialist daily, emphasizes that the incumbent president, who is running for a second term, failed to win in the first round of elections.

Almost half of the electorate show preference for Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev, today's "DEMOKRATSIYA" writes in a headline. "Dr. Zhelev's failure to win in the first round of the presidential elections though polling the greatest number of votes is a lesson which nobody should forget," Mr. Stefan Prodev, MP of the Bulgarian Socialist Party and editor-in-chief of "DUMA," points out in his commentary.

"DUMA" quotes BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] leader Zhan Videnov as saying that the fact there will be a run-off proves the majority of Bulgarians do not support the incumbent president. Mr. Videnov believes that the election result is "an attempt to stop the totalitarian crusade of the UDF [Union of Democratic Forces] and resist the anti-constitutional tendencies,.

The BSP did not nominate a presidential candidate of its own but gave its support to the tandem Velko Vulkanov-Rumen Vodenicharov who proclaimed themselves to be independent candidates. According to information that appeared in today's press, however, the Socialist Party's leadership is divided as to whether they should support Vulkanov-Vodenicharov in the run-off or insist on their retirement and back up the tandem George Ganchev-Petur Beron in the run-off instead. "DUMA" writes that yesterday the Bulgarian Democratic Centre called for the retirement of Vulkanov-Vodenicharov too. The Socialists' daily also says that after consultations some of the candidates who failed in the first round are expected to make an appeal to their electorate to vote for the tandem Vulkanov-Vodenicharov in the second ballot.

According to BSP leader Videnov the rivalry in the second ballot will be between the national cause and the party cause, the embodiment of which is the blue ticket of the UDF and Dr. Zhelev.

In Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev's opinion in the run-off Bulgarians will have to choose between democracy and communism.

"DEMOKRATSIYA" carries a series of features on Dr. Zhelev's rivals paying attention to their family status (Velko Vulkanov is a bachelor, Rumen Vodenicharov is divorced) and quoting the statement of a psychoanalyst who said Mr. Vulkanov was mentally imbalanced. The paper writes that the supporters of this independent tandem should think twice before casting their votes because Rumen Vodenicharov, who is one of the founders of the UDF, may prove to be the "Fifth Column" in the circle of the Socialists.

The press tries to analyze the reasons for the surprisingly high percentage of votes polled by the attractive George Ganchev. According to "DEMOKRATSIYA" this is a paradox which has occurred in some of the former communist countries too—"the Tyminski syndrome."

Zhelev on Party Affiliation, President's Role

AU1401082992 Sofia ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME in Bulgarian 7 Jan 92 pp 1,2

[Interview with Bulgarian President Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev by unnamed ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME correspondent; place and date not given: "What Is An Independent Candidate? Someone on Whom Nothing Depends..."]

[Excerpt] [ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME] Why did you agree to run on a blue [Union of Democratic Forces] ticket?

[Zhelev] I have been asked the same question in a different way—namely, why I am not running as an independent candidate? However, what does it mean to be an independent candidate in a society with strong political polarization? Well, as many as 12 parties back me, support my nomination. From a political point of view, I cannot be totally independent of those people. Wherever their interests coincide with Bulgaria's interests, with our national interests, I am willing to coordinate these interests. If their interests were to conflict with national interests, I would certainly not take their interests into consideration in the event I am elected, but give priority to national interests, as I am expected to do according to the country's Constitution. All the presidential candidates who are posing as independent can only be described as independent in one specific aspect—namely in the aspect that nothing depends on them.

[ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME] Why did you recall so many ambassadors and why were so many high-ranking police officials recently dismissed?

[Zhelev] No one is appointed to a post and has power entrusted to him for eternity. As far as I am concerned, I consider it necessary to replace a major part of the diplomatic corps. This is a process that we started a long time ago. As regards the changes in the police corps and as to the question whether it is the appropriate time to carry them out—I would say no from a personal point of view and for purely selfish reasons, because I am being blamed for all that happens. On the other hand, however, I am convinced that the changes should be implemented as soon as possible and that my personal interests do not count. The reason for such actions is to ensure that members of the police rather than members of State Security are appointed to leading posts in the local police departments.

[ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME] A new law is expected that could totally disrupt the social peace in our country, namely the law depriving people from the private plots granted to them. It is likely to affect numerous people and their families, who have with their own hard labor transformed wasteland into fertile vegetable gardens, orchards, and vineyards, after building small country houses for themselves. Are such people going to be affected?

[Zhelev] It is a question of different categories of land. The vacation home areas where people made the land arable with their own efforts cannot all be treated at the same level. We certainly cannot destroy the property of half a million people. In that case we should carefully apply a differentiated legislation. Otherwise, we might provoke a wave of discontent against the reform, which cannot be implemented without the support of the people. Accordingly, we should be careful in applying the legislation on the land reform.

[ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME] How do you explain the fact that there are so many presidential candidates?

[Zhelev] As a matter of fact, I am amazed at their courage. I think that the majority of these candidates have no idea what the institution of the presidency means, the hardships it involves, and the numerous risks to which one is exposed in this post. I would not like to sound excessively pompous, but I feel obliged to say that the presidency requires great efforts without being personally rewarded. This is the truth. I, for example, feel like a person who enjoys much less freedom than all other Bulgarian citizens. I used to be a free intellectual and I could express my opinion with much more openness and firmness. Today I have to think twice about every sentence I pronounce so that I cannot be misinterpreted, which some people do not hesitate to do anyway. Usually the candidates promise to accomplish incredible things. I am convinced that most of them have not even read the Constitution to find out what they are entitled to do and what not and are not aware of the consequences that any unusual action of the president is likely to entail.

[ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME] Considering that we are a parliamentary republic, and the president's prerogatives are rather limited, what are you capable of accomplishing in this post?

[Zhelev] The presidency in Bulgaria can only act through its personal prestige. If a president has influence on the political forces he can maintain the balance and try to achieve a consensus by finding peaceful means of settling conflicts and compromises so as to prevent political disputes from escalating to become explosive situations and crises.

[ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME] Everyone is talking about what kind of person the president should be. Could you tell us what kind of person he should not be, in your view?

[Zhelev] In this connection we could dwell at length on moral and intellectual qualities, but I would confine myself to the more usual extremes. For example, I am convinced that the president should not be a sexual pervert. In saying this I do not mean the abstract, but the specific medical sense of the term. Personally, I sympathize with people who suffer from such perversions. Many of them are talented artists and intellectuals. However, they are not fit for the presidency. Also, the president should never have been a collaborator of State Security services. He may have worked as an official of such services, but not as a secret agent, because as an active politician he would be exposed to pressure from many people who have got hold of his file. Third, the president should not be a clown, because in that case he is likely to make the presidency a laughing stock for the entire nation and disgrace Bulgaria in the eyes of the world.... The president should be a serious person. [passage omitted]

Zhelev Invites Vulkanov to TV Debate

AU1301182792 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1730 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Presidential candidate Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev has invited his competitor in the second round of presidential elections, Mr. Velko Vulkanov, to a public debate that will be broadcast on Bulgarian Television after the Around the World and at Home [Po sveta i u nas] program on Friday, 17 January. We were informed of the suggestion for this public debate by the Election Campaign Press Center of Dr. Zhelev and Mrs. Blaga Dimitrova.

Georfiev Kuzmanov Withdraws From Race

AU1101162992 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Text] As we heard from our reporter Zlatina Georgieva, today Kuzman Georgiev Kuzmanov applied to the Central Electoral Commission with the request to be allowed to withdraw from participating in the presidential elections scheduled for 12 January.

In connection with the request the Central Electoral Commission adopted the following decision: The request is granted and the registration of the candidates' list submitted by the United Democratic Forces—Right Wing Democratic Alliance proposing Kuzman Georgiev Kuzmanov for the post of president of the republic and Nikola Kostadinov Shumarev for the post of vice president, as well as the ballot of the alliance, which is white with three blue stripes, are cancelled.

The Central Electoral Commission instructed the regional and local electoral commissions to remove ballots bearing names of these candidates from the polling stations. In case that someone should nevertheless vote with the ballots bearing the names of Kuzmanov and Shumarev, the votes should be counted but the ballots would be declared invalid. This is in accordance with Article Four (One) of the Protocol on the work of electoral commissions applying to cases of voting with empty envelopes.

The Central Electoral Commission also submitted its operational plan to a final review and inspected the polling stations, specifying the composition of working groups.

Interior Ministry Troops Supplement Police

AU1301190692 Sofia BTA in English 1747 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Sofia, January 13 (BTA)—As of tomorrow near 1500 soldiers of the Ministry of Interior Troops National Service (MITNS) will guard the embassies in Sofia and the policemen who have been doing it until now are going to reinforce the operative groups fighting criminality, Major Khristo Karaichev, official spokesman for the Ministry of the Interior, announced at today's briefing of the ministry.

The MITNS units are deployed in different regions of this country and in actual fact they correspond to the gendarmerie in other countries, Major Karaichev explained.

As the Bulgarian Police is undermanned, today the leadership of the Ministry of the Interior headed by Mr. Yordan Sokolov decided that the policemen guarding embassies should be engaged in safeguarding public order.

Military Appointments, Dismissals Announced

AU1401141092 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 7 Jan 91 p 1

[BULGARSKA ARMIYA staff report: "Appointments and Dismissals"]

[Text] During the 6 January meeting of the Bulgarian Army's main command team, the chief of General Staff, Colonel General Lyuben Petrov, read the ministerial orders announcing the decrees of the Republic's president on cadres changes.

The following are appointed to the Armed Forces Inspectorate: Major General Panto Pantev as chief inspector of Land Forces; Lieutenant General Iliya Sinapov as chief inspector of the Antiaircraft Defense and Air Force; Vice Admiral Engineer Dimitur Pavlov as chief inspector of the Navy.

Major General Engineer Mikho Mikhov is appointed as commander of the Antiaircraft Defense and Air Force.

Rear Admiral Engineer Ventsislav Velkov is appointed as commander of the Navy.

Major General Spiridon Spiridonov is temporarily appointed to fulfill the duties of head of the troops at the Ministry of Transport.

The following are released from their posts and are placed at the disposal of the Ministry of Defense: Lieutenant General Engineer Tenyo Zapryanov, Lieutenant General Ivan Tsekov, Major General Angel Angelov, Colonel Vasil Vasilev, First Rank Captain Borislav Vasilev, First Rank Captain Atanas Atanasov, Lieutenant General Petur Iliev, Colonel Asparukh Gotsov, Colonel Dimitur Arnaudov, Colonel Nedyalko Tsokov, Colonel Engineer Boris Dimitrov, and Colonel Engineer Ivan Zidarov.

The following are released from their posts Major General Viktor Chaushev from the Medical Corps, Colonel Veselin Momirov, Colonel Engineer Delcho Delchev, Lieutenant General Mityu Kisyov, Major General Mladen Mladenov, Major General Spas Dzhedzhev, Major General Grigor Zhotev, Major General Tsanko Tsonev, Major General Lyudmil Fandukov, Major General Petur Kibarov, Major General Doncho Malchev.

The following were released from their posts as from 31 December 1991 and are dismissed from active military service as from 1 July 1992: Colonel Engineer Petur Zikulov, Major General Rangel Kashev, Major General Asen Trendafilov, Major General Nikola Nikolov, Major General Ivan Bantutov, Major General Angel Bubarov, Major General Engineer Ivan Spasov, Major General Kamen Petrov, Major General Engineer Boris Radev, Major General Peyu Yanchev.

Navy Commander Assumes Post

AU1001183192 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] Rear Admiral Ventseslav Velkov, newly appointed commander of the Bulgarian Navy, officially assumed his post this afternoon.

Ventselslav Krumov Velkov was born in Lom on 9 April 1939. He is not the son of writer Krum Velkov. He graduated from the Nikola Yonkov Vaptsarov Higher Navy School in 1960, specializing as a naval engineer and sea captain. Following this, he attended a naval academy and a higher training course.

He served as commander of a naval unit and as chief of staff of the Navy. He is candidate of military sciences. He is married and has a son who is a Navy officer.

Intelligence Chief Describes Current Tasks

AU1001173592 Sofia BTA in English 1711 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] Sofia, January 10 (BTA)—Bulgaria is no longer carrying out intelligence operations in Europe, General Brigo Asparukhov (46) director of the National Intelligence Service, said in an interview for the REPORTER 7 private weekly. According to him, this was dictated by political considerations but does not deprive the Bulgarian Intelligence of the right to observe the processes there.

In General Asparukhov's opinion, Bulgaria's priorities are mainly in the Balkans. This is determined by the contradictions between Turkey and Greece and the situation in Romania and Yugoslavia.

The chief of the Bulgarian Intelligence said that the national interests make it imperative to establish an economic department with the National Intelligence Service. Its sole task will be to obtain reliable and useful economic information which it will then send to the respective institutions in order to enable them to make adequate decisions, as, for instance, on the expected stand of the countries of the European Community towards Bulgaria on a given issue.

According to General Asparukhov, at present there are no aspirations to use the National Intelligence Service for narrow party interests. Even if there were such interests they could be explained by the complicated period in the development of this country. "It is our responsibility not to yield to such aspirations. Loyalty to the democratic processes in this country is a requirement for every employee of the National Intelligence Service," General Brigo Asparukhov said.

The general dwells on the necessary personnel cuts. According to him, some of the dismissed employees accepted his decision as reasonable. But others threatened him. There were some cases of disloyalty. Some of them were related to partisan interests.

Policemen Fired for Forced Turkish Name Changes

TA1101123492 Ankara ANATOLIA in English 1025 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Excerpt] Sofia (A.A)—The Bulgarian administration removed eighteen policemen from their job because they had taken an active role in the forcible name changing campaign which had been previously exerted on the Turkish minority.

In a press conference in Sofia Bulgarian Interior Minister Yordan Sokolov said on Thursday that, "it has been determined that 18 out of 81 policemen removed from their jobs have actively taken part in the name-changing campaign."

"Decrees, issued during the term of Todor Zhivkov, which award these people for these activities, exist," he added.

"This is not an action aimed at questioning the past, but a necessity of our legal responsibility," he said.

He added that they aimed at transforming the Interior Ministry into an institution which safeguarded the order and the security of the property and lives of people from a state apparatus which served the Communist dictatorship. [passage omitted]

Supreme Court Repeals Stoyan Ovcharov Sentence

AU1401110492 Sofia BTA in English 0944 GMT 14 Jan 92

[Text] Sofia, January 14 (BTA)—The Bulgarian Supreme court repealed the sentence passed on Mr. Stoyan Ovcharov on June 6, 1991. The Court returned the case to the stage of preliminary investigation.

The appeal was considered on December 19, 1991 by a five-member panel of the Supreme Court.

This was the first one of a series of legal proceedings initiated against leading functionaries of the former Communist Party. The trial opened on February 13 and ended on June 6, 1991.

Mr. Stoyan Ovcharov was given a prison sentence of two years. He was an alternate member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and minister of economy and planning. The court ruled that Mr. Ovcharov should refund near seven thousand Swiss francs and pay the litigation costs.

He was accused that in the autumn of 1989 he acted in conflict of his official position to the benefit of a third person. On October 5, 1989 he issued an order for sending Todor Ivanov Slavkov (former ruler Todor Zhivkov's grandson) as a student to Switzerland for five years. Then the amount of 32,700 Swiss francs was remitted to Switzerland which caused the state a damage of 6,991.70 Swiss francs.

Todorov Trial in Markov Case Adjourned

AU1401110892 Sofia BTA in English 0937 GMT 14 Jan 92

[Text] Sofia, January 14 (BTA)—The trial of General Vladimir Todorov, former chief of the Bulgarian Intelligence Agency, was adjourned for Friday because one of the judges is ill.

General Vladimir Todorov is accused of having illegally destroyed the police file of dissident writer Georgi Markov assassinated in London in 1978.

Correction to Kalugin Expected To Testify

WA1401143292

The following correction pertains to the item headlined "Kalugin Expected To Testify," published in the 9 January East Europe DAILY REPORT, page 8:

Column two, make sourceline read: ...Sofia BTA in English 1329 GMT 9 Jan 92... (correcting sourceline date)

Klaus Comments on 1991 Republic Budget Deficits

AU1001144392 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 9 Jan 92 pp 1, 2

[Interview with CSFR Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus by Marcela Doleckova; place and date not given: "What the Republics Have Cooked for Themselves...."]

[Text] As expected, the 1991 budget of the federation ended with a surplus of some 6 billion korunas. However, the Czech Republic budget shows a 14-billion-koruna deficit, and that of the Slovak Republic, 9 billion korunas.

When the budgetary results of cities and communities are included in the republican data, they will have a positive effect on the budgetary results of the republics. We discussed this topic with Federal Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus.

[Doleckova] Do you know whether the republic deficits were caused by unexpectedly low income or by excessive expenditures?

[Klaus] We certainly expected lower income from the turnover tax and from the tax on profit. Despite the fact that this factor played a certain role, it did not have an effect on the specific results of the budgets. This applies to November and particularly December. Spending habits at the end of 1991 had a decisive effect on creating the deficit.

[Doleckova] Can you be specific?

[Klaus] Average monthly expenditures from the Czech Republic budget were 18.8 billion korunas in the first nine months of 1991. This figure reached 25.8 billion in December. This average was 9.9 billion in the Slovak Republic in the first nine months, and reached 16.4 billion korunas in December.

[Doleckova] Do you know in what manner these higher than average expenditures were used?

[Klaus] The Federal Ministry is not informed about details. Nevertheless, if the republics have overdrawn their budgets—and this is what has happened—then, as a matter of fact, it does not matter for what purpose these sums of money were used. Despite the fact that we urged the republican ministries to be careful about their spending, we were receiving reports about an enormous increase in spending, which I consider a warning signal. I do not want to give specific names. For instance, one board of education drew my attention to the fact that they were literally flooded with unexpected funds by the end of year.

[Doleckova] In 1991, the budgets were based on restrictive philosophy. Can we still speak about restrictive budgetary policy in view of the republican results?

[Klaus] In my opinion, the republics respected this policy in the first ten months and it was only at the end of the year that the standard phenomenon of the typical planned economy appeared. At the moment when attention was fully concentrated on 1992 budgets, discipline failed totally.

[Doleckova] How will the republics be able to eliminate their deficits?

[Klaus] The possibility that they will be able to service their deficits from the federal budget is out of the question. They will pay their debt to the Czechoslovak State Bank and they will pay interest. Of course, this will be a burden on their budgets, not only this year, but also in years to come.

[Doleckova] Is it possible for the republics to achieve balanced 1992 budgets under such circumstances?

[Klaus] I do not want to forecast anything, because each republic has large sums under its administration.

[Doleckova] Do you believe that we can speak about some kind of Czechoslovak budgetary policy if the budgetary policies of the republics are different?

[Klaus] They cannot be different. What happened to republican budgets in December is a violation of this policy. Finance ministers of both republics deal too little with international organizations such as the IMF, for example, and they do not see the macroeconomic and external circumstances clearly, unlike the Federal Ministry. We are in quite a difficult situation, because we thought that the Financial Council was a coordinating body. By the way, this is the condition under which we accepted our obligations toward the IMF.

[Doleckova] An IMF mission is expected to arrive in the CSFR in January. This mission is supposed to discuss the possibility of granting more standby credit. Do you think that the discussion will be affected by the budgetary behavior of the republics at the end of last year?

[Klaus] Yes, definitely. It will be considered as a sign that the unified economic policy does not exist.

[Doleckova] Czech Minister of Industry J. Vrba repeated at a news conference on Tuesday [7 January] that he would not be afraid of a budget deficit in 1992, either.

[Klaus] This is nothing more than an expansionist idea, according to which expansion could be financed by the state budget's deficit. We have proved on many occasions that this theory is invalid. I explained it in my statement on the 1992 budget.

Klaus Sees No Alternative to Market Policies

AU1301100392 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 9 Jan 92 pp 1, 6

[Interview with Vaclav Klaus, CSFR deputy prime minister and minister of finance, by Petr Husak and Josef Kotrba; place and date not given: "No One Can Stop the Market Now"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [LIDOVE NOVINY] Could the budget situation affect the constitutional arrangement?

[Klaus] Not the situation in itself. This situation is only a symptom of what could be the complete collapse of the common financial, and, therefore economic policy of the state.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] The collapse of the common economic policy, however, could have a negative impact on the constitutional arrangement.

[Klaus] Under certain circumstances, yes. [passage omitted]

[LIDOVE NOVINY] Not to arouse political passions, but rather for purely pragmatic reasons, we should reiterate that the federation is still more advantageous for Slovakia [than for the Czech Republic] and that finances flow mostly in the direction of the Slovak Republic....

[Klaus] The federation certainly is more advantageous for Slovakia and the direction of finances is certainly west-east. This, however, is not the greatest problem facing the Czechoslovak economy. It is only a derived problem that gains prominence as our economic difficulties progress. Nevertheless, the illusion that the pace of economic reform would be infinitely greater in the Czech lands if it were not for Slovakia and that there would be fewer polemics with the Zemans, Komareks, or Matejkas if it were not for a certain breeding ground for their type of thinking in Slovakia is fallacious. I believe that we would stew in the same juice of our own inconsistencies and controversies even if we happened to live in an independent Czech Republic.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] It could happen that the Civic Democratic Party and the parties of the right wing and center will win the elections in Bohemia, while in Slovakia it would be the left-wing current....

[Klaus] Although it might come as a surprise to you, I do not perceive any major differences between the economists of the Christian Democratic Movement and Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. Therefore, I believe that the difference that might emerge in their economic policies would not be too great. I have a feeling that if I shuffled (God forbid, that I would want to do anything like that) and switched the main political currents—the head of the current opposition would become prime minister, and the present prime minister would lead the opposition—the "political and economic argument game" (this is valid in general but it applies to Slovakia in particular) would be very similar to the one currently being played. Therefore, I am convinced that if the eventual outcome of the Slovak elections did not correspond to the present composition of the government coalition, it would not necessarily lead to diametrically opposite results for economic policy. In my view, the alternative of Mr. Filkus as an economist is certainly no worse than that of Mr. Oberhauser.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] If a coalition were formed in Slovakia between the Christian Democratic Movement and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, what effect would it have on the subsequent implementation of economic reform?

[Klaus] We would certainly be able to continue the reform we have started. I believe we have crossed the Rubicon that separates one economic system from another. The implementation of economic reform would certainly be more difficult and complicated than it is today, but I do not believe that other politicians would stop the general economic development. [passage omitted]

[LIDOVE NOVINY] Most probably it would be impossible to create a program substantially different from the current one. It would be possible, however, to fuel inflation, for instance.

[Klaus] If our critics became the government, it would become apparent very quickly that they are not able to develop a positive economic policy because on principle such a policy cannot be dominated by the state. They could, however, spin the inflationary spiral by their lax monetary and fiscal policies, and divert the economy. [passage omitted]

When I said that other people could not implement another economic policy, I was thinking the short term. If they managed to disrupt the economy by rapid inflation, there would again be room for government intervention in the economy. The state can cause a great deal of trouble in monetary policy. Unfortunately, it cannot manufacture better cars or nuclear power plants. [passage omitted]

[LIDOVE NOVINY] It remains theoretically possible for the state to raise the profit tax to 75 percent, and to begin planning again....

[Klaus] I do not believe it is realistic today for any government to dare to take such measures. I even have the feeling that if our critics became the government, they would implement an absolutely identical economic policy. They might change the vocabulary but the policy would be the same. The illusion that central planning would be possible without a diktat by one party with its party secretaries for industry, trade, agriculture, youth, and women is completely fallacious. It is not possible to establish a planning center without its auxiliary political mechanisms. [passage omitted]

[LIDOVE NOVINY] What is your expectation regarding the koruna's exchange rate? Will the koruna become stronger?

[Klaus] That certainly depends on relative developments in Czechoslovakia and other parts of the world. The exchange rates, like any other monetary quantity, have a nominal and a real level. The koruna's exchange rate has not changed in Czechoslovakia for over a year. However, it is only the nominal rate that has not changed. Since the last devaluation on 28 December 1990, the nominal exchange rate has not changed, but the real one increased sharply, and the koruna became stronger. If last year's inflation was 5 percent in Germany and 52 percent in Czechoslovakia, then the value of the koruna as compared with the German mark has increased by approximately 40 percent. The revaluation referred to by some economists is real rather than nominal. I expect neither a decline in the nominal rate, nor an improvement. Since I expect a stable nominal exchange rate, however, and a higher level of inflation in Czechoslovakia than in Germany, for instance, I also expect an improvement in the real rate of the koruna.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] Administrative wage regulation in Czechoslovakia is relatively harsh, although most other prices were liberated. Do you intend to relieve it at least for the privatized enterprises?

[Klaus] I believe that it is generally known that the enforcement of wage regulations is not exactly my business. I am afraid, however, that, if we withdrew all wage limits right now, because of the strict monetary and budget policies, it would not lead to far reaching inflation but to such a growth in wage costs that employment could not bear it. Unemployment would grow, and thereby we would accelerate a politically very sensitive development. On the other hand, the privatized sector could be relieved of wage regulation.

ODS Rejects Havel's Electoral Reform Proposals

AU1001134192 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 9 Jan 92 p 2

[Text] CSTK—The Civic Democratic Party [ODS] is aiming to win the 1992 parliamentary elections. ODS press spokesman Jiri Schneider declared this intention at a party news conference held in Prague yesterday. He said that in the opinion of the deputies dealing intensively with the electoral law issue, the president's electoral law proposal does not amalgamate the advantages of the proportional and majority systems, but rather amalgamates their disadvantages. "We insist that the electoral system be based on parties and not on personalities," said Vaclav Klaus in conclusion.

SNR Committees Reject Proposals on Elections

AU1001125992 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 9 Jan 92 p 1

[CSTK report: "The President's Proposals Were Not Passed"]

[Text] Bratislava—At its session yesterday the Slovak National Council [SNR] Constitutional and Legal Affairs Committee approved a proposal put forward by 11 Federal Assembly deputies to amend law No. 47/1990 on elections to the Federal Assembly. "This proposal unequivocally endorses the proportional representation system," said Committee Chairman Milan Secansky (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia). He stated that "according to this proposal, new parties wishing to campaign [in the elections] will have to have 10,000 signatures" and he added that the SNR Constitutional and Legal Affairs Committee is against this principle. The deputies consider it to be a violation of the Document on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.

The deputies held a vote and decided not to discuss the two proposals put forward by the president of the Republic for a constitutional law on changes in the Federal Assembly and establishing a Federal Council and on amending constitutional law No. 143/1968 since they are giving priority to the deputies' proposal. The National Economy and Budget Committee yesterday approved a proposal put forward by the group of Federal Assembly deputies to amend law No. 47/1990 on elections to the Federal Assembly. The deputies agreed with neither of the two aforementioned proposals put forward by the CSFR president.

Communist Front Organizations Protest Expulsion

AU1301124392 Prague CSTK in English 1041 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Prague Jan 9 (CSTK)— Czechoslovak Minister of the Interior Jan Langos has confirmed his decision of last August that the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ), the International Union of Students (IUS), and the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), should end their activities in Czechoslovakia, the daily RUDE PRAVO today said.

"We have tried to convince Mr. Langos that his decision was not correct and is even at variance with what the premier of the Czechoslovak Government (Marian Calfa) had said," IOJ First Vice President Manuel Tome told the daily. (Last April Calfa said there was no legal basis for the expulsion of the three Prague-based organizations).

"It is an unjust decision as our 120 member organizations and their members are to be punished because of several persons we had nothing in common with and who worked in Prague.... In my opinion (Langos's) reasons are rather political," he says, adding that Czechoslovak authorities have never been prevented from carrying out a control of IOJ property.

Giorgios Michaelides, IUS secretary general, says the decision completely ignores the reforms and changes in the IUS which took place already before the November 1989 events as well as the democratization process in the organization. "We study the possibility of appealing to international legal bodies to revise the decision," Michaelides said.

WFTU Secretary-General Alexander Zharikov says the organization will appeal to the Czechoslovak prosecutor general, the Czechoslovak prime minister, and the Constitutional Court to revise the decision. "We will consult the International Labor Organization (ILO) and ask the

Council of Europe and the U.N. Human Rights Commission for help," he noted.

Public Opinion Poll Reveals Party Preferences

AU1001114392

[Editorial Report] Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech on 9 January on page 3 carries a 450-word CSTK report on the results of a public opinion poll, conducted by the Prague-based Institute for Public Opinion Research in the week from 4 to 12 December 1991, on the degree of public support for individual Czech and Slovak political parties.

The complete results of the poll, per the SVOBODNE SLOVO report, follow:

Czech Republic: Civic Democratic Party (21 percent), Czechoslovak Social Democracy (10 percent), Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (9 percent), Liberal Social Union (8 percent), Civic Movement (6 percent), Movement for Self-Governing Democracy-Society for Moravia and Silesia (5 percent), Czechoslovak People's Party (4 percent), Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (4 percent), Christian Democratic Party (3 percent), Civic Democratic Alliance (3 percent), other parties (2 percent), undecided or would not go to the polls (25 percent).

Slovak Republic: Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (30 percent), Party of the Democratic Left (16 percent), Christian Democratic Movement (13 percent), Slovak National Party (12 percent), Democratic Party (5 percent), Green Party (4 percent), Civic Democratic Union-Public Against Violence (4 percent), Coexistence/Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (3 percent), other parties (1 percent), undecided or would not go to the polls (12 percent).

Changes in Unemployment Benefits Outlined

AU1001135392 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 9 Jan 92 pp 1, 13

[Marta Moricova report: "Decree Is Banging at the Social Door"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] The Law on the State Budget of the Federation for 1992, which also changes some taxation and other laws, went into force on 1 January 1992. It also amends Law No. 1 of 1991 on Employment. Under this amendment, the terms for providing unemployment benefits remain the same, but the level of these benefits, and the period of their provision, change. Unemployment benefits can be applied for by everyone who had been employed for at least 12 months in the course of the past three years (period of study and maternity leave also count). The unemployment benefit is being reduced [from up to 65 percent in 1991] to 50-60 percent of the previous average pay and the period of payment of unemployment benefits is being reduced [from 12 months in 1991] to a maximum of six months.

What does this mean in practice? As Milan Kubalak, deputy Slovak minister of labor and social affair, told us, the immediate effect will be that a large number of job seekers will be excluded from unemployment benefits. As early as January, this will concern some 120,000 people [in Slovakia], that is, those who have been getting unemployment benefits for more than 6 months. This will, on the one hand, lower the rate of unemployment, which is high in Slovakia, having exceeded the 11 percent mark, and, on the other, many people will start looking for work more actively. [passage omitted]

Under the new law [on the budget of the federation for 1992], the federation will provide 11 billion korunas for employment policy, that is, for unemployment benefits and the creation of new jobs. Slovakia is to get full 50 percent of this sum. At first glance, this looks favorable, in view of Slovak population figures [as a proportion of the CSFR population]. But.... The Slovak rate of unemployment is much higher, which means that more will be spent on unemployment benefits and very little will be left for active employment policy. [passage omitted]

None of the 120,000 unemployed who will lose their unemployment benefits will be left in the street. [passage omitted] Everyone whom the new regulations deprive of his claim to unemployment benefits can apply for social assistance at the social affairs departments of the district offices of state administration. These welfare payments will be lower than unemployment benefits, however, and, moreover, the money will come from the budgets of the republics, rather than from the federal budget. [passage omitted]

Civic Movement's Spacek Rejects Deficit Remark

AU1401085092 Prague CESKE A MORAVSKOSLEZSKE ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech 11 Jan 92 p 2

["(pen)"-signed report: "Reform Should Not Be Ideologized"]

[Text] Prague—At yesterday's Civic Movement press briefing Czech Finance Minister Spacek rejected the "colossal insult" made by CSFR Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Klaus. In connection with the Czech and Slovak budget deficits, Klaus, as is well known, declared that the republics behaved in a socialist manner, that is, they squandered money in their desire to curry favor before Christmas.

Spacek stated that the Czech Republic even managed to save 1.3 billion korunas in last year's budget expenditure. "The problem does not lie in squandering money, but in the decline in budget revenue, which last December alone was 200 million korunas less than the year before. This is the logical consequence of the fact that last year's gross national product did not decline by the envisaged 5 percent, but, according to the most recent statistical findings, by 16 percent," said the minister.

Spacek expressed his surprise that Klaus would provoke a discussion on the budget deficit now, at the beginning of January, as the final financial statement for last year will be made available in February and the closing account for 1991 will probably come onto the Czech National Council's [CNR] agenda in May. According to Minister Spacek, the deficit for the whole federation will not amount to the figure currently being expressed, 17.7 billion korunas. Agriculturists owe 5.2 billion korunas in deferred levies on income tax; there is a surplus of 6.3 billion korunas in community coffers in the Czech and Slovak Republics; Transgas will divert 2.7 billion korunas; and the Commercial Bank will divert 1.7 billion korunas. This amounts to 15.9 billion korunas altogether that will have to be deducted from the deficit of 17.7 billion korunas for the whole federation. Spacek diplomatically indicated that, without a solid analysis of the results of economic activity, Klaus' "colossal insult" is politically motivated. Minister Spacek does not discount the possibility that Klaus will demand "his head." "However, the CNR Presidium would have to make this decision if it or the plenum came to the conclusion that the Czech Government's financial policy was a bad one," he said in reply to a question from CESKE A MORAVSKOSLEZSKE ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY.

In its point of view regarding the results of budget management, the Civic Movement says, among other things, that "the budget system as a whole has a deficit because the federation subordinated some budget items to its political points of view. Subsidies on rents were not removed for obvious reasons; later, it acceded to the withdrawal of subsidies for heating and energy. Unrealistic preelection illusions are being unnecessarily aroused about the possibility of a turnaround this year." The Civic Movement is demanding cooperation, that the reform scenario be thoroughly adhered to, that the government's resolutions be fulfilled, that negotiations be conducted in time, and that reform be kept free of ideology.

Czech Minister's Resignation Accepted by CNR

AU1001110392 Prague CESKE A MORAVSKOSLEZSKE ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech 9 Jan 92 p 1

[CSTK report: "His Resignation Has Been Accepted"]

[Text] Prague—In accordance with Article 131 of the constitutional law on the Czechoslovak Federation, the Czech National Council [CNR] Presidium yesterday accepted the resignation of Justice Minister Leon Richter (Civic Movement) and thanked him for his work.

Czech Prime Minister Petr Pithart (Civic Movement) told journalists that the CNR Presidium will propose (at one of its future sessions) that Frantisek Houska, a Federal Assembly deputy representing the Civic Democratic Party [ODS], be appointed to the vacant post in the Czech Republic Government. He also stated that the ODS chairman had submitted the names of two other candidates for the post of justice minister, Federal Assembly Deputies Jiri Kovar and Filip Sedivy (both ODS).

Calfa Discusses Slovak Issues, Russian Visit

AU1301141592 Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak 11 Jan 92 p 1

[Interview with Federal Prime Minister Marian Calfa by Zuzana Zemlova; in Bratislava on 10 January: "Things Are Moving in the Right Direction"]

[Text] The Civic Democratic Union-Public Against Violence Party Slovak Council will convene a meeting in Bratislava today. Federal Prime Minister Marian Calfa, the council's deputy chairman, flew in for the meeting early yesterday evening. Despite being pressed for time, he was willing to grant our newspaper an interview and answer a few topical questions en route from the airport to Venturska Street.

[Zemlova] What is your assessment of recent developments on the Slovak political scene?

[Calfa] It seems to me that passions cooled down toward the end of the year. I do not know if this had anything to do with the Christmas holidays or if we just came to the conclusion that we can resolve issues in a more sensible fashion and without bitter pronouncements. I was very pleased that the Slovak National Council Presidium managed to agree on an equable proposal in Papiernicka so that the issues connected with the contents of the treaty [between the Czech and Slovak National Councils] can finally be resolved. I think it would be good for the treaty to be adopted and become the basis for our constitutional arrangement. I would be very pleased if talks between the national councils could be held soon and an agreement could be reached on the contents of the treaty and on the form and method of its adoption, because the sooner we do this, the better it will be for all of us—a huge weight will be removed from our shoulders and this would also be a fitting moment to conclude the discussion on the Slovak constitution. It appears from all of this that, perhaps, we have put our best foot forward and at the best speed.

[Zemlova] We were given the impression at Tuesday's [7 January] Slovak National Council Presidium session that points of contact were sought and not the things that divide the coalition and the opposition. Do you also have such an impression?

[Calfa] I have this impression and I must say that, right from the very beginning, my philosophy has been that it is essential to seek those things that unite us and not those that divide us. Unfortunately, there were times when reasons leading to division were accepted and not reasons that united us. Let us hope that this period has been overcome and that we realize we have more in common—and of more substance—than we think.

[Zemlova] Its seems that the opposition is also beginning somehow to realize this. Do you agree with this view?

[Calfa] I have felt from the beginning that the opposition's arguments contain no rational reasoning for the conclusions it has come to and I had the impression that its ears were not adjusted to listening to the rational arguments in favor of the starting points for the constitutional and legal arrangement that we put forward; now the issue is whether the opposition will have enough pluck to state that, after all, there was something in our points of view, attitudes, and arguments benefiting Slovakia and not a narrow group of bureaucrats worried about their positions.

[Zemlova] You will soon depart for Moscow, for a country different from the one you last visited—I think that, for you too, Russia must be a great unknown. What are your feelings as you prepare for this visit?

[Calfa] I would not put it like that. After all, we know President Yeltsin, we met with him before the collapse of the Soviet Union, and before that when he became Russian president. I had breakfast with him and the president of our Republic at our embassy last June during a session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee. Now we can talk about it openly. Although we talked about it at that time, the meeting did not attract the publicity it deserved in the Soviet Union, which was understandable. On the other hand, very many new people have appeared on the scene there. Although we know nothing about them, we have no reason to think that they are not competent people capable of dealing with issues on this level and capable of being equal partners.

[Zemlova] Nevertheless, we have outstanding claims that have not been fulfilled for many years....

[Calfa] We have outstanding financial claims there, the greater part of which is a credit agreement that we envisage will be repaid as of 1996. This amounts to $2 billion. Then we have integration projects there that amount to more than one billion convertible rubles. The third sum, a kind of balance of trade surplus, amounts to roughly $360 million.

Danco Views Slovak Tax Evasion, Laundering

AU1001134992 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 9 Jan 92 p 2

["mik"-signed report: "Sanctions To Be Applied; Tax Evasion Amounts to 2 to 3 Billion Annually"]

[Excerpts] Zilina— The objective of yesterday's aktiv of senior staff of internal revenue directorates and offices in Slovakia was to enhance tax discipline. The aktiv, which was held in the building of the Transportation and Communications College in Zilina, was attended by Slovak Minister of Finance Jozef Danco.

In connection with the deficit in the budget of the Slovak Republic for 1991, which exceeds 6 billion korunas, the minister drew attention to the widespread "production of costs" among enterprises and entrepreneurs, which allows them to reduce their tax obligation and to surrender lower levies to the state budget. J. Danco estimated the scale of tax evasion at 2 to 3 billion korunas annually. The amendment to the law on taxation authorities, which is expected to go into force in mid-February, enables internal revenue officials to apply more severe repressive measures. Whereas at present they can impose a maximum fine of 50,000 korunas, and can do so only through boards of trade, in the future they will be able to collect fines of up to 1 million korunas and do so directly. [passage omitted]

An acute threat is posed by money whose origin is not clean. Money from Arab countries and Africa is penetrating the CSFR. It came as a shock to many to learn that a certain African country has a package of 25 billion British pounds ready [sum as published] and offers a commission of 30 percent of this sum to those who manage to place this money in the CSFR. [passage omitted]

Slovak Presidium Approves Constitutional Setup

LD1001025292 Prague CSTK in English 1350 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Bratislava Jan 9 (CSTK)—Executive vice chairman chairman of the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) Jan Petrik today characterised as "very significant" Tuesday's [7 January] approval by the Slovak parliament presidium of a draft agreement for the Czech and Slovak Republics on Czechoslovakia's future constitutional setup.

"I expect that it will bring results at talks with the Czech partners", he told journalists.

No agreement on the country's future state setup has been reached between Czech and Slovak representatives, despite months of bilateral talks.

Petrik said that opposition parties in Slovakia have called the agreement a retreat from established Slovak positions, but he denied that this was the case. He said he believed it was the first time in the history of Czech and Slovak coexistence, excluding the years under communism, that Slovak politicians had come to a united position.

Chairman of the Hungarian Independent Initiative (MNI) Laszlo Nagy said that with the exception of deputies from the Slovak National Party (SNS), which calls for independence for Slovakia, the Slovak parliament presidium was able to concur on all controversial points in the agreement between the two republics.

The KDH, MNI, the Democratic Party (DS) and the Civic Democratic Union-Public Against Violence (ODU-VPN) are partners in the Slovak coalition government. The KDH is currently the most popular of the four, garnering a 13 per cent approval rating in a December poll.

Slovak Privatization Projects Process Assessed

AU1001122792 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 9 Jan 92 p 2

[S. Tomanek report: "The Projects Have To Be Resubmitted"]

[Text] Bratislava—Ivan Miklos, Slovak minister for the privatization and administration of national property, declared yesterday that Slovakia has overtaken the Czech lands in assessing privatization projects.

Ministry experts assessed 296 projects from 233 state enterprises before the end of December. Although their property is valued at 119 billion korunas, it is only worth 44 billion korunas after their liabilities are deducted. Almost all the privatization projects (including rival projects) have to be redrafted. The projects have several shortcomings in common—they were drawn up before property-related legal relations and restitution claims had been clarified and before the commercial code and the business law had been adopted. Despite this, within a couple of months, millions of citizens—without more in-depth information—should manifest their faith in the authors of coupon privatization by purchasing 1,000-koruna coupons. As the deadline of 31 January approaches, time is assuming the same value as gold. Literally, for some people....

People are still adopting a wait-and-see attitude. Of the 11 million people in the CSFR entitled to participate in this process, 525,300 Czech Republic citizens and 200,000 Slovak Republic citizens have purchased investment coupons. According to staff at the Privatization Ministry, these numbers are expected to increase exponentially by the end of January.

Privatization investment funds are becoming a determining phenomenon of coupon privatization. Unfortunately, the information flow is minimal here. However, this is mainly to these funds' advantage. To date, 184 of them have been approved in Slovakia. There are 271 privatization investment funds in the Czech lands, and it is expected that 340 will be established. The funds have to be registered before 21 January at special registration centers where they will be assigned an organization identification number. So far, more than 20 privatization investment funds have "guaranteed" registration in Slovakia.

Experiments Continue on Magion-3 Satellite

LD1101094192 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Czech 1100 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] An interesting space experiment called (Apex) involving the Intercosmos-25 satellite and Magion-3, which were launched on 18 December, is under way. Pavel Triska, candidate of sciences from the Geophysics Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, is on the line to give us more details.

[Triska] The Czechoslovak scientific satellite Magion-3 has been in orbit for two weeks already. During this time it has made a number of measurements of the characteristics of the atmosphere 440- 3,000 kilometers above the Earth. All its on-board equipment and systems were tested. It was confirmed that all its equipment is operational and is producing interesting scientific data.

Yesterday, Thursday, 9 January, the Magion-3 satellite trajectory correction system was used for the first time and tested at the same time. Its task is to bring this small satellite closer to the mother satellite, the large Intercosmos-25, in the second half of January. The purpose of bringing them closer together is to conduct measurements, by using Magion-3, of the effect of active plasma experiments, which is most intense in short distances from the plasma accelerator carried by the mother satellite.

Foreign scientists are receiving scientific data and are confirming the good quality of the results obtained by the Czechoslovak satellite Magion-3.

Calfa Views Economic Ties With CIS Republics

AU1401083092 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 10 Jan 91 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Prime Minister Marian Calfa by an unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "Eastern Debt: $4.5 Billion"]

[Text] [LIDOVE NOVINY] At the beginning of the year you declared that, "for the first time in the history of Czechoslovakia, oil is flowing without any contractual basis." We assume that this problem will be one of the key items on the agenda of your talks in Moscow.

[Calfa] Until 1990, Czechoslovakia's economic relations with the former USSR had been subject to long-term trade agreements concluded by the governments for five-year periods. Those agreements particularly provided for mutual deliveries of raw materials and fuels. These deliveries used to be specified in greater detail in annual trade protocols, on the basis of which the respective foreign trade enterprises used to conclude contracts. In view of the changes under way in the two countries, it was necessary to conclude a new agreement for 1991. This agreement, the intergovernmental agreement on trade and economic relations with the USSR, was signed on 17 December 1990. Until the end of 1991, oil supplies, too, were implemented on the basis of that agreement.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] How will they be implemented this year?

[Calfa] No analogous document has been concluded so far. It has not been possible, in view of the continuing profound changes in the state structures of the former USSR, to conclude with a signature the negotiations conducted so far at the level of the Ministries of Foreign Trade and Economy. At this moment, no contracts have been concluded at the level of organizations, either, although our side is striving to do so. Following a brief interruption toward the end of 1991, however, oil deliveries were resumed on 2 January 1992 in what is essentially the usual daily volume. As oil drilling is concentrated on the territory of the Russian Federation, the question of oil deliveries will be an important item on the agenda of the upcoming negotiations with President Yeltsin.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] Is it already clear whether individual republics will be able to export oil? What about other trade?

[Calfa] By achieving independence, the former Soviet republics have assumed jurisdiction over foreign trade, which, apparently, will also apply to oil exports. In view of the territorial distribution of oil resources, the Russian Federation will be our most important partner, plus the Ukraine as the country of transit. As for the foundations of mutual trade, they were laid, in fact, in the agreements between the CSFR Government and the USSR Government for 1991, in which transition was made toward accounting in freely convertible currencies on the basis of current world prices. In the interest of maintaining existing relations at a level indispensable for the economies of the two states, the agreement was reached to regulate a part of mutual deliveries at the central level in the form of indicative lists of goods.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] What is your assessment of the models of economic development in individual republics [of the former USSR]? Does Czechoslovakia have a coherent strategy for further economic relations with them?

[Calfa] In spite of the talks among representatives of the newly established independent states in Minsk where a uniform course of action on economic issues was agreed upon, no scenario has been worked out so far for the operation of the new economic system, and no models have been drafted for individual republics' economic development. The situation is complicated because the agreements of Minsk have not yet been fully accepted by the republics. It would be premature to make an overall assessment of the further development within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS]. The CSFR's approach, oriented even previously twoard individual republics and, in some cases even crucial oblasts, has proved to be correct. In developing this approach further, we are focusing on:

—transforming the agreements concluded at the level of the CSFR and USSR Governments into agreements with individual republics;

—identifying the basic development programs of the republics and considering the possibilities of our participation in them;

—establishing all conditions necessary for direct ties at the level of enterprises and trade companies;

—analyzing the impact of the republics' autonomous instruments of trade policy.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] The former USSR owes us roughly $4.6 billion. Has this debt been divided among individual republics?

[Calfa] At the beginning of December 1991, the debt of the former USSR toward Czechoslovakia amounted to $4.5 billion. Of this, $2 billion is accounted for by a government loan, the repayment of which is not due to start until 1996. Other indebtedness, amounting to 1.1 billion in transferable rubles, was generated by integration projects. The predominant part of this debt is being offset by supplies of natural gas. The unsettled claims of Czechoslovak subjects toward their partners in the former USSR for goods delivered in 1991 amount to approximately $360 million. As far as the division of the debts among individual republics is concerned, the principle of mutual guarantee for the liabilities of the former USSR toward foreign countries was accepted in the agreements concluded at the talks among CIS representatives at Minsk. We will also discuss these liabilities during my planned visit to Moscow.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] In your recent interview for LIDOVE NOVINY, you attributed a great role to the Ukraine, and you also stressed the importance and a certain sensitivity of relations between the Ukraine and Slovakia. What is your view on this issue following the Ukraine's independence?

[Calfa] As for my assessment of the Ukraine's role, it remains valid even after the recognition of its independence. The Ukraine wants to fully develop its state independence and cooperate with European states. There exist certain indications of its independent course of action, different from the one agreed upon within the CIS framework at Minsk. In our statements and in talks with Ukrainian representatives, we have declared the CSFR's interest in cooperation with the Ukraine. The relations of Slovakia with the Ukraine, as its direct neighbor, will be an important part of Czechoslovak cooperation with the Ukraine. In its relations with the Ukraine, the CSFR as a state has no interest in opening problems that might harm the prospects of mutual cooperation, despite the existence of political groups in the CSFR that are opening, for example, the issue of

Transcarpathian Ukraine [that was ceded by Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union in 1945].

Russian Ambassador on Relations, Need for Aid

LD1301115192 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Bratislava was visited today—and it should be noted for the first time in history—by Aleksandr Lebedev, the ambassador of the Russian Federation in Czechoslovakia. He was received before noon in the building of the Slovak parliament by the chairman, Frantisek Miklosko. Our colleague, Michal Michalcik, was present at the meeting.

[Begin Michalcik recording] I have several observations here. The first is that Mr. Lebedev speaks very good Czech, he did not need an interpreter, and so the talks were more comprehensive. In the introduction, he recalled a matter of interest from the not-so-distant past. After the demise of the Soviet Union, at the Prague Embassy of the, by then, Russian Federation, they searched in vain for a flag. Somebody then advised them to borrow a Slovak one, since it was exactly the same. The talks showed, however, that it is not only the state flag which we had in common.

Another observation: the Russian ambassador spoke very frankly about problems, especially economic ones, in which his country, as well as other independent states of the new Commonwealth, are mired at present. In this connection, I asked the ambassador what kind of prospects did he himself envisage, from the point of view of a representative of the Russian Federation, for the newly created Commonwealth.

[Lebedev in Russian fading to Slovak translation] I hope and believe that the recently created Commonwealth was not only the end of the old era, the end of the former Soviet Union. I believe that this Commonwealth will play its role. True, if it survives one or two years [changes thought] ... It will not, however, be an easy life. In contrast to the British Commonwealth, with which we are so often being compared, we have no Queen. The independent states of the Commonwealth are nevertheless politically, economicallly, culturally, and historically interconnected, maybe to an excessive degree, they are mutually interdependent. And these factors of integration, in my opinion, should function also in the new Commonwealth. No, I do not think that this should become some kind of new Union with central bodies, but rather something like today's European Communities with their coordinating bodies.

[Michalcik] We need not speak about the unenviable economic situation in Russia. Our citizens are, after all, expressing their stand by their humanitarian and economic help. Nevertheless, I asked the ambassador what they needed most of all in the Russian Federation at present.

[Lebedev in Russian fading to Slovak translation] To be sincere, we need everything, but specifically: first of all evaporated milk for children, medicine for the elderly, especially for cardiac patients and those suffering from influenza. Of course, we would refuse neither meat nor clothing. But it is not customary for a state finding itself in such a situation as we are today to be choosy.

[Michalcik] So that was Ambassador Aleksander Lebedev.

Our Slovak side is interested in establishing first contacts with deputies of the Russian Federation. Since this activity met with favorable responses at the other end too, the highest representatives of Slovakia and some deputies could, according to Ambassador Lebedev, visit Moscow and St. Petersburg as early as the second half of February. And a short while ago, the Russian ambassador was also received by the chairman of the Slovak Government, Jan Carnogursky. [end recording]

Foreign Ministry To Recognize SFRY Republics

LD1301223792 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2100 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] MTI earlier this evening reported that Hungary would recognize, this week, the independence of Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Macedonia. The Foreign Ministry spokesman, Janos Herman, is on the line.

[Herman] This cannot yet be stated so unequivocally. What is at issue is merely that the deadline set by the EC is approaching. Intensive consultations are taking place between the countries. It is natural that Hungary also has a part in these consultations, discussions.

All I can say with certainty at this moment is that the Hungarian decision, on the one hand, will not precede the EC decision. Secondly, it will fall in line with their decision. It will fall in line with the set of countries to be recognized, and naturally it will fall in line as regards the date.

If we make the decision, we naturally shall immediately give information about this. I can also say that we shall endeavor to make a decision rapidly when we are acquainted with the opinion of the EC countries, and we are acquainted with the steps of other states, too.

[Announcer] So what is at issue is that inasmuch as the EC foreign ministers decide now in Brussels, either today or tomorrow, that they will recognize the independence of only Croatia and Slovenia, then Hungary will do the same and the recognition of the independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia will not enter into the picture?

[Herman] Again, all I can say is that we are not familiar at this moment with what kind of decision the EC member states and other states will make, so I believe that it would be early for me now to make an unequivocal statement on this.

[Announcer] How should we consider this MTI statement, which appears unequivocal? Did someone in the Foreign Ministry speak precisely in this manner, or did the news agency misinterpret it?

[Herman] I believe that my statement was interpreted in this manner.

Delegation Meets Croatian Prime Minister

LD1101204292 Budapest MTI in English 1946 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] Budapest, January 10 (MTI)—Croatia may enlist Hungarian participation for some reconstruction work before their war ends. A Hungarian delegation met in Zagreb today with Croatian Prime Minister Franjo Greguric, the three ministers and the Croatian chamber of commerce president. Gyorgy Karikas, a ministry of industry and trade senior official who headed the delegation, said the visit aimed at intensifying long-term economic cooperation with Croatia. Surveys estimate the buildings and infrastructure damaged by war will cost about 20 billion USd to repair. Hungary is ready to deliver various construction materials, such as cement and concrete. Earlier, trade between Hungary and Croatia logged about 200 million USd. Good relations and economic conditions of the countries offer a chance for continued cooperation. Also, Karikas said about other work in Croatia, factory restoration offers a good investment opportunity for Hungarian entrepreneurs.

Jeszenszky To Attend USSR Aid Conference

LD0701175392 Budapest MTI in English 1443 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text] Budapest, January 7 (MTI)—"The most efficient ways for Hungary to help aid the Soviet Union's successor states is to deliver goods and provide services and know-how under certain financial conditions," says a Hungarian Foreign Ministry statement issued before an upcoming Washington conference on aid to the former Soviet Union.

At the conference, scheduled for 22 and 23 January, Hungary will be represented by Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky, foreign affairs spokesman Janos Herman said at a press briefing today.

"In coordinating a comprehensive aid project, G-24 countries and other states having the necessary financial resources will have to take into account the special situation in our region and the challenges of the transition period we are living in. Therefore, we are counting on the G-24 to extend further support under a tripartite cooperation serving equally the interests of donors and recipients. Such a cooperation will make it possible for our region to directly contribute to Western aid projects, as we have already done on several occasions," the statement runs.

"Hungary is ready to take part in all multilateral aid projects to deliver goods and services, including various forms of technical aid, to republics and regions of the former Soviet Union, against appropriate payment.

"The Hungarian Government expects Western aid to the Soviet Union's successor states not to affect the size and forms of Western support for the East-Central European region," the statement says.

On January 16, Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky is to make a brief visit to Moldova to sign an agreement on the establishment of diplomatic ties with his Moldovan counterpart, Herman said.

After Russia, the Ukraine and Moldova, diplomatic ties will also be established with Belarus, during a visit by the Belarus foreign minister to Hungary in the near future, Herman said.

Ready To Represent Visegrad Triangle

AU1301115692 Budapest MTI in English 0816 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] Budapest, 10 January (MTI)—Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky is ready to act as spokesman for the Visegrad Triangle (Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia), at the two-day conference scheduled to open in Washington on January 22, foreign affairs spokesman Janos Herman said, in an interview in Friday's daily, MAGYAR HIRLAP.

Foreign ministers of 47 countries and representatives of several major international financial organisations are to discuss ways to coordinate assistance to the Soviet successor states.

Poland's ambassador to Washington proposed to authorize the Hungarian foreign minister, in the course of a meeting between the ambassadors of the three countries accredited to the United States. Herman said the joint position is to be coordinated with Prague and Warsaw over the next days.

Jeszenszky Calls Nastase on Tokes Death Threat

AU1001154192 Budapest MTI in English 2050 GMT 8 Jan 92

[Text] Budapest 8 Jan (MTI)—Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky this evening telephoned his Romanian counterpart Adrian Nastase and anxious about the death threat made to Laszlo Tokes, Calvinist Bishop of Oradea, a foreign ministry spokesman told MTI.

Nastase said the threat must come from a troublemonger or mental handicap. The circles behind the culprit must have an interest in preventing an improvement in Hungarian-Romanian relations, Nastase said.

Jeszenszky pressed for detecting the culprit as soon as possible since such actions fail to improve Hungarian-Romanian relations.

State Secretary Views Foreign Policy

AU1001144592 Budapest 168 ORA in Hungarian 7 Jan 92

[Interview with Tamas Katona, political state secretary at the Foreign Affairs Ministry, by Gyorgy Nika in Budapest on 4 January: "Foreign Policy on More Than One Pillar"]

[Text] "The world should have paid attention to Hungary's policy on the Soviet Union in 1990." The BBC's Hungarian broadcast quoted this sentence from Tamas Katona late on the night of 3 January. Katona added that because of its own circumstances Hungary could not undertake to feed a dying mammoth, but it could be a springboard for Western aid for the states that are becoming independent. Gyorgy Nika interviewed Tamas Katona, the guest of radio program 168 Ora, on Hungarian foreign policy, which was declared to be a definitely successful sector at the national meeting of the biggest government party a few weeks ago.

[Nika] The former Soviet republics are already having disputes and Yugoslavia has also fallen apart. Hungarian foreign policy has to prepare itself for conducting its business with an ever increasing number of countries. Is it possible to prepare for this?

[Katona] We have been preparing for this for a year and a half. Hungarian foreign policy was the only one in Europe to recognize already in the summer of 1990 that these fossil unions could not be kept together in their old form. If, of their own accord, the unions had given serious decisionmaking rights to the various republics in the area of politics and the economy, there would have been some kind of chance for their survival. Since this did not happen, the unions of states were bound to disintegrate. I conducted negotiations with the Ukrainian foreign affairs minister as early as in August 1990, and [Foreign Affairs Minister] Geza Jeszenszky signed nine agreements and protocols between Hungary and the Ukraine in the spring of 1991. We were preparing for this and proclaimed this, although the educated West viewed our opinion with a certain amount of pity and the kindly patience given to the feeble-minded.

A Model That Can Be Followed

[Nika] However, the now emerging successor states are not uniform but oppose each other—or, at least they are unwilling to cooperate. In this case, how is it possible to maintain or maybe enhance relations with two countries that have good relations with us but not with each other?

[Katona] We have to find the points that are common in these countries, in spite of their conflicts. This is the unavoidable stimulus to join, the desire to become part of Europe. This is present in all countries and we also have the same policy. Therefore, we already have a point where we can come to an understanding with them separately. The other point is that these countries' borders with Hungary are of considerable length and we have serious economic interests in them and vice versa. Therefore, the other point of cooperation is economic interest.

[Nika] Analysts often say that two tendencies exist in Hungarian foreign policy. According to one, our task is to join European integration, while, according to the other, we should develop into some kind of a regional large or small power by exploiting the uncertainty that exists in the other countries.

[Katona] The Ukraine is here for that. Of course we cannot develop into a regional small or medium-sized power! We do not even have such an absurd desire. As a nice, calm, and hopefully increasingly wealthy country, we would like to become a useful example that can be followed. Compared to the others, we do have some advantage because our transformation started earlier.

This is not only an honor. This also means that we will make the mistakes on this untrodden road and the others will learn from these. Nevertheless, our aim is to present a model for the late starters.

Masterly Change of Directions

[Nika] When our system began to be changed two years ago, a foreign policy based on several pillars began, which—if I remember correctly—first started with a strong Hungarian-German cooperation, and continued with Hungarian-U.S. cooperation. The two did not always progress in parallel with each other and, in the meantime, we opened toward Latin America and South-East Asia, at least in our foreign policy and diplomacy. At what stage is this multi-pillar foreign policy now?

[Katona] I believe that from the beginning Hungarian foreign policy used the ugly foreign term of having to diversify. Yes, for example, we have to diversify our energy resources and the sources of their supply. It obviously would not have been wise to create another similar dependence after our one-sided dependence. Our government never intended to conduct a one-sided policy. Therefore, right from the beginning, we strived for a coordinated use of various possibilities. In the beginning, the opposition often accused the government of one-sided German orientation, and this was replaced by a one-sided German-French orientation, as Miklos Szabo put it. In my view, this simply comes from the fact that geography has its own rules. It is obvious that Germany was able to enter the Hungarian economy faster and to play a larger role than the others, especially at a time when it did not have to struggle with the new provinces. However, France was also quick to wake up, although it did not have such traditions in the Hungarian economy and politics. In addition, the United States, the only world power that is left, is also present in the Hungarian economy through its investments. A number of European countries also are offering good possibilities for cooperation. More distant areas were interesting for us because we needed somewhere to sell the goods that we had produced for the Soviet or East German markets until then.

It was very hard to sell these goods anywhere else. We did not manage to do this in Latin America, either. Therefore, we simply had to change and to try to have a more complex trade with these countries, too. Hungary's foreign economic relations implemented this change of direction in a masterly way.

[Nika] Hungary will be a non-permanent member of the Security Council for two years starting in 1992. Obviously, a foreign ministry starts the preparations much earlier than when the actual fact is announced. Are there any concrete ideas as regards the Security Council membership?

[Katona] I believe that the fact that the world is increasingly interested in the changes happening on the territory of the former Soviet Union and in the handling and management of the Yugoslav crisis will upgrade the position of Hungarian diplomacy in the Security Council, too, because Hungary, which is in the immediate vicinity of both these areas, has acquired reliable information. We obviously have to let our opinion be heard on these issues, in accordance with the size of our country and the nature of our neighbors, which obliges us to have good cooperation with these countries—in other words, quiet but determined cooperation. Well, we have done our best to strengthen this mission.

Border Violation Figures Published for 1991

AU1401132892 Budapest MTI in English 1745 GMT 12 Jan 92

[Text] Budapest, 12 January (MTI)—"Last year 30,000 border violators were arrested in Hungary, slightly more than double the 1990 figure," Lieutenant-Colonel Zoltan Fazekas from the Interior Ministry's Border Guard told MTI's correspondent.

The border violators were from 100 countries, including 18,000 Romanians, 3,000 Turks, and nearly 2,000 Pakistanis. Five hundred human runners [traffickers in human beings] were also arrested. The Hungarian border guard has knowledge about the successful fleeing of 5,251 persons from Hungary, of whom 5,043 were returned by the authorities of the neighbouring countries, mainly Austria.

In 1991, chiefly in connection with the civil war in Yugoslavia, 143 gun smugglers were caught with the help of customs officers, and 1,500 guns and 44,000 ammunition confiscated.

Of the 10,000 Yugoslav citizens asking for temporary shelter, over 2,600 had returned to their country by the end of December.

Last year 102 million passports were checked on the Hungarian borders, 9 percent fewer than in 1990. At the same time, traffic on the Austrian border rose by 28 percent, while the number of passengers on the Yugoslav border decreased to a similar extent. The largest drop, 50 percent, was registered in Hungarian-Soviet passenger traffic.

Accord To Return Violators Expected

AU1401103292 Budapest MTI in English 1707 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] Budapest, 10 Jan (MTI)—Hungary is to agree with all its neighbours how to hand over persons expelled from their country, Government Spokeswoman Judit Juhasz said today.

Presently, Hungary has agreements with Czechoslovakia, Romania, the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, but they say only persons captured in the immediate border region can be turned back.

An agreement between Austria and Hungary for border violators says persons from third countries to be taken back to their country of origin. There must be proceedings launched within 72 hours and evidence the person was legally staying in the original country.

Most fleeing from Hungary to the West are from Romania. Since there is no agreement with Romania, Hungary cannot send people back to Romania. Transport costs home are to be covered by Hungary.

Between January and November 1991, over 28,000 border violators were turned back from Hungary, costing over 100 million forints. Among those expelled, there were 17,646 Romanians, 1,602 Pakistanis, 2,807 Turks, 625 Indians, 450 Ghanaians, 552 Bangladeshis, and 573 Yugoslavs, and other Africans and Asians.

Hungary, Romania, and the former Soviet Union signed an agreement at a conference about illegal entry. Hungary accepted the obligation to take back all border violators leaving the country. Also bilateral and multilateral agreements are to be concluded for the quick transport of those expelled and those taken back.

In another matter, Juhasz announced upcoming bills on agreements with Brazil and South Korea eliminating double taxation.

Antall, Estonia's Savisaar on Future Cooperation

LD1201102292 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 8 Jan 92

[Text] Hungary wishes to build especially close relations with the related Finnish and Estonian peoples, and believes Finno-Ugrian tripartite cooperation in certain fields is possible. Jozsef Antall said this at the first Hungarian-Estonian prime ministerial meeting.

During his lightning visit to Budapest, Edgar Savisaar said Tallin would like to use Hungarian knowledge on Soviet troop withdrawals and privatization. Jozsef Antall promised help for this and suggested that a joint committee be set up as soon as possible to assess Hungarian-Estonian relations and to vitalize the relationship, which was merely nominal during the decades of the Soviet Empire.

Antall Speaks at War Memorial Ceremony

LD1201183992 Budapest MTI in English 1937 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Text] Budapest, January 11 (MTI)—To mark the anniversary of the January 1943 Voronezh breakthrough which brought the destruction of the Second Hungarian Army, a memorial session was held in the Budapest Museum of Military History on Saturday.

Addressing the meeting, Prime Minister Jozsef Antall cited the national moral cohesion and patriotism that characterized the Second Hungarian Army fighting in the Don bend as an example to be followed in today's army, civil life and the political field.

Assessing the former Soviet-type East European system, Antall stated that these countries deserve not be treated as Europe's back hen-yard, any longer. They have loved the Western democracies all through unanswered and actually won the West the third world war without a shot, the prime minister added. [Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian at 1800 GMT on 11 January, in a brief report on this speech, added that "according to Jozsef Antall, Hungary during World War II was in a dire situation and could only choose between the German and Soviet alternatives. So we have to break with the feeling of guilt forced on us."]

Official on Privatization, Plans for 1992

LD1401103492 Budapest MTI in English 1537 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Budapest, January 13 (MTI-ECONEWS)—Up to December 31 1991, only 10 per cent of the book value of what former state assets, were in the hands of Hungarian private entrepreneurs.

The 40-billion-forint privatization income target for 1991 was met, with the SPA [State Propery Agency] cashing precisely 40.118 billion forints on privatized assets, 85 per cent of which was hard currency. This was announced today by the managing director of the State Property Agency Lajos Csepi. With company profitability figures worsening, the SPA does not expect more than 40-50 billion forints, worth of privatizations to take place in 1992, Csepi said.

Foreign capital investment in privatized Hungarian businesses was 770 million USD, just under 60 per cent of all foreign investment in 1991. This represented a 40-per-cent foreign share in joint ventures.

Some 20 per cent of the state assets, about 370 billion forints according to book value, was privatized in 1991, with 50 per cent of the privatized property in the hands of private investors.

Last year the SPA approved the conversion of 189 state companies, with another 307 still in progress on the last day of 1991, Csepi said. Twenty companies carried out self-privatization and another 353 minor companies launched self-privatization last year.

Csepi suggested at the same time that Hungarians would only be encouraged to invest by radical changes in domestic credit facilities.

Csepi said the SPA will continue to decentralize the privatization process.

The 100-150 state companies which are to remain state-owned will be put under the control of the state ownership institute, while bankruptcy proceedings will be launched against 80-120 companies, he said.

The principal aim this year is to begin the privatization of the banking and telecommunications systems, Csepi said, as both industries are vital to the country's economic performance.

The privatization of the telecommunications industry is expected to require between 1 and 3 billion US dollars (70-200 billion forints) of foreign capital, which the SPA calculates will generate 200-300 billion forints, worth of domestic demand.

The SPA recommends that a considerable proportion of privatization income be ploughed back into the economy through the employment, restructuring and environmental funds and submitted a proposal to this effect to the government last December, Csepi said.

The SPA plans 3-4 major public share issues this year to encourage private investors to buy shares in privatized businesses, he added without elaborating.

Walesa Invites Ukraine's Kravchuk To Visit

LD1301225992 Warsaw PAP in English 2144 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 13—President Lech Walesa invited on Monday [13 January] President of the Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk to pay an official visit to Poland. No date for the visit has been specified yet.

In a letter conveyed to Kravchuk, Walesa pointed to numerous common interests linking both countries.

In another letter, addressed to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, President Walesa asked for the return of Polish archives taken away from Poland by the NKVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] during World War II and after its end.

"The return to Poland of all our archives would be a sign of changes taking place in our relations," Walesa wrote.

The president also asked for access for Polish researchers to Soviet documents on Polish POWs murdered by the NKVD in the camps of Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostaszkow.

Walesa Meets With Diplomatic Corps in Warsaw

LD1301175792 Warsaw TVP Television Network in Polish 1830 GMT 9 Jan 91

[Excerpts] [Announcer] For the second time during his presidency, President Lech Walesa has met the diplomatic corps at the Royal Castle in Warsaw.

[Correspondent] Poland maintains diplomatic relations with 147 states. There are 75 diplomatic representatives accredited to Warsaw. After Poland's recognition of the Commonwealth of Independent States, there will probably be 11 more. The meeting was attended by the Sejm and Senate speakers, the prime minister, and members of the government.

[Begin Walesa recording] The country of which I have been the president desires good and partner-like cooperation with the states of all continents. It has been our particular desire to maintain friendly relations with all neighbors, in the east and the west, in the north and in the south.

The last months of last year brought intensified contacts with the East. Poland signed a declaration on good-neighborliness with Belarus; initialed a treaty on the withdrawal of Soviet troops; has been in the process of negotiating a treaty with Ukraine; has prepared a draft of a treaty with Russia; and was the first to recognize Ukraine. I deeply believe that an extensive and fruitful cooperation in all fields will develop between Poland and the states beyond our eastern border. We declare honest will and pure intentions. [end recording]

Solidarity Union Stages Strike Against Prices

Enterprises Launch Protests

LD1301225292 Warsaw PAP in English 2124 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 13 —As the Solidarity union staged a nation-wide warning strike against the recent price hikes on energy on Monday [13 January], crews of several Polish enterprises launched independent protests over pay issues.

In the south-western city of Wroclaw nearly whole crew of the PZL-Hydral aircraft factory started a sit-in Monday [13 January] morning to protest against the disastrous condition of the Polish aircraft industry.

The workers demand payment of overdue remunerations, higher wages and the employment of all the crew as further 750 employees are to be dismissed in addition to 250 already laid off.

Also the crew of Philips Lighting Poland in the north-western town of Pila decided Monday to launch a strike over pay issues as the arbitration court had failed to settle the dispute between the workers and the company's board of directors.

Meanwhile, the strike committee in the textile machine factory "Majed" in the central city of Lodz dissolved itself on Monday as the crew received December wages and was promised to get remaining remunerations by the end of this month.

In Warsaw several dozen unionists from the Solidarity road maintenance section demonstrated in front of the Transport Ministry on Monday against the inconsiderate reorganization of local road units.

According to leader of the section Andrzej Tracz, the unionists did not want to boycott economic reforms but they disapproved of illegal and harmful measures which increase unemployment among road workers.

The demonstrators conveyed a petition to Transport Minister Ewaryst Waligorski demanding cancellation of the decision on changes in the road sector until the law on public roads is amended. They also demanded higher means from the budget to cover costs of road maintenance.

In another development, the radical Solidarity-80 union from 12 mines and mining enterprises in the south-western region of Silesia demanded an immediate dismissal of Industry Minister Andrzej Lipko whom they hold responsible for "the present situation of the mines and the people working in them."

According to Solidarity-80, Lipko, "both as leader of the Solidarity mining commission and deputy minister in the Jan Krzysztof Bielecki cabinet, sabotaged the interests of miners by representing the interests and participating in the implementation of the World Bank policy on the Polish mining industry."

The union also demanded taking to account all those responsible for the implementation of the Balcerowicz plan which "proved murderous to the whole Polish nation and industry, the sign of it being the recent price hikes on energy and gas, and further rises, already waiting to be announced."

"By meeting these demands, Jan Olszewski's government may show its good will and honest intentions," the union said in a statement.

Chairman Urges Increase Suspension

LD1401105792 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 0600 GMT 14 Jan 92

[Excerpts] According to Solidarity chairman Marian Krzaklewski, Monday's [13 January] protest demonstrated that the union was strong. The strike showed the large scale of the resistance to the way in which energy price increases were introduced. Marian Krzaklewski thinks the best thing would be for the government to consider the range and determination of the protest, suspend the increase and start comprehensive talks with the union. [passage omitted]

Marian Krzaklewski also rejected the suggestion that the strike was directed against Jan Olszewski's government. Solidarity, the head of the union added, did not play political games. The strike could help the government as public discontent grows. We know that a change of government is pointless.

Marian Krzaklewski also thinks that during the negotiations with the government another approach to obtaining the necessary sum of 1.5 billion zlotys for the budget could be found, as well as explaining to the trade unionists the need to save the state budget. The Solidarity chairman avoided answering a question on a possible general strike. He said the union was awaiting the results of the Tuesday's [14 January] talks with the government, while on Wednesday [15 January] the national commission would adopt a position.

Walesa Assesses Economic Problems

LD1301200192 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1800 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Remarks by President Lech Walesa on 13 January; place not given—recorded]

[Text] As far as present strikes are concerned I would say this: If I were a worker and not the president in the year I have been president, then this [latest strike] would have probably been not a third or a fourth but the fifteenth strike. Matters and reforms are being run so badly. So few matters are being settled that seeing what is happening in Poland, I would protest at least three times more often. Really, we have made a great revolution; the elites which gained power did not have an idea about governing. Of course we counted on the West's understanding very strongly, and we forgot about the simple truth that the western system is being led by simple rules—the rules of business. And at the time when our enterprises are still of the post-communist type, incapable, ineffective, of low production capability, the West has flooded us [words indistinct].

Briefly speaking, instead of us making profit on our production, instead of getting on with production, well, we made the revolution for the West [word indistinct]. It is the West, western factories, enterprises, and institutions that profited most on our revolution, pushing [words indistinct] whatever had been nicely packaged and [words indistinct]. We have not defended our market at all, and now the time has come to reflect on this because it bounces back against us.

In our revolution we were very romantic, and today we are bearing great costs. But there are also pluses in such a situation. Seeing what is happening we must, as it were, change production profiles, production technology much quicker, but to put it briefly this is a bit more expensive than [words indistinct]. Our society (?knows) how to carry on with this fight, and knows that it is right being dissatisfied. Therefore, this protest must not be stopped; it needs to be led into creative directions [words indistinct], explanations, ways of making use of it to put it briefly, but at the same time acknowledging that [words indistinct]

Spokesman Cites Government Reaction

LD1301162192 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1510 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] The press spokesman for Solidarity said a moment ago that the trade union is now waiting for the reaction of the government regarding the strike actions today. We already have the first reaction. Here is Marcin Gugulski, the press spokesman for the government:

[Begin Gugulski recording] The government is treating the protest action today, carried out by the independent self-governing trade union [NSZZ] Solidarity, as an expression of protest against the results of the economic and social policies carried on in recent years, and also in relation to the impunity with which economic and financial scandals have taken place. The state of the country is difficult and the future uncertain. Cooperation on the best solutions is required.

We confirm the already many times repeated obligation to carry on the necessary consultations with the trade unions. The protest today confirms and supports us in this intent. The government is aware of all the inadequacies that today touch especially the poorest families and social groups, and will do everything that is in its power, insofar as the financial condition of the state allows, to protect the poorest.

Prime Minister Jan Olszewski has proposed to the trade unions frank talks on the subject of an accord guaranteeing the implementation of a minimum of obligations in the sphere of welfare entitlements, health care, and education. We wish to undertake these talks as quickly as possible. A positive reaction by workers' representatives, including in this NSZZ Solidarity, allows one to believe that this is possible, that we will find in these talks the best method for the improvement of our fate, especially that of those Polish families for whom assistance is most required.

The government also remembers the obligation it has taken on itself to undertake the struggle against abuses and financial scandals. Proposals for concrete steps will be considered at the coming sessions of the Council of Ministers. More energetic activities will be undertaken on the part of the investigative authorities. The time of impunity is coming to an end. [end recording]

Olszewski Contacts Solidarity Leader

LD1301165192 Warsaw PAP in English 1606 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Katowice, Jan. 13—Prime Minister Olszewski contacted the Solidarity leader, Marian Krzaklewski, on Monday [13 January] informing him that the cabinet would be adopting a position regarding the Solidarity demands at its next meeting on Tuesday, Jan. 14.

But it did not seem that the government intended to rescind the price hikes, according to the Solidarity National Commission (KK) spokesman Andrzej Adamczyk.

Solidarity wants the government to make an announcement on Tuesday "if not that the recent price increases have been rescinded, then at least on negotiations with the KK", said Adamczyk.

The KK resolved on Monday that it would enter into negotiations on condition that the price rises were suspended.

Meanwhile, factory commissions from 12 mines and mining enterprises from the Union Solidarity-80, a radical splinter of Solidarity, want the Minister of Trade and Industry, Andrzej Lipko, to be removed from office.

They state that "he is responsible for the present situation in the mines and the people working in them", according to information received by PAP from the regional organisation commission of Solidarity-80 in Katowice, Upper Silesia.

Olszewski To Broaden Cabinet 'Political Basis'

LD1201093792 Warsaw PAP in English 2055 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 11—Prime Minister Jan Olszewski told his Centre Alliance (PC) party Saturday [11 January] that he considered it the pillar of his government, but at the same time he was convinced that the political basis of his cabinet should be broadened.

Olszewski took part in a meeting of the PC main political council devoted largely to political and economic issues of the country.

In his 30-minute address to the gathering the prime minister did not rule out the possibility of building "a new, more stable political configuration that would support the government." The main criterion in forming such a coalition would be the "sense of responsibility for the state expected from the potential partners," Olszewski declared.

PC leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski claimed that the scale of threats now facing the state, its economy and its people is so great that Poland needs a "government of national salvation" rather than a government based according to ideological, centre-right criteria.

Even though not everyone on the council agreed with Kaczynski's opinion, the council in principle approved the to-date policy of the party, PC spokesman Ludwik Dorn told newsmen.

Asked about PC's stand on strikes declared by the Solidarity unions Kaczynski said he was against it, all the more so as they would not change the situation in the least.

Olszewski Comments on Budget Problems, Economy

LD1201131292 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1125 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Interview with Prime Minister Jan Olszewski by Nina Michalska; place and date not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [Michalska] Mr. Prime Minister, you have taken office in an immensely difficult situation. Apart from our economic conditions, which are universally known, I am thinking about the legacy you inherited: an interim budget, empty coffers, and price increases for electricity and hot water, which in turn resulted in a wave of strikes and announcements of more to follow. In view of social pressures, do you see a possibility of any government concessions?

[Olszewski] Madam, we have inherited not only empty coffers, but something even worse: a huge packet of legal committments to society that are weighing heavily on the government and the state budget. But the plain truth is that the state coffers will not be able to meet, will not be able to sustain, those committments. Even if we tried to meet only essential needs—those that all groups have a right to—the budget, the state's financial system, would simply collapse. There is now a need, an urgent need, to work out some form of social agreement in which an essential standard of welfare and aid for the poorest groups—the groups that have to receive protection from the state—and, as it were, a limit to budget committments in this area, would be defined. Otherwise there will simply be a collapse of the system of public finance, a collapse of the state budget, and a collapse of the economy.

The government's task in the present conditions is, first and foremost, not to let that catastrophe occur. And, in view of this, when strike demands exceed the minimum that can be met, the government simply cannot give in. Here the forms of pressure, their intensity, cannot, unfortunately, be a factor in any political calculation. The government has simply to choose either to meet its basic tasks—to save the country and save the economy in this most difficult period, getting through this most difficult period—in which case it cannot give in, or to give in and contribute to bringing about this catastrophe. Well, I have to say that I am resolute not to be responsible for causing this catastrophe under any circumstance. If it turns out that the government will not be able to fulfill its tasks, it should just clearly present this situation to the Sejm and the president, and hand further action to those who would, in such a situation, take responsibility for the state.

[Michalska] Mr. Prime Minister, the wave of financial scandals does not improve social attitudes. Apart from the fact that there are definite sums of money involved that are flowing out or have flown out of the state treasury, they also have an immense influence on social attitudes because it is known how such things agitate society, which is reaching the bottom, or maybe even below the bottom, of its endurance. Does the government envisage in the near future any legal initiatives or other countermeasures to put a stop to this?

[Olszewski] Yes, economic scandals, the so-called grey sphere of our whole economy, were a phenomenon that occurred throughout the 40-odd years of communist rule. However, those phenomena have taken on a new quality in the past two years simply because there has been a collapse in the efficiency of the state, which under new conditions, but with the old communist structures, is not able to fulfill its tasks, and at the same time gives in to the advancing demoralization.

At the moment we are dealing with, as it were, something like a collapse of this apparatus. Basic decisions are not being made, we are dealing with a large margin of error referring to contradictory rules that are concurrently legally binding. The situation is such that in this context, when privatization processes which are practically uncontrolled are taking place, and when this apparatus has at its disposal huge amounts of public assets—which are the subject of those privatization processes—well, in such a situation immensely favorable conditions appear for the flourishing of such phenomena as corruption, economic scandals, and various forms of the embezzlement of public assets.

Well, I think that at the moment there is nothing else for us to do but to take up a very resolute and immediate fight against them. The government has already passed drafts of the so-called anticorruption law, which will be submitted to the Sejm in the coming days. It introduces limitations on people performing public functions taking advantage of those functions in running any other form of private economic activity. This is only the initial step in the actions that we will have to take.

But I am aware that even the most severe repressions, and one has to make use of the repressive apparatus, will not lead to an eradication of this phenomenon as long as we do not change the state structure itself. This is the next step the government has to take—it must begin to press ahead with reform in spite of the fact that pushing it in the present economic conditions is extremely difficulty. But we have no other choice.

From this point of view, to a considerable degree, two years have been wasted and we can wait no longer. In the near future we will proceed to restructure (?both) the organizational apparatus and the government itself, and I think that if this operation succeeds, if we can carry it through within a certain time, only then will it guarantee a breakthrough of those pathological phenomena we were discussing.

[Michalska] The near future will require a lot of self-denial, strength and immense political wisdom on your part. Are you an optimist? Can you foresee if you can manage?

[Olszewski] Madam, if I was a pessimist I would not be here today at all. For the moment we are somehow managing. Let us also hope for the same in the future.

[Michalska] Mr. Prime Minister, I therefore wish you a lot of resilience and thank you very much.

Skubiszewski Explains Foreign Ministry Budget Cuts

AU1301104892 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 10 Jan 92 p 5

['Krzem'-signed report: "Minister Travels In Economy Class"]

[Text] A cut in the Foreign Ministry budget by two-thirds for the first quarter of 1992 means that "we will continue to exist, but we are not going to do any work," according to Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski.

Skubiszewski, who was speaking at a meeting of the Senate Foreign Affairs Commission this week, said that the interim budget prepared by the previous government and approved by the present one gives the Foreign Ministry only 184 billion zlotys [Z] for the first quarter of the year, instead of the Z340 billion the ministry needs.

If the Foreign Ministry does not obtain additional funds (experts in the Senate commission think the ministry needs at least another Z63 billion), we will be unable to open new embassies, pay membership dues to international organizations, receive foreign delegations, or send our diplomats on foreign trips, said the minister.

Cooperation with NATO and with regional groups like the Polish-Czechoslovak-Hungarian triangle or the Hexagonale will be suspended.

The financial cuts will apply to virtually all spheres and will result in pay cuts inside the ministry.

It was suggested during the Senate commission meeting that extra funds for the Foreign Ministry could be won by abolishing trade missions, which are relics of the time when the state enjoyed a monopoly over trade.

Even last year something happened that is very curious by world standards. The foreign minister actually went on one of his foreign trips alone, and in economy class.

Peasant Alliance Urges Regional Economic Approach

PM1401100092 Wroclaw GAZETA ROBOTNICZA in Polish 30 Dec 91 p 5

[Interview with Wieslaw Wlusek of Peasant Alliance (Wroclaw Branch) by correspondent Lidia Rozycka; place and date not given]

[Text] [Rozycka] "Today we need a common economic table around which we can solve our problems independently and in the best ways we can devise; as to ideological considerations, they should be realized within the work of individual political parties." These were the words with which you ended our previous interview, which appeared in GAZETA ROBOTNICZA on 25 November 1991. I would like to return to that statement of yours now and to ask whether you are still convinced that we need that common economic "table."

[Wlusek] I certainly am. I was even further reinforced in my conviction by a meeting which took place a few days after our conversation on the initiative of the Peasant Alliance. To tell the truth, I wondered whether anyone would answer the invitation to that meeting. As it turned out, representatives of seven political parties from the Wroclaw region came to the meeting. As was to be expected, the participants in the meeting represented different views on many questions, but they all agreed that it was possible to identify areas of agreement which should be discussed as soon as possible.

[Rozycka] What were these areas?

[Wlusek] Regionalization, privatization, and unemployment. We must jointly consider and work out new methods of achieving transformations in the economic structure of our region—methods which will not cause such confusion as those which were applied before. After all, we must think of what is more advantageous: to wind up enterprises and pay unemployment benefits to those made redundant, or to subsidize the enterprise until a suitable restructuring program has been prepared. Perhaps it would be advisable to start training employees in new jobs? There are very many questions and proposed solutions of this kind. The thing is to think about the problems first and if necessary liquidate enterprises later. Never the other way round.

[Rozycka] Regionalization is a very trendy topic these days....

[Wlusek] Not just trendy! We may not be aware of it yet, but the fact of our membership of the Council of Europe and our associate EEC membership already imposes certain solutions and defines a certain broad framework. Despite being united within the EEC, Western Europe is very highly regionalized. However, the "framework" I am talking about concerns mainly economic matters. In practical terms, we have been given 10 years to adjust our economy and our legislation to Western models.

[Rozycka] You must know that many people are irritated by such an approach. They maintain that we are virtually selling out Poland and its vital interests....

[Wlusek] Our strategy is not dictated by the wish to sell out Poland. After all, it is not the EEC that needs us. On the contrary, it is Poland which wants to join the civilized world through its EEC membership. This is why it is necessary to guard, even at the very start, against all wasteful misuse of able and talented people. My own definition of our needs is this: We must open up to success.

[Rozycka] But this is another thing that Poles, on the whole, dislike. Anyone who achieves success in any area becomes immediately and automatically suspect....

[Wlusek] Unless we change this attitude, the future will be hard for us all. In Western Europe all initiative, whether coming from an individual, a group of people, or maybe even a whole enterprise, is immediately put to good use. We must have the same chances and the same approach here.

[Rozycka] You are talking about chances. These have often been squandered here. And still, despite the many changes that have taken place, people with initiative keep encountering many difficulties. I would even venture to claim that the real "lords and masters" of our new ideas and new initiatives are the administrative officials. Not just high-level regional officials in the voivodship office, either, but officials in Warsaw, too. Only they know best how and when to invest your money. I do not want to keep citing examples, but there are really very many cases which confirm to this claim. Nor do they concern individuals alone: There are whole enterprises like that....

[Wlusek] This is a delicate problem. I believe that administration must constitute an "active element of the market," which is not to say that it should decide in matters of detail. Administration should define certain areas of entrepreneurship, even prompting people on where to invest for best results. To this end officials' approach must not be one of "automatic negative response." This is why we urgently need to stabilize our personnel resources. Obviously, such posts as those of voivoda, deputy voivodas, or directors of central offices are political appointments. On the other hand, all the remaining administrative officers should be trained experts who must not be swept off the stage by any political storms! No administrative officer should ever feel threatened by the fact that one voivoda has been replaced by another! These issues are, in my opinion, extremely important. The transformations which are still ahead of us require an army of well-paid officials who will be both helpful and efficient.

[Rozycka] When will the next meeting of the representatives of the seven parties take place?

[Wlusek] It is scheduled to be held 4 January 1992. During the meeting we will discuss issues connected with regionalization. I have decided to take advantage of the situation and I have invited representatives of all parties active in our region, all who want to decide about our future and our economic stabilization.

At that table we will separate politics from economic considerations. Really, these two areas must be kept apart and considered separately.

The meeting will take place at the Voivodship Agriculture Advisory Center in Wroclaw on Saturday 4 January at 1100 hours.

[Rozycka] Thank you for talking to us.

Parys: No Review of Army Careerists Planned

LD1001023992 Warsaw PAP in English 2108 GMT 9 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 9—In an interview for the SOLIDARNOSC weekly, National Defence Minister Jan Parys dissociated himself from the intention to review career soldiers in the Army.

Jan Parys said he did not plan to start any verification, as there is normal procedure to review career soldiers.

Parys came out for speeding up the system of promotions that is too slowly in his opinion. He stressed that in this connection everybody who acquired retirement rights would have to take into account that he would retire, mentioning former Defence Minister Vice Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk in this context.

Parys announced he did not plan any cadre revolutions in the armed forces, as he intended to ensure high training level and professionalism to the Army.

Parys 'Anxious' Over Tactical Nuclear Weapons

LD1201192392 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 0700 GMT 12 Jan 92

[Text] Jan Parys, the new minister of national defense, chaired the first meeting of his team a few days ago. He told Konrad Paradowski:

[Begin Parys recording] The situation our country finds itself in is quite specific. We are, all the time, a country which is active, which has to prepare for its defense on its own, and therefore, we must take measures to insure that we are not too weak a country, that our combat capability is not too small. At the moment, what I am anxious about is tactical nuclear weapons, which are located not too far from Poland. The superpowers spend little time discussing this subject, since they are not threatened by these weapons. However, these missiles are within the sphere of our interests, and we would like them to be subject to strict international controls. [end recording]

Composition of New Defense Committee Detailed

LD1101093192 Warsaw PAP in English 2243 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 10—The Polish president's decree published last December 31 spells out the composition and activities of the National Defence Committee (KOK), and it came as a result of new related legislation and organisational and political changes within the Polish Government and the presidential chancellery, PAP was told at the National Security Bureau (BBN), the KOK's executive body.

Composition of the National Defence Committee:

1. Chairman: President Lech Walesa
2. First deputy chairman: Prime Minister Jan Olszewski
3. Deputy chairman: Defence Minister Jan Parys
4. Secretary: Jerzy Milewski
5. Members: Sejm and Senate speakers Wieslaw Chrzanowski and August Chelkowski, respectively, Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Internal Minister Antoni Macierewicz, Finance Minister Karol Lutkowski, Chief of General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces Gen. Zdzislaw Stelmaszuk

6.

One of the secretaries of state in the presidential chancellery to be appointed by the president as the need arises

The National Defence Committee shall consider matters relating to national security, including the country's defences and state security, public security and order, and security of the citizens.

The ordinance also specifies the scope of the activity of the BBN National Security Bureau, now headed by the KOK secretary, who at the same time acts as chairman of an Interministerial Consultative Council (KK), or the National Defence Committee's advisory body. The BBN is supposed to pinpoint threats to national security and present ways to remove or dimish them. Meanwhile, the KOK chairman is authorised to attend cabinet meetings devoted to defence or security questions. The KOK secretary is now supposed to take over the to-date responsibilities of the minister of state for national defence, a position which under the presidential decision has been liquidated.

Nastase Discusses Foreign Policy Targets

AU1101190192 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1745 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 11/1/1992—Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase assessed in a statement he made at ROMPRES on Saturday [11 January] that 1992 could be a year of all possibilities and risks given the geopolitical changes come up through the dismemberment of the Soviet Union and the hotbeds of tension and confrontation in Yugoslavia.

Whereas during the cold war the European foreign policy was relatively simple because it was, to a great extent, an equation with only one unknown quantity that belonged to ideology and the balance of forces, the current policy is an equation with a lot of unknown elements, with each one of them undergoing changes, stated the Romanian foreign minister. What we the European countries must do now is to project our national interests in a highly articulated manner. In the middle of this year the CSCE process is to take on a new configuration apt to set the framework for the evolution of relations on this continent till the end of the century.

Therefore, the conflict of interests among the European countries will be marked by a conflict of ideas which will try to assert themselves at international meetings. A first test is to be passed by the foreign minister meeting of the CSCE countries due in Prague at the end of this month.

The European policy will be marked to a great extent by a manysided dimension, but for us the bilateral dimension matters quite as much, said Mr. Nastase.

We must readjust our relations with some of our neighbours. So, for us things are still complicated in this highly dynamic and even dangerous space, were we to consider the hotbeds of tension in Yugoslavia and the former USSR.

Nastase, CSFR's Dienstbier Comment on Treaty

AU1101152092 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0931 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 11/1/1992—An exchange of opinions and information on home political evolutions in the two countries, their relations with their neighbours and changes in Europe, those were the main topics we tackled, the Romanian foreign minister, Adrian Nastase, said in the opening of the 10 January news conference of Jiri Dienstbier, the foreign minister of the Federal Czech and Slovak Republic.

We tried to initiate the creation of a new bilateral legal framework, stemming from the general political treaty we signed, and institutionalise, at the same time, a framework for consultations, held every time we meet at international sittings.

The head of the Czechoslovak diplomacy mentioned that the ties between Czechoslovakia and Romania, which "are really traditional," offer ways of cooperation in very many fields. The role of our states, added the Czechoslovak foreign minister, is to remove possible barriers, to create legal premises for such ties.

As for security issues related to international developments, the guest said that the two countries opined they were bearing great responsibility, as they lie in that part of Europe under change at present.

Referring to the military cooperation, as is stipulated in the recently initialed treaty, Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier mentioned his country was willing to promote "the European security principles," and his Romanian counterpart added that the document provisions establish only a "normal" network of links between the military forces of countries that are not in conflict, such as a swap of staff officers, in keeping with the standard of military relations at an European level.

Making comments on the position of his country on the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, the Czechoslovak foreign minister said that "generally speaking, the Czechoslovak Government considered it to be "negative," and added that the government of his country had no territorial claims on the sub-Carpathian Ukraine. Minister Jiri Dienstbier opined that the frontier problem was only a means of diverting the attention of the public opinion from major issues the society has to face, especially in this part of Europe. The present tendency would be, according to him, to overcome the frontier issue," which would be pleading for the internationalisation of the statal entities on the European continent.

Turkish President Supports Market Economy Effort

AU1001200592 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1801 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 10/1/1992—"President Turgut Ozal of Turkey lends his full support to Romania in its effort to build a free market economy and the state of law," stated Deputy Secretary of State Birjin Unan of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after his reception at the Cotroceni Palace by President Ion Iliescu to whom he handed a personal message of Turkey's President Turgut Ozal.

Meeting on Cooperation With EFTA Countries Held

AU1001200892 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1754 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 10/1/1992—The Ministry of Trade and Tourism was the host, Friday, 10 January, of the first meeting of the Interministerial Committee empowered to negotiate the agreement for Romania's association to the European communities and to boost cooperation with European Free Trade Association (EFTA) member-countries.

The proceedings were chaired by Trade and Tourism Minister Constantin Fota as president of the Interministerial Committee. Attending were top executives of ministries and bodies included in the committee.

The committee's prime concern was the examination of a memorandum reflecting Romania's position in the negotiations for its admission to the EEC and to the programme for the development of cooperation relations between Romania and EFTA countries.

It was agreed that, at its following meeting, the Interministerial Committee should put the finishing touches to the main lines of action of the negotiation mandate over the agreement for Romania's association to the European Communities.

Iliescu, Stolojan Discuss Agricultural Campaign

AU1001211892 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1952 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 10/1/1992—Romania's president, Ion Iliescu, met Friday, 10 January, at the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, with members of the management of the ministry, with directors-general of speciality departments in Romania's counties.

The minister of agriculture and food, Petru Marculescu, presented the situation in the sectors of agriculture and food industry.

A number of specialists put forth the difficulties the Romanian agriculture is facing, and made proposals for the home market supply with foodstuffs and their selling at smaller prices and in the amounts requested by the population. Particular attention was paid to the current situation of specialists, in agriculture.

Friday, 10 January, in the afternoon, Romania's president met, at Cotroceni Palace, Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan and the managements of the ministries of agriculture, economy and finance, industry, commerce and tourism.

The centerpiece of the discussions was the ensuring of the means for the agricultural campaign of this year and the supply of produce the market is short of at present from home and foreign producers.

PUD President Stancescu Runs for Presidency

AU1001211992 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1939 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 10/1/1992—The board of directors of the Party of Democratic Union [PUD], based in Bucharest, announced that the PUD chairman, Nicu Stancescu would run for Romania's presidency. Mr. Stancescu mentioned [words indistinct] had not been proposed to this high office by the Democratic Convention PUD is part of, but by his party.

Nicolae Manolescu and Lucian Cornescu have announced so far they will run for Romania's presidency, both in the name of the parties they are chairing, the Civic Alliance and the Traditional Social Democratic Party respectively.

PSM Has No 'Legal Right' in Elections

AU1001212192 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1940 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 10/1/1992—On 7 January 1992, Bucharest's Court examined the appeals tabled on 6 January by the Socialist Party of Labor [PSM], and the Democratic Leftist Union [UDS], to the rejection by Bucharest Electoral Commission of the joint electoral roll those parties forwarded for the 9 February local elections.

By a civil decision, Bucharest Court panel rejected the appeals as ungrounded, as PSM was found to have no legal right to function.

The decision writes that PSM is not registered in conformity with the provisions of decree—law 8/1989 on the registering and functioning of political parties in Romania. This political party could give no evidence that it was registered by Bucharest Court under this name. The documents mentioned in the appeals refer to another party, the Democratic Party of Labor, turned, following a fusion, into the PSM. According to the legal norms in force, in case of reorganization, fusion included, the juristic persons have to obtain a new legal decision for their registration, which PSM did not make. Consequently, in the absence of this decision, and according to the provisions of law 70/1991 on local elections, PSM cannot present candidates either alone or as part of a coalition. Implicitly, the democratic leftist union cannot present joint rolls including PSM, it can only present joint rolls of the other parties in the coalition, i.e. the Neoliberal Movement, the Romanian Party for a New Society, the Romanian Socialist Democratic Party, Romania's Democratic Front, the Young Democracy Movement and the General Association for Ensuring the Right to Work.

FSN Names Candidates for Bucharest Government

AU1101151892 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0938 GMT 11 Jan 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 11/1/1992—The National Salvation Front, FSN, held Friday, 10 January, a news conference to present its candidates to the offices of general mayor of the city of Bucharest and mayors of the capital's sectors.

Cazimir Ionescu was nominated for general mayor of the city of Bucharest, Iancu Cepi for Bucharest Sector One, Iulian Velicu for Sector Two, Florian Chirovici for Sector Three, Paul Magureanu for Sector Four, Mihai Pintilie for Sector Five and Constantin Patica for Sector Six.

The FSN leader, Petre Roman, explained to journalists the criteria according to which the nominations were set, and expressed his hope that if the FSN nominees won, the general condition of the Romanian capital would improve.

Daily Explains Reasons for Split Within FSN

AU1401134792 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 7 Jan 92 p 2

[Daniel Uncu article: "National Salvation Front: A False Conflict Between Reformers and Conservatives?"]

[Text] Many people wonder what is the point of the Iliescu-Roman conflict or whether the conflict actually exists. One must admit that there are different opinions about the speed of the application of reform, to which one should add the clearly enunciated desire of the National Salvation Front [FSN] National Leader Petre Roman to "cleanse" the party and to no longer admit former Romanian Communist Party activists on the Front's electoral lists. Contrary to expectations, the truth of these hypotheses is as relative as the former prime minister's desire to resort to a massive purge for purely anticommunist reasons... Let us try to picture one of the possible causes of the start of the present conflict.

It seems that last spring, some "personal files" of FSN parliamentarians appeared on Mr. Barladeanu's [Senate President Academician Alexandru Barladeanu] desk; they were some kind of dossiers containing assessments about the stance of the respective individuals toward the Front's leadership. The academician demanded to know who was still interested in producing such Securitate-like files? Mr. Roman swore that he is innocent and not guilty, and the whole issue died down. However, after a while it became known that a Department of Social and Political Structures led by Mr. Dorel Sandor operated within the Roman cabinet; this department, which, by the way, is still functioning now, dealt with such obscure matters. Then the scandal broke! This hotbed of scandal was exacerbated by the discontent caused by the introduction, at the latest FSN national convention, of the concept of "rightful members" of the FSN Executive Bureau, a concept that assured Mr. Roman the right to impose 15 people—from his own entourage, as it was only natural—without having to submit their endorsement to the vote. Everything ended up in booing and whistling. However, Petre Roman did not give in to this scandal, either.

Now, that he is no longer prime minister, the discontented ones or those whose combative spirit could not be stilled through some material incentives deemed it fit to question the legitimacy of the Executive Bureau, which contains Mr. Roman's 15 "chosen" people. Moreover, the national leader's initiative in this respect is labeled by the "conservatives" as contrary to statute provisions.

Generally speaking, this is the essence of the conflict. One can categorically assert that Mr. Roman's constant attempts to eschew the vote of the Steering Collegium or to impose certain decisions denote his lack of trust in certain members of his party. We do not know whether this mistrust derives from his conviction that these people are "leftists" or from his desire to lead in a "despotic and authoritarian" manner. What we know is that the legitimacy of the Executive Bureau will not be questioned for now, at least not until next March, when the FSN national convention will be held.

Justice Ministry Roundtable on Communists' Trial

AU1001213592 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 2013 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 10/1/1992—The Ministry of Justice held, Friday, 10 January, a roundtable as part of the measures established by the Romanian Government to step up demarches for the beginning of the trials of those guilty of crimes against the Romanian people in the 45 years of communist rule. Attending were representatives of the Association of Romania's Former Political Prisoners, the Association for Human Rights and Helsinki Committee, the League for the Safeguarding of Human Rights, the Association for Honoring the Heroes of the December '89 Revolution, the Association "21 December", the Students' League, the General Prosecutor's Office, the Romanian Intelligence Service, the Ministry of the Interior.

The press office of the Ministry of Justice mentioned that, on the occasion, it was stressed that all state bodies and nongovernmental organizations had to cooperate to back the Prosecutor's Office in gathering the evidence necessary for the starting of penal trials against the ones guilty of breaching the law, of abridging the basic human rights and freedoms.

Presbyterian Bishop Protests Official 'Offenses'

AU1201193492 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 9 Jan 92 p 4

["Text" of letter written by Laszlo Tokes, Presbyterian bishop in Romania: "Protest in the Spirit of Temesvar"]

[Text] 1. I protest against Karoly Kiraly's arbitrary expulsion from our country's Senate. He is the first victim of the new antidemocratic Romanian Constitution. As a direct continuation of the attitude toward him and the other possible abstentions, every Romanian citizen who failed to participate in the vote could be punished. This logic goes in the direction of dictatorship and the restoration of the old regime.

Karoly Kiraly, the champion of the former anti-Ceausescu opposition, should be immediately restored to his position of senator.

2. I protest against the arbitrary arrest of the following residents of Kezdivasarhely [Tirgu Secuiesc]: Dezso Hejja, Daniela Orban, and Otto Pajzs, whom the authorities accused of complicity in the lynching of militia member Aurel Agache in December 1989. These three people are the first victims of the shameful anti-Hungarian report on the Hargita-Kovaszna affair. Their case is an alarming warning of the possible increase in counterrevolutionary antinational minority discrimination and the possibility of further victims. We feel this threat on our skin. Your turn could come tomorrow!

Dezso Hejja, Daniela Orban, and Otto Pajzs should be released immediately and the discriminative and selective sentences passed in Oroszhegy, Zetelak, and Marosvasarhely [Tirgu Mures] should be declared null and void in the spirit of the revolution and in accordance with [President] Iliescu's amnesty decree of 4 January 1990.

3. I protest against the acquittal of Radu Tinu and his group, former members of the nomenclature and secret police in Temesvar [Timisoara], originally accused of genocide. Their acquittal is a cynical manifestation of the one-sided and selective communist administration of justice and of the restoration of the old regime, a slap in the face of the Temesvar revolution and its martyrs. From the opposite direction, the attitude toward the Szekler-Hungarian prisoners and the servants of the old regime shows the same counterrevolutionary trend.

Justice should be given to the victims of the Romanian people and their family members, and to the plundered Romanian revolution.

4. I protest against the tendency of the upcoming national census to discriminate against national and religious minorities. This census, prepared in the spirit of the ideology of the Orthodox Romanian national state and of the division of national minorities, wants to implement the homogeneous, assimilative, and nationalist principles of Article 1 of the new Romanian Constitution.

The minority aspects, both national and religious, of the upcoming census should be reexamined and the necessary measures should be taken in conjunction with the representatives of the aforementioned minorities.

I make this protest public at home and abroad and I also draw the attention of the churches and the domestic political opposition to it. I call upon the churches of the national minorities and the national minority associations, especially the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] to make use of all opportunties of legal political struggle (positions, demonstrations, etc) against the aforementioned antidemocratic actions in order to remedy the human rights, citizenship, and minority offenses, either together with their allies or without them.

I also call upon our people and followers to defend our condemned people and the justice of our oppressed people, and to actively participate in protecting the democratic rights of the Romanian nation, the Hungarians, and the ethnic and religious minorities, and in building a better future.

Nagyvarad [Oradea]

[Dated] 7 Jan 1992

[Signed] Laszlo Tokes

Presbyterian bishop and honorary chairman of the UDMR.

Draft Budget Based on 'Zero Growth' Issued

AU1001200092 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1836 GMT 10 Jan 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 10/1/1992—Romania's draft state budget for 1992, tabled to parliament and based on the governmental program "zero growth", considered to be "the optimist variant" by Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan, plans incomes of 1,031.5 billion lei and expenses of 1,120.5 billion lei, therefore a 89 billion deficit, that should be covered from state loans, to be launched by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, through Romania's National Bank.

99.4 of the incomes are current incomes, most of which namely 98.1 per cent, being fiscal incomes. The draft budget stipulates that, if economic agents do not pay due taxes and other obligations to the state, fiscal bodies will order that the respective sum of money be automatically deducted, no permission being necessary from the economic agent involved. That provision is expected to generate heated debates in parliament, to clarify if, in the absence of a decision of a law court, it does not impair on one's freedom of disposing of his own property.

As for expenses, out of the total 1,120.5 billion lei, 291.6 billion lei would be going to represent staff expenses (for the employees of public institutions), 191.7 billion lei material expenses, 110.4 billion lei investment expenses, 5.8 billion lei expenses for state reserve.

From the total state expenses in 1992, 350.7 billion lei are planned for social-cultural activities, 137.0 billion lei for the country's defense, 36.7 billion lei for public order, 34.8 billion lei for the state power and administration.

From the latter, 679.7 million lei are earmarked to the Senate, 1,775.0 million the Assembly of Deputies, 647.3 million lei to the presidency, 4,489.0 million lei to the judicial and prosecution bodies. The executive power is allotted 2.75 billion lei, 2.6 billion lei of which to the government and 24.6 billion lei to ministries and the other central bodies of the state administration.

Expenses for stimulating 1992 export activities in the name of the state and supported by the state will total, according to the draft budget, 7.2 billion lei, i.e. 4.5 billion lei to promote, back and orient export in the name of the state and supported by it, and 2.7 billion lei to insure export credits against political risks.

If until 1990 the state budget was directly involved in financing the economy, the 1992 draft budget earmarks 467.5 billion lei to the economic field, 344.0 billion lei of which for subsidies and transfers and only 59.9 billion lei for capital expenses. Out of the expenses for the economic domain, 8.7 billion lei are allotted for supporting priority programmes of scientific research, 210.3 billion lei for subsidies and industrial product price and tariff differences, 162.9 billion lei to agriculture, silviculture, waters, environment and staple foodstuff price differences.

International

EC Mission To Coordinate With UN Observers

LD1301233692 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2308 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Zagreb, Ljubljana, Jan 13 (TANJUG)—Spokesman for the European Community monitor mission in Zagreb Joao Mira Gomes said today that the E.C. observers had set up cooperation with the United Nations liaison officers who have arrived in Vienna as an advance party for the U.N. peacekeeping force. We are in permanent contact with them so as to facilitate future cooperation during their stay in Yugoslavia, Gomes said at a news conference.

The U.N. advance party, TANJUG has learned, arrives in Yugoslavia tomorrow—about thirty liaison officers will come to Belgrade, and 25 liaison officers and administrative staff will go to Zagreb. The advance party of the "blue helmets" arrives on the basis of a decision by the U.N. Security Council and Secretary-General Boutros Ghali, after the two warring sides in Yugoslavia accepted the peace plan offerd by special envoy of the U.N. secretary-general Cyrus Vance and signed a ceasefire agreement.

Joao Guerra Salgueiro, the new head of the E.C. monitor mission in Yugoslavia, said today he hoped the ceasefire in the secessionist Republic of Croatia would continue to be honoured. The new head of the monitor mission and its outgoing head, Jan Van Houten, held talks today with representatives of the secessionist Yugoslav Republic of Slovenia—President Milan Kucan and Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel.

Jan Van Houten said in the six months he had spent in the observer mission in Yugoslavia as much as could be expected in the given circumatences had been accomplished. The E.C. monitor mission arrived first in Slovenia after a conflict broke out late in June last year between the Yugoslav People's Army and the Slovenian territorial defence after the republic's unilateral declaration of secession from Yugoslavia. After fighting also flared up in Croatia between the paramilitary formations of that republic and the territorial defence in the areas with majority Serb populations, the mission's mandate was expanded to cover Croatia.

EC Spokesman Denies Snipers Targeted Observers

LD1401110192 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0905 GMT 14 Jan 92

[Interview with Mira Gomes, deputy spokesman of the EC monitoring mission in Yugoslavia, by unidentified interviewer; place and date not given; live or recorded]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Gomes] I would like to take advantage of this opportunity just to refer to the news that there were some snipers that tried to shoot some EC monitors.

[Interviewer] Yes.

[Gomes] That is not true. We received a report from our team that was present in that location. And actually they confirmed that they heard some snipers shooting, but they definitely were not the target.

[Interviewer] I see. Thank you very much.

UN Official Explains Deployment of 50 Officers

AU1401080992 Belgrade RTV Sat TV in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Interview with Marrack Goulding, UN under secretary for peace operations, by correspondent Tatjana Lenard in New York; date not given—recorded, in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation]

[Text] [Lenard] Will you be so kind as to tell us what the 50 officers will actually do in Yugoslavia?

[Goulding] These 50 officers are liaison officers. Their function is to help several sides in Yugoslavia—here I primarily refer to the Yugoslav Peoples' Army [JNA] and the Croatian Guard—to observe the cease-fire signed in Sarajevo the week before last.

These officers will be attached to the JNA General Headquarters in Belgrade, as well as to the headquarters of the Croatian Guard in Zagreb. They will also be attached to the command in the field, to the generals that command the units on the front line. They will have their own communications system across the front line. The officers will be present there to help the EC observers. There are considerably more of them than us. They have been there for a long time, they know the ground, they know the commanders on both sides, and are in a position to do a lot in monitoring the observation of the cease-fire.

[Lenard] How long will the officers' mission last, and what will be the next step by the UN?

[Goulding] We do not know how long their mission will last. We hope that it will be a very short one, that the cease-fire will establish itself, and that the other conditions needed for the cease-fire will also be fulfilled. The officers will then be replaced by the peacekeeping troops consisting of 10,000 people, as proposed in the UN Secretary General's report to the UN Security Council in mid-December.

What we now need is to see whether the leaders on both sides can establish and maintain an effective cease-fire. Secondly, we need to know that all interested parties in Yugoslavia accept the UN plans. It is a well-known fact that there are leaders in the regions that are very important to us who have some reservations about the plan.

When those conditions are met, when we have a lasting cease-fire, and when this plan is accepted by everybody upon whose cooperation the success of the plan depends, than the next step would be for the Secretary General to recommend to the Security Council that it set up this big operation in Yugoslavia.

[Lenard] This big operation must be quite expensive. Bearing in mind the financial problems of the UN, can this influence the operation in Yugoslavia?

[Goulding] Money is always a serious problem for this organization. However, I think that you have seen from the attention of the Security Council, the Secretary General, and the present and former supporters of Yugoslavia, that this organization is very worried about the suffering of the nations in Yugoslavia as a result of this horrible war. The risk for the world could be much bigger, it could even spread to Europe, if the clashes in Yugoslavia do not end soon.

[Lenard] Thank you very much.

Under Secretary Protests Vatican Decision

LD1301152192 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1422 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Belgrade, 13 Jan (TANJUG)—Apostolic nuncio Monsignor Gabriel Montalvo today handed to the undersecretary in the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, Milan Veres, a note on today's decision of the Holy See to recognize the sovereignty and independence of Croatia and Slovenia. The note stresses that the Holy See has conditioned the recognition with an explicit obligation for Croatia and Slovenia to observe fundamental human rights. At the same time, the Vatican expressed its intention to continue and even broaden its relations with all parts of the SFRY.

Under Secretary Veres expressed the protest and regret of the Yugoslav Government in connection with this unilateral decision, which means the recognition of a secession and, thus, represents a flagrant violation of principles and provisions of international law, the UN charter, and CSCE documents, and also direct interference in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia.

This act represents a denial of full sovereignty, the territorial integrity, and the international position of Yugoslavia. Veres particularly stressed that it was detrimental that this move had been taken at a moment when the cease-fire in Yugoslavia was stabilizing and before the Yugoslav factors completed the process of negotiations on the alteration of relations in the country.

This move is not in accordance with provisions of the UN resolutions setting out that all UN members should refrain from actions hampering or postponing the peaceful settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.

By taking this move, the Vatican took over special responsibility for the future of relations with Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Government will thoroughly examine the note from the Holy See and take necessary measures in accordance with interest of the country and international cooperation, Veres told Monsignor Motalvo.

Editors Condemn 'Trickery' of Italy's De Michelis

92BA0306A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 24 Dec 91 p 1

[Unattributed article on report by TANJUG and response by the editors of POLITIKA]

[Text] Rome, 23 Dec—The Italian Foreign Ministry today lodged a sharp protest because of the refusal of the Belgrade newspaper POLITIKA to publish the interview with Gianni de Michelis, the AFP reports.

In that interview, which he gave to the newspaper's correspondent in Rome, de Michelis, chief of Italian diplomacy, harshly criticized the policy of the Serbian leadership at certain points.

In the press release of the Italian ministry, the decision of the editorial collegium of the newspaper POLITIKA is described as "shocking." This is the way, it adds, that Serbian public opinion has been prevented from learning of Italy's position at this delicate moment in which every contribution to dialogue and peace efforts should be encouraged.

According to the AFP report, in that unpublished interview de Michelis criticized the alleged attempt of the Army to alter internal borders by force, and he also appealed to Serbia not to allow itself to be left isolated in the international community.

Statement by the Editors

We are shocked by the deception and trickery to which a foreign minister resorts in presenting the alleged "incident" with an interview he gave to our paper.

Since last year we have not sought any interview at all from Mr. de Michelis. On the contrary, Mr. de Michelis called S. Aleksandric, POLITIKA correspondent in Rome—a case unprecedented in the many years of our newspaper's experience—and by virtue of his pressure and on his initiative gave it this "interview" for which no one had even asked.

It is easy to imagine where such a journalistic practice would lead if someone were to give an interview on his own initiative—and at his own pleasure—to a foreign newspaper concerning a situation not related to his country, but to a foreign country, that is, the country where the newspaper is located. That would be like an international jungle, which, it seems, is what Mr. de Michelis would like to see in the case of Serbia and its dignity.

It is out of the question that we did not publish some of the statements of Mr. de Michelis because in some way he criticized someone in Serbia. Just a day before that we published extensive statements of Mr. de Michelis about Yugoslavia, and therefore also Serbia, running three prominently placed columns. This can be checked by anyone interested in seeing that the public gets the truth.

What we will not allow, however, either in the case of Mr. de Michelis or any other minister, is that he issue "special interviews" as he sees fit and which have not been requested by the editors, when they do not concern his country, but the country where the newspaper is published. Mr. de Michelis can be certain that we will print the text of his statement about Serbia, we give him our word, including even the most critical passages about President Milosevic, or the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], and we will do so in a prominent place, but as material taken from some Italian newspaper, because he is nevertheless, until we receive notice to the contrary, the Italian foreign minister, not the foreign minister of Yugoslavia or Serbia.

Federal

Presidency Members Support Peaceful Settlement

LD1301211192 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1856 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Belgrade, January 13 (TANJUG)—Members of the Yugoslav Presidency Sejdo Bajramovic and Jugoslav Kostic pointed out on Monday that this body has opted for cessation of armed conflicts, and a peaceful and democratic settlement of the current crisis in the country, which is indicated by the request that the U.N. Security Council send a peacekeeping force to Yugoslavia.

Bajramovic and Kostic said this during talks with president of the Alliance of Workers of Yugoslavia and a delegation of a Yugoslav forum, which includes representatives of Yugoslavs temporarily employed in Germany and France, it was announced.

Bajramovic—who represents Kosovo, the southern province of the Republic of Serbia—pointed out that the activities of that body were directed to end armed conflicts, caused by forceful secession of the republics of Slovenia and Croatia, and to make impossible disintegration of Yugoslavia. That disintegration is organized not only by forces in Yugoslavia but also by some forces abroad, said Bajramovic.

Kostic, who represents on the Federal Presidency Serbia's northern province of Vojvodina, assessed that "Europe has contributed to making conflicts and problems (in Yugoslavia) even more complex, instead of helping us."

Kostic Views EC Recognition of Slovenia, Croatia

AU1301201792 Belgrade RTV Sat TV in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 13 Dec 92

[Text] Branko Kostic, vice-president of the SFRY Presidency, gave an interview for the WTN [World Television Network] British television network. Here is his answer to the question on how the SFRY Presidency views the international recognition of Slovenia and Croatia:

[Begin Kostic recording] From the very beginning, we were of the opinion that the international recognition of individual republics that unilaterally seceded from Yugoslavia could only aggravate the internal situation.

Regarding Slovenia, we believe that it would have been better for Slovenia also, if the EC had left it to us, Yugoslavia, to resolve our internal problems, for instance, to draw up a final settlement of accounts [diobeni bilans] with Slovenia, to establish mutual rights and obligations concerning the foreign debt, and so on. Because the problem of internal borders did not exist in Slovenia's case, Yugoslavia would have recognized the independence of Slovenia without hesitation, and then it would have been normal for the EC countries to recognize Slovenia, and we, as a UN member, would have also supported them and initiated the process of recognizing Slovenia and of its joining the UN.

Regarding Croatia, the situation is more complex. The problem of internal borders exists here. The Croats and Serbs in Croatia used to be two constituent nations with equal rights. The Croats opted for formation of a national state of Croats; in other words, they did not grant this right to the Serbs, but the Serbs opted to stay in Yugoslavia. That is why an armed clash began in Croatia. Once the UN peace troops have been placed in this crisis area and peace has been established, we, as Yugoslavia, will not object to recognizing Croatia within the borders it currently controls—that is, where the Croats form an ethnic majority—and to the problem of the Serbian nation being resolved in peace through political negotiations. [end recording]

State Committee Sees 'Progress' on UN Plan

LD1301210692 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1904 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Belgrade, January 13 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav State Committee for Cooperation with the United Nations said on Monday that progress has been made in view of the acceptance of the peace plan proposed by Cyrus Vance in areas where blue helmets are to be deployed, the committee said in a statement.

The committee also assessed that the results of the implemention of the 15th ceasefire, signed in Sarajevo, are "basically satisfactory," and pointed out that competent federal organs and the Yugoslav Army would "continue to observe the situation and take all necessary measures for preserving the ceasefire."

The committee, chaired by its president Borisav Jovic, today dealt with activities in connection with tomorrow's arrival of a group of liaison officers, U.N. observers, "as well as with other questions in connection with preparations for the deployment of a peacekeeping force," said the statement.

"Concrete duties of individual federal organs were established in this view," the committee concluded in the statement.

Raseta Reviews Achievements of Pecs Talks

LD1301230292 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1822 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Belgrade, 13 Jan (TANJUG)—In connection with diverse and also incorrect interpretations of the contents of talks at the tripartite meeting at Pecs between the representatives of the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA], the EC observer mission, and Croatian authorities, Colonel General Andrija Raseta, JNA deputy chief of staff, said today that the themes of yesterday's discussions included the incident of the EC observer mission helicopter, the safety of work and movement of the EC mission, and also the demands of the Croatian authorities regarding the safety of air space for air transport.

As regards the helicopter incident, the JNA representative informed the participants in the meeting about the findings of the investigation commission of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense. Other commissions set up in this connection by the Federal Executive Council and the EC are still working on their findings.

As regards the safety of work of the representatives of the EC mission, General Raseta emphasized that it was agreed that in the future the representatives of the JNA and the Croatian authorities will also maintain direct contact at lower levels in order to prevent or resolve any possible incidents. It was agreed yesterday that two JNA liaison officers will be permanently stationed in Zagreb. Their task will be to maintain constant links, above all with the EC mission and thus also with the Croatian authorities. There is no question of military missions, as reported by some public media.

As regards flying safety, it was agreed that this will be dealt with within the Federal Secretariat for Transport and Communications, which should make arrangements with the Croatian and Slovenian representatives. On the possible agenda for future meetings of the tripartite committee, General Raseta mentioned the solution of questions arising from the present agreements that have not yet been resolved. For instance, there will be talks about the return of appropriated military and civilian vehicles, the formation of a joint commission for the exchange of housing from the army stock on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, the exchange of prisoners, the question of payment of pensions to military pensioners in Croatia, the sending of remittances to the families of active military personnel, and some other questions which need to be solved in the coming period.

The next meeting of the tripartite committee for the supervision of the cease-fire, which includes the representatives of the JNA, the Croatian authorities, and the EC observer mission, will be held at Pecs on 21 January, Raseta said. It has been agreed that these meetings will be held once a week in the future on neutral ground.

Denies Zagreb Mission Established

LD1301223392 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2203 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Belgrade, Jan 13 (TANJUG)—Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), Colonel General Andrija Raseta, denied today that the JNA would set up a mission in Zagreb, the capital of the secessionist Yugoslav Republic of Croatia.

Raseta said that at a meeting in the Hungarian town of Pecs of the tripartite committee for overseeing the cease-fire (made up of representatives of the EC monitor mission, the JNA and the Croatian paramilitary formations) it had been agreed two JNA liaison officers should be permanently based in Zagreb, but that this did not mean that any representative offices would be set up.

These officers will liaise permanently with the EC mission, and thereby also with the Croatian authorities, General Raseta said. Raseta thus denied a statement made yesterday by Chief of Staff of the Croatian Paramilitary Colonel General Imra Agotic according to which the JNA would open in Zagreb, as early as January 14, an office which would be the centre for liaison with the Croatian side.

Agotic said the Croatian forces would soon after set up a similar mission in Belgrade. He added that the centres would be tasked with inquiring into all violations of the ceasefire. Raseta said today it had also been agreed in Pecs that the JNA and the Croatian authorities would also liaise directly on lower levels in order to prevent or resolve any incidents.

JNA Reports Bosnia, Montenegro Troop Movements

LD1301210192 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1713 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Sarajevo, 13 Jan (TANJUG)—Colonel General Pavle Strugar, commander of the Second Operational Group, has informed the republic governments of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Montenegro that between 11 and 22 January, the movement of military units will take place from western Serbia, Montenegro, and eastern Hercegovina toward Dubrovnik, Ston, and Mostar for the purpose of the essential replacement of troops. This was announced today by the Ministry of Information of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

There should be a timely provision of information to responsible municipal bodies and their branch offices about the movement of units in these areas, the announcement says. This is in keeping with the decision by the SFRY Presidency on the retention of those obliged to do their military service on the front for a period of four months. This information is in keeping with the Sarajevo agreement "on the cessation of hostilities so unnecessary disagreements and awkward situations do not occur."

Drop in Imports, Exports in 1991 Reported

LD1401095192 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1434 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Belgrade, January 13 (TANJUG)—Yugoslavia's foreign trade in 1991 was extremely unfavourable, showing a downward trend, as assistant manager of the Federal Statistical Office Mirjana Rankovic said today.

Rankovic told a news conference that exports and imports declined particularly since last August due to the country's political situation and transport problems. The drop in imports resulted also from the suspended clearing-account trade with countries of the former East European bloc.

Noting that the Federal Statistical Office had available information from the secessionist republics of Slovenia and Croatia up to September 17, Rankovic said that last year's export balance [word indistinct] 13.8 billion dollars, or 13.7 percent down and imports 14.7 billion dollars, or 18.2 percent down from 1990. last year's exports were at the [word indistinct] level and imports at the level in 1983, Rankovic said. She noted that the largest amount of trade was affected with industrialized countries, although the relevant exports dropped 7.3 percent of the overall exports, 70 percent went to industrialized countries, which also accounted for 67 percent of the imports.

Exports to the clearing-account markets dropped appreciably, by 84 percent, and thus accounted for only three percent of Yugoslavia's overall exports. The situation with imports was similar, meaning that imports from these countries accounted for no more than four percent. Germany was Yugoslavia's biggest foreign trade partner, accounting for 30 percent of the overall exports and 25 percent of imports.

Serbia registered the highest value of exports (4.5 billion dollars) and imports (5.2 billion dollars), Slovenia was second (3.3 billion dollars imports), Croatia (2.5 billion dollars exports, 3 billion dollars imports), Bosnia-Hercegovina (2.2 billion dollars exports, 77 billion dollars imports), Macedonia (1.1 billion dollars exports, 1.7 billion dollars imports) and Montenegro (158 million dollars exports, 190 million dollars imports). The value of Macedonia's exports alone equalled that in 1990. According to incomplete data, the value of Slovenia's exports went 10 percent down to around, while this decline varied at about 15 percent in the other republics.

Slovenia

Assembly President Bucar Views New Constitution

92BA0330A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene
24 Dec 91 p 3

[Text of speech by Dr. France Bucar, president of the Slovene Assembly: "Not Even the State Can Violate the Rights Listed in the Constitution"—first paragraph is DELO introduction]

[Text] "The new constitution is based on the principle that everything that is not specifically prohibited is allowed," Dr. France Bucar said, among other things, in the opening speech.

The time for preparing a draft constitution occupies a period longer than one year. The onslaught of events in the past year, in which there was a plebiscite on the independence of Slovenia, a fundamental constitutional document on the autonomy and independence of the Republic of Slovenia and immediately after it a brief and successful defensive war, and the simultaneous process of Slovenia's separation from the normative framework of the former Yugoslavia, imbued that period with the need for a whole series of ongoing measures that mostly had constitutional significance. It was therefore continually necessary to halt work on a new constitution in order to prepare amendments to the existing one. The number of such amendments even reached the figure of 100, which, to be sure, allowed us to make the transition to independent statehood without any major social upheavals, but at the same time led to extremely great constitutional and general normative confusion, which in and of itself dictates the need for a new codification of the fundamental rules of social coexistence.

Perhaps it is necessary to point out in particular certain important characteristics of the proposed constitutional system. If the second chapter of the constitution, "Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties," contains a number of specifically enumerated rights (the list of those rights, to be sure, is rather extensive, and the right to decide on giving birth to children is only one of them), that does not mean that an individual has only those rights and liberties; it only means that it is a list of rights which represent a relatively complete range of human rights in the present state of humanistic development, and which by their nature are such that the state cannot violate them. Consequently, they represent a sort of defensive wall, even against our own state, which, like any organization, is oriented toward restricting the completely free behavior of individuals. This means that in principle, everything that is not specifically prohibited is allowed. That is why this constitution is also relatively shorter than the real-socialist programmatic constitutions. This constitutional proposal was formulated on the basis of an awareness that any legal norm is essentially an infringement upon human freedom. Consequently, the fewer legal norms there are, the greater the freedom of individuals. Consequently, the shorter the constitution is, the more freedom there is. This apparently dubious liberalistic principle, however, needs a certain corrective in the modern concept of the state and social organization; specifically, the state, in contrast to the view that still prevailed in the last century, is only an arbiter in social events, which sets the rules and takes care of their fulfillment; it also becomes a social partner.

Partnership is one of the most important pillars of the social order ensured by the constitution, and the constitution also provides an institutional basis for it. Thus, not only is the freedom of trade unions guaranteed, but their role in regulating social affairs is also specifically guaranteed. There is a specifically guaranteed place in the state council for employers, employees, professors, and, of course, representatives of local interests. It gives them the opportunity to promote a legislative initiative in an organized manner, and to demand a referendum on an individual matter as well, and also to have a right to a so-called pocket veto of all laws that have already been passed. Thus, in a legal and formal way, the influence of representatives of different economic, social, and local interests would be brought to parliament. Through this mechanism, all representatives of such different interests would participate creatively and responsibly in regulating social matters as partners, not as antagonists who would see the state as representing interests opposed to them.

Proceeding from the principle of the separation of powers among the legislative, judicial, and executive branches, on which there has been general agreement from the very beginning, there have been rather different opinions about the implementation of this principle, and especially about organizing the highest representative bodies. That principle, on which the equality of the votes of everyone entitled to vote and of their representation in parliament is based, also had to be supplemented in the parliament with a reflection of social structure. That means a decision on a unicameral or bicameral parliament. The combination of both principles led to the solution that the general representative body, which has the function of holding legislative powers, is the state assembly, while at the same time, the above-mentioned state council is being formed along with it, as an independent body, and with essentially supplemental and corrective functions, which reflect the composition of society. It is consequently a sort of bicameral system, in which the two chambers do not have idential functions, and instead each chamber has its own specific powers. In this respect, the solution proposed here is essentially in accordance with the majority of the systems in effect today in European parliaments, with the difference that the state council is a representative of specific representatives of interests and not just local ones, although the representatives of local interests in this council nevertheless have half of all the seats, out of a total number of 40. This number has a certain relationship to the number of deputies in the state assembly, which is set at 90. In view of Slovenia's size, that number, in the opinion of the Constitutional Commission, is sufficient to represent the will of the people, and furthermore it would be possible for all the deputies in that chamber to be professionals, and also have direct ties with their electoral base.

At this point the new method of voting in adopting decisions should also be mentioned. Only definite votes are counted for the adoption of a proposal. To be sure, this allows a relatively very small majority to decide on important social matters, but under the assumption that all those who have not decided remain neutral on the issue, and consequently do not oppose it. There is also an important innovation in the fact that the door is thrown wide open for passing laws on the basis of a referendum, which in the future should become an increasingly more established practice.

The president of the republic is elected directly by the voters, so that this ensures greater solidity for his position and authority, but he is primarily limited in his powers to the functions of a representative of the state.

The government's role is also completely different from the former arrangement of the Executive Council, although logically derived from the concept of the separation of powers. It is understandable that the concept of the Executive Council is being abandoned. The government is acquiring the function not only of the highest executive body, but also of the leadership of the state administration. The role of the government as part of the so-called cabinet system is derived from the concept of parliamentary rule. Since in the theory of the parliamentary system that is being introduced by this constitution the government is being made dependent to a certain extent upon the parliament, there would be a danger of instability and rapid changes in the government, and thus indirectly in the parliament itself as well. Depending upon the situation in parliament, there could also be a danger of prolonged anarchy, if agreement upon a government were blocked because of differences and opposing votes in the parliament. Several European states have tried to protect themselves against this danger through greater emphasis on the powers of the head of state (the so-called presidential system), which of course means a deviation from a strictly parliamentary system. In this regard the proposed solution relies on the so-called constructive vote of no confidence in the government, which means that the government can only be replaced if a new prime minister has already been elected at the same time as the proposal for a vote of no confidence.

The principle of the separation of powers was also necessarily reflected in the real independence of the judicial system, which would be achieved not only by a formal provision that a judge acts only in accordance with the law, but also by guaranteeing his actual independence. This would be achieved by having a judge's position a permanent one, not subject to reelection and thus dependence upon those who elect him; at the same time, a judge cannot be either replaced or reassigned against his will.

The Constitutional Court is acquiring a special place in this system. In a certain sense, it is becoming an independent pillar of authority. Since the constitution is based on the position that everything is allowed that is not specifically prohibited, that authority is divided among various entities, and that this automatically creates room for the promotion of very different factors, also with the privileges of authority, it is logical that it would also be necessary to create a body that would have the function of a supreme arbiter over the activity of all those with power, rights, and obligations with respect to the constitution. Consequently, even the legislative function is subject to judgment of its consistency with the constitution. The function of the Constitutional Court is thus becoming an integral, constituent part of the law-governed state, and it is only by promoting it that it is even possible to ensure the principle proclaimed in article 2 of this constitution, that Slovenia is a law-governed state.

If we speak of the principle of the separation of powers as a classic attribute of the modern state, then it also has to be supplemented with the content of the Accounting Court. This court, which we are introducing here completely for the first time, is an independent body, in the same capacity as the courts are, although it is not part of the judicial system. It is an instrument that is supposed to ensure full legality, accountability, and control in the area of public finances as well.

In the area of local self-administration, there is also a fundamental change and innovation in the area of the institutional system of society. With this constitution, we are abandoning the previous so-called communal system. The new system is based upon a consistent separation between state affairs and the affairs of local self-administration. The state cannot use its powers to infringe upon the settlement of local self-administration matters, and consequently hierarchical relationships of superiority and subordination have not been established between the state and local communities. We are restoring to self-administration the place and role that belong to it in the historical emergence of European society. The state did not exist before local self-administration, but the other way around. The national state emerged through usurpation of the rights of local self-administration.

Economic Impact of Republic's Recognition Noted

92BA0333A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene
20 Dec 91 p 6

[Article by Darijan Kosir: "Recognition of Slovenia Is Not a Matter of Prestige, But Rather a Condition for Normal Economic Activity"—first paragraph is DELO introduction]

[Text] Specifically, it will open the way to a trade agreement with the EC, and membership in the EFTA [European Free Trade Association] and international financial institutions, and provide a possibility for the normal operation of Slovene enterprises and banks (and also the state) abroad.

It seems that we have to reiterate once more: Recognition of Slovenia is not a festive action after which one can only celebrate; the recognition of Slovenia is an existential issue. At first, to be sure, it seemed that we could perhaps live quite calmly without it: Slovenia's political, economic, and other ties with the world were supposed to be established quietly, "under the table," and recognition would come in the end—when it did come—like dotting the "i" on the whole process. In time, however, it turned out that ties could not even be established in any other way except after recognition. And when everything together was also followed by a wave of economic sanctions, it became clear to all politicians and entrepreneurs that without recognition we could end up in a very dangerous situation.

Consequently, it is necessary to clarify precisely what recognition of Slovenia as a state will bring with it, primarily in the economic area (political relations are easier to solve).

1. The Possibility of Association With the EC.

The fundamental positive value of the Brussels declaration on the recognition of Slovenia is that now there is a quite [word indistinct] possibility that Slovenia will be recognized by the EC as a whole. It was sensible to fight for such a possibility: recognition by Germany and some other state would also be "valuable" in its own way, of course, but real value is given to it only by recognition by the entire EC, because Slovenia's strategic goal is nevertheless membership of one kind or another in that group. After 15 January and recognition, Slovenia has two gigantic possibilities: in the first place, talking about association—associate membership—in the EC, i.e., the kind of status that Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia obtained on 16 December, and in the second place, talking about a completely new trade agreement with the EC after May 1992, when the termination deadline expires for the agreement between the EC and the former Yugoslavia.

The second possibility, which is feasible in a very short time and which we should begin working on right away, has to do with Slovenia's setting up a means of trade with the EC that is entirely its own. What has been used so far is the agreement between the EC and Yugoslavia, which allowed exports of certain Slovene products to the EC at lower prices, but which was suspended on 8 November by a decision of the EC foreign ministers. After that time, the system of trade with the EC that applied to Slovenia was the same as the one for states that have never signed any agreements whatsoever with the EC, and never had any privileges whatsoever. To be sure, the Council of Ministers recognized its mistake on 2 December and lightened the sanctions, but not yet to the level that applied in the suspended agreement. Now, the task of Slovenia and the EC is to write the kind of trade agreement that would contain at least all the elements of the old agreement with Yugoslavia, and possibly even something more. Recognition is necessary for this, however; recognition is also necessary for possible agreements on the first possibility, i.e., association with the EC. Such a version of an agreement with the EC would *eliminate all administrative* barriers to trade in both directions, but of course, tariffs, taxes, and the exchange rate would remain as an element to protect domestic industry. Nevertheless, the least that such an agreement offers, and that Slovenia should obtain in half a year after recognition, is the creation of a free trade zone with the EC. That is already a great deal.

2. The Possibility of Membership in the EFTA [European Free Trade Association].

The EFTA has functioned for some time as a waiting room for entry into the EC (since then, for instance, Great Britain and Portugal have joined the Twelve); after the EC-EFTA agreement on a common market, signed on 22 October, the EFTA is also acquiring a completely new significance: its former members will automatically adopt the rules of the EC market, and, except for Liechtenstein, will also gradually join as members of the EC.

Consequently, possible new members of the EFTA, in time, will gain the role that has been played so far by Austria, Switzerland, and others, and that has been outwardly expressed in the fact that the EFTA states have sold to the EC almost two thirds of all goods intended for export. That could also be Slovenia's long-term goal, i.e., through membership in the EFTA, but international recognition is necessary for that.

3. The Possibility of Normal Business Between Slovene and Foreign Enterprises.

Igor Fon, the general director of Metalflex in Tolmin, pointed out to us a few days ago how very important recognition of Slovenia also is for the microeconomic level, i.e., for enterprises. Metalflex is an enterprise that sells abroad close to 90 percent of all its goods, and in general is one of the most successful Slovene exporters. According to his story, before New Year's, Metalflex wanted to renew its cooperation agreements with German, Italian, British, and Spanish partners; it received affirmative responses from the first two, whereas their partners from Spain and Great Britain informed it that the commercial (economic) chambers of those two countries would no longer permit them to do business with Slovene enterprises, until Slovenia's recognition. That can be a serious blow to an enterprise oriented completely toward exports. To date, of course, there are four countries which have given their enterprises guarantees for exports and business with Slovenia, namely Hermes in Germany, Kontrollbank in Austria, Sace in Italy, and Cofas in France; at the same time, these are countries to which Slovenia sells 90 percent of its convertible exports. In spite of that, the remaining 10 percent—primarily from Great Britain, Spain, the United States, and Canada—can be a serious blow to individual enterprises. This can be avoided only after recognition of the state of Slovenia, when all transactions will at least be equivalent to the former Yugoslav ones.

4. The Possibility of Joining International Financial Institutions Like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, To Mention Only the Three Most Important Ones.

Membership in the UN is necessary for joining the first two, and that is possible just a few months after international recognition. IMF assistance for Slovenia, which certainly exceeds the average per capita national income specified by the IMF for possible monetary assistance, could be primarily technical in nature, i.e., it will be very important in achieving international monetary convertibility. Assistance from the World Bank, and from its International Finance Corporation [IFC], which is possibly more important for Slovenia, could be either in the form of loans for "reconstruction and development," or specific loans to enterprises, or in the form of guarantees for certain international transactions. As far as the IFC is concerned, to date, of course, there have been many complications as well because of American policy toward Yugoslavia, but its business with Slovenia in the past has proceeded "normally," at least conditionally. For the World Bank and the IMF, however, as stated, we need recognition and UN membership.

The Possibility of Concrete Transactions Between the State of Slovenia and Other States.

In addition to the EC states already listed, with which we should establish business cooperation soon, there are also others, with which it is necessary to determine conditions for trade and business during the transitional period (and the EFTA states as well). This is not just a question of trade, but also of completely legal banking transactions as well, including at the level of the National Bank with currency swaps, and other financial operations.

There are undoubtedly still many more "needs" after recognition. We have only listed the most important ones, in the desire to show that the effort to gain international recognition for Slovenia is truly a fundamental and vital Slovene interest.

Democratic Reform Party Changes Name, Program

92BA0325A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene
21 Dec 91 p 2

[Article by Marko Pecauer and Veso Stojanov: "Reformers' Fear of Revolutionary Leftism"—first paragraph is DELO introduction]

[Text] Dr. Ciril Ribicic thought at the SDP [Party of Democratic Reform] that the social situation is growing so much worse that a renewal of revolutionary leftism is possible

Postojna, 20 Dec—"The two years of our existence have been full of surprises and changes. It has not always been easy for us. The pressure against the SDP has increased again," stated Dr. Ciril Ribicic, the party's president, in the opening speech at the SDP's conference in Postojna. He expressed the belief that at today's conference, the party would prove that it was not an advocate of the old system, but rather a party of the future. It was difficult for observers to conclude anything like that from the events at the conference.

The party was already supposed to take a step forward with the new interpretation of SDP: Social Democratic Reform. In Ribicic's opinion, this is necessary for several reasons: so that the party could clearly anchor itself on the domestic and European political scene and strengthen its ties with the reformist tradition of the Reform party, and "because the social situation is growing so much worse that one can conceive of a revival of the illusion of revolutionary leftism." He also reminded the delegates that elections were approaching.

This is perhaps also pointed out by the conference's slogan, "Slovenia '92," in contrast to its slogan a year ago, "Europe '92." Miran Potrc, the leader of the deputies' club, said as usual in his report how correct the party's previously uttered views were. Specifically: that the economic policy of the Demos government would lead Slovenia to the brink of economic collapse and social crisis. He called upon the delegates at the conference to adopt a new party program for an economically successful and socially just Slovenia. In his words, this was necessary if they wanted to ensure the confidence and support of the voters, and to participate as equals in the formation of a new ruling coalition.

Another opening speaker, Zeljko Cigler, also attacked the government's social policy in a discussion about Slovenia's economic and social situation. The authorities who pushed Slovenia into a deep economic recession and a serious social situation are now dismantling the social state by eliminating the population's social rights that had already been achieved. In his opinion, Slovenia is coming closer and closer to the ideal of a neoconservative state.

Franci Krizanic, the party's vice president until recently and one of the participants in the dispute with Emil Milan Pintar, informed the delegates, as one of the creators of the new SDP program, about Slovenia's economic prospects. With an intelligent economic policy that would lead to the budget's stimulation of domestic consumption, the gradual formation of a duty-free zone in the territory of Slovenia as a whole, and an antimonopolistic policy, Slovenia could soon emerge from the economic recession. He also spoke about the dispute with Emil Milan Pintar. He said that Pintar, without the party's authorization, had participated in Umek's coordinating group on the privatization law, and finally agreed with compromise proposals. Then he wanted to impose them on the party. "At my suggestion, the party adopted the position that the proposals of Umek's commission were deceptions, and for that reason we in the leadership decided to refuse to support them," Franci Krizanic said.

He also acknowledged that in this case they had actually suppressed the shadow prime minister, and that the party had made a big mistake with the shadow government. Franci Pivec, the SDP secretary, did not agree with this, saying that it was good if the party had an alternative to the government proposals, and that the shadow government quite certainly represented this alternative. Otherwise, many of the participants in the discussion warned about the serious situation in our economy, and called upon the state at least to do something about it.

[Box, p 2]

The starting points for the new SDP program, entitled "New Social Democratic Force for Slovenia '92," among other things, support the following: the SDP as a modern party of labor and knowledge, and as a democratic force for a democratic Slovenia; the values of the European left; a partnership on the left; and a left-central position.

Croatia

Tudjman Thanks Vatican for Recognition

LD1301170392 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman today sent a letter expressing his thanks to Pope John Paul II saying:

Your Holiness,

It is my honor to express our most profound gratitude for the Holy See's decision to extend its formal recognition of the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Croatia. This act opens up a new era in Croatian history and in relations between the Holy See and the Republic of Croatia.

We are particularly pleased that the Holy See, as the strongest moral force in the world, was among the first to recognize Croatia's independence. That obliges us even more to urge the peace, coexistence, and well-being of all Croatian citizens in the spirit of ecumenism and peacemaking, which you, Holy Father, have tirelessly been promoting.

We are strongly convinced that the diplomatic recognition of the Republic of Croatia will contribute to the cessation of the merciless aggressive war against Croatia, and thus to the stability and cooperation in this part of Europe.

I am availing myself of this opportunity to renew my invitation to your holiness to visit Croatia. Your visit to Croatia, for which there are no formal obstacles any longer, would help a great deal the realization of these noble goals, the letter of gratitude sent from President Tudjman to Pope John Paul II says in conclusion.

Republic 'Mainly Calm'; Sides Continue Talking

LD1301201392 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1851 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Belgrade, Jan 13 (TANJUG)—The situation on the battlefronts in the breakaway Yugoslav Republic of Croatia has been mainly calm on the 10th day of the 15th ceasefire agreement, TANJUG's reporters quote military sources as saying. Croatian radio, which is subject to censorship regulations introduced by the republican authorities, said that 30 smaller-calibre mortar shells have allegedly been fired at a suburb of the Eastern-Slavonian town of Vinkovci.

The information service of the Yugoslav Army's Banja Luka Corps said that Croatian forces last night repositioned and reinforced its infantry, armoured and artillery units. The Banja Luka Corps confirmed that representatives of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and Croatian forces held talks today in the region of Novska and Nova Gradiska in Western Slavonia. It also confirmed that the two sides exchanged bodies of soldiers killed in the fighting. TANJUG's reporters said that the situation was calm today in Kninska Krajina and on the battlefronts in Dubrovnik and Hercegovina.

JNA Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandar Mihailovic said today after a talk with the Croatian side in the village of Mirkovci that the two sides have pledged to abide by the ceasefire agreement and keep their units under control. "We have also pledged that each side should give full protection to the population on the territories it occupies," Mihailovic told the press. Representatives of the European Community monitor mission also attended the talks in Mirkovci.

Slavonia Accepts Limited UN Deployment Only

AU1301204592 Belgrade RTV Sat TV in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] This evening in Erdut the government of the Serbian Region of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem accepted the plan of deployment of blue helmets. However, the government demands that the troops only come to the line of delineation between the warring sides.

The government is opposed to the withdrawal of Yugoslav Peoples' Army [JNA] units from the territory of this region where the UN peace troops will not be stationed. If the JNA withdraws to Serbia, it will be no longer be Yugoslav and a symbol of Yugoslavia, government President Goran Hadzic stated. This would mean that the Serbian Region of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem would remain under Croatia's sovereignty, which the Serbian nation does not want because it has suffered the Ustasha genocide twice in the last 50 years, Hadzic stressed.

At the same time, Goran Hadzic and the government of this Serbian region fully support Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, as they consider that Milosevic has not betrayed the Serbian nation on the territories caught up in the war, but that he has been protecting their interests. However, the government sticks to the position that the blue helmets can only be deployed on the line of delineation.

Report Views Situation, Public Opinion in Krajina

AU1301182392 Belgrade Radio Belgrade Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] This has been yet another peaceful day in the Knin Krajina. Not one armed incident has been reported in the last few days, which has been unheard of in Krajina since the beginning of the war.

Many Knin people are using the veritable spring day to go shopping and prepare various delicacies to adorn their tables during the Serbian New Year celebrations this year. The shops are well stocked, but the prices are equivalent to those in a big town. Religious services for Serbian New Year will be held throughout the night in almost all churches on the territory of the Krajina.

Otherwise, the impression is that tempers have, to some extent, calmed since Serbian President Milosevic's letter to Milan Babic, president of the Serbian Krajina, and the reply that followed from Knin. There has been silence from the leaders of what are referred to here as the dissident communes of Korenica, Donji Lapac, Obrovac, and some others that, as is well known, fully support Milosevic's letter.

However, all conversations have [words indistinct] revolved around 15 January, the day of the possible European recognition of certain Yugoslav republics, including Croatia, as well as the arrival of blue helmets. People here believe in the UN forces as a guarantor of peace in this area, but they are frightened at the possibility that the blue helmets will remain for six months and then the Krajina will be left to the mercy of Croatia. This is why they are asking for additional guarantees and oppose the announced withdrawal of the Yugoslav People's Army.

Nevertheless, the view prevails that the present disagreements between the leaderships of Serbia and Krajina can be overcome without much friction and that the future of the Krajina is in a community with Serbia regardless of the future composition and setup of the rest of Yugoslavia.

Finally, let me report the information that has just arrived from Novigrad that says that a military government was introduced today in this town by the sea. Since about 20 days ago, Novigrad has been under the authority of Serbian territorials.

Mesic Calls For Economic Aid for Reconstruction

AU1301134592 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 13 Jan 92 p 11

[Cornelia Glees report: "Bavarians in First Place in Help for Croatia"]

[Excerpts] Again and again his speech was interrupted by loud applause: Like a national hero they celebrated Stipe Mesic, secretary general of the Croatian Government party and former SFRY president, in the Catholic church of St. Gabriel in Munich on the evening of 11 January. Several hundred, mostly Croatian, believers had come to participate in a peace service together with the top politician. [passage omitted]

Father Nediljko Sabic, priest of the Bogenhausen parish, had invited his prominent compatriot, together with Vlado Gotovac, director of the oldest Croatian cultural institute "Matica Hrovatska," for a four-day visit to Germany. "I have come to ask for help for Croatia," Mesic said in an interview with SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG. The 56-year-old politician is looking primarily for economic support for the forthcoming reconstruction and the necessary reprivatization in his homeland. He held corresponding talks with representatives of companies in Munich; he is also looking for business partners in Stuttgart and Ludwigsburg. He did not want to give any details on that. In St. Gabriel, he received much applause when he said: "Of all Germans, the Bavarians have been in first place in help for Croatia."

For him, who called himself the "president for life of a state that no longer exists," one thing is clear: The war in Croatia will soon be over, but it will break out again in Bosnia-Hercegovina. "It is Serbia's goal to occupy this republic. The Serbs ruined Yugoslavia, because they saw Yugoslavia only as Greater Serbia," he said. The Europeans believed the lies of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic about the violation of human rights by the Croats. For Mesic the solution, at least for his homeland, looks like the following: Recognition as an independent state by the world public and acceptance into the EC. [passage omitted]

Tudjman Speech to Croatian Assembly Reviewed

92BA0337A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 29 Dec 91 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Special Meeting of the Assembly of Croatia, Report of President Tudjman: Croatia Has Achieved Its Goal"]

[Text] The results of the patience and principle that we have shown are now becoming evident. About 10 countries have passed decisions on the diplomatic recognition of Croatia, and all this is a reason for us to look back with pride and dignity on the road traveled, at the results achieved. With the international recognition of Croatia, a new era in its history is beginning.

In presenting the yearly report before representatives of the Assembly, President of the Republic Dr. Franjo Tudjman began with an assessment of Serbia, which forced the war on Croatia, driving Slovenia out of Yugoslavia and using for its purposes the Yugo-Serbian army, the pro-Serbian government in Montenegro, and the Serbian population in Croatia with the primary aim of the complete subjugation of Croatia to a re-formed Yugoslav federation. When we thwarted this, then it was necessary through war to conquer Croatian areas and annex them to greater Serbia under the mask of the remainder of Yugoslavia. In order to defend against this policy and such aggression, continued Dr. Tudjman, a principled, peacemaking policy and a consistent focus on the development of democracy confronted one of the largest and technically best equipped military forces in Europe. But, even under war conditions, the inevitability of recognizing Croatian striving for independence and sovereignty resulted in the end.

President Tudjman mentioned the basic stages of the attainment of full Croatian statehood. Everything began on 22 December 1990, when the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia became for all of us not only the highest expression of the political will of the Croatian people and all citizens of the Republic, but also the obligation to establish and build a democratic system in all areas of government and social life. The route to this has been exceptionally difficult. As far back as 25 July 1990, greater Serbian policy was organizing Chetnik renegade terrorism. An uprising occurred in Knin on 17 August 1990 with the aim of challenging the democratically elected government in Croatia by attempting, through occupation of parts of the territory and disrupting major transporation connections, to cause the disintegration of political and economic life. After passage of the Constitution, we were faced with the preparation of an increasingly open attack by Serbia and the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] on the Croatian government and the sovereignty of the Republic. During January, especially on 9 and 24 January 1991, the army openly announced its aggression against Croatia. It was happening under the pretext of disarming Croatian paramilitary forces and protecting the allegedly threatened Serbian population. Under these conditions we were not able to count on major international entities, since they widely supported the reform program of Ante Markovic for the preservation of Yugoslavia.

Confederalist Plan

Under such circumstances, emphasized Dr. Tudjman, we proposed a confederalist plan for the transformation of the former Yugoslavia into an alliance of independent republics. If Macedonia and Bosnia-Hercegovina had supported our proposal then, when Slovenia already had approval for leaving Yugoslavia, perhaps a destructive war could have been avoided. But, this did not occur, so our efforts were directed at changing the viewpoint of major international entities on the resolution of the crisis in Yugoslavia and the conditions for stopping the aggression against Croatia. These efforts gradually bore fruit at the cost of many victims. Then, on 9 January 1991, the Presidency of the SFRJ issued an order that all armed units not part of the JNA must be disbanded within 10 days. With this decision we were faced with the greatest danger both to the democratic system and to the integrity and sovereignty of Croatia. Total war with the army threatened Croatia. But it had to be avoided, as did a direct clash with the consequences of the so-called Serbian uprising in Croatia, which the greater Serbian and Yugo-communist scenarists wanted to provoke at any cost.

Separation From Yugoslavia

The president of the Republic also mentioned 15 May, the date when Stipe Mesic, as the Croatian representative, was prevented from assuming the duties of president of the Presidency of the SFRJ. Pressure from the EC ministerial council led to Mesic's assuming this position on 1 July. The next stage in the disintegration of Yugoslavia came on 1 October, when the Serbian-Montenegrin part assumed, in the manner of a putsch, all powers of the Presidency and designated the further attendance of the Croatian representative as superfluous. Because of this the Croatian Assembly, on 8 October, passed a decision on the withdrawal of the Croatian delegation from the Assembly of Yugoslavia as a sign of the interruption of the government-legal connections of Croatia with Yugoslavia. By decision of the Assembly on 5 December, Stipe Mesic was relieved of his duties in the Presidency of Yugoslavia.

President Tudjman also mentioned the role of the Chetnik faction in the achievement of the goals of greater Serbian policy in the war against democratic Croatia. Its basic characteristics are reckless terrorism for political purposes and genocide against the Croatian and other non-Serbian population. However, emphasized Dr. Tudjman, by carrying out a long-term policy, we must strive to thwart such an inconceivable form of barbarism, but at the same time not permit the justifiable bitterness of the Croatian population because of the numerous crimes to be transformed into blind revenge and self-willed violence.

Three Key Tasks

After the terrorist attacks widened to include direct army participation in the aggression against Croatia, the policy of the Croatian leadership was faced with three tasks. The first demanded that the actions of the democratic institutions of the state conform with the effective defense of the government, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia. The focus of these institutions was maliciously used by critics to declare the actions of the Croatian leadership as undemocratic and even totalitarian. The sharp edge of the criticism was especially directed at the advisory Supreme State Council and crisis executive staffs. The Constitution of the Republic, which empowers the president to appoint a close war cabinet, instead of the government, was forgotten and the president did not resort to this. The malicious critics, as well as well-intentioned people, forgot that many government policies cannot exist in war, but only one, the one for whose program the victorious party obtained a majority in the Assembly through the will of the people at the elections and the one for which it bears responsibility until the next elections. The malice or ignorance of headstrong or misguided opponents must be judged according to the fact that they found themselves, with their abuse of democracy, on the same line with those whose aim was the destabilization of the Croatian government. The stirring up of disorientation and hostility in the public had as its aim the weakening of the effectiveness of the leadership institutions of the government and authorized individuals. The second important event was the decision on the announcement of the referendum, made at a time when political conditions demanded that Croatia come out for its complete national independence. By the constitutional decision on the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Croatia of 25 June 1991, the action of separating from the other republics and the SFRJ, and the action for the international recognition of Croatia, were set in motion. The end of this process followed on 4 December 1991 with the approval of the constitutional Law on National Societies or Minorities. As the third, Dr. Tudjman mentioned the struggle for maintaining the democratically elected government. Numerous opponents of any sovereign and independent Croatia, as well as opponents of its democracy, have wanted to destabilize, confuse and destroy this government. They have persistently attempted to cause division within the leadership and to compromise it. Various domestic, Yugoslav, and international anti-Croatian factions even took advantage of minor political events to shatter the unity of the Croatian national being. All political strongpoints bore the brunt, while attacks on Croatian territory were stepped up at the same time. Toward that aim an attack on the president's palace was also carried out, and plans were prepared for the destruction of all other important seats of the political and economic life of Croatia.

The Role of Serbs in Croatia

Dr. Tudjman devoted particular attention to the role of Serbs in Croatia. From the Knin uprising onward, we warned the Serbian population in Croatia that, with their approval of the policy of the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party], especially, and Serbian political leaders, both republic and party, they were assuming the responsibility for everything that was happening in Croatia. Our assessment that Serbs in Croatia had been assigned the role of a fifth column and diversionary units in the war, as it was being waged by the armed forces of the communist JA [Yugoslav Army], was shown to be correct. The perception that the army was prepared, with its strength, to attack Croatia in order to destroy its government and conquer Croatian territories was also shown to be accurate. Toward this aim, with a court trial of and a spliced film on 24 and 25 January 1991 about General Spegelj, minister of defense in the government of Croatia, the overthrow of the Croatian government with an open military coup on command or with the approval of the president at that time, Borisav Jovic, was planned. Traveling to Belgrade, we succeeded in thwarting this intention, although numerous political leaders and some assembly representatives were against this and the extended negotiations that followed. On 9 April 1991, in order to strengthen our defense forces, we made a decision on the restructuring of a large part of the police forces of the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] into special operating units of the Corps of the National Guard. At that time we possessed only police forces and light infantry weaponry. But, this was a decisive step toward the creation of a Croatian army. The Croatian army was in its infancy and we possessed only light weaponry. Thus we could not permit a direct clash with JNA units. The result would have been catastrophic for us. For the same reason, we could not attack all the military bases in Croatia at once. It was necessary to wait for the process of demoralization in the army, which began after the debacle in Slovenia and with gradual failures in Croatia. The embargo on the import of arms into Yugoslavia also affected us, and the army had them for years of fighting. Only when, with the seizure of bases, we could arm a large number of units and gradually carry out a mobilization, were we able to count on successes on a front thousands of kilometers long. The siege of Vukovar and holding out for such a long time there were evidence of a Croatian military victory, emphasized Dr. Tudjman. Soberly assessing enemy aggression in eastern and western Slavonija, the morale and strength of the enemy were destroyed. This success came in conjunction with the complete political victory of Croatia in international negotiations. It is true that the aggressor still has superior war equipment, but he can no longer count on the overthrow of Croatia.

Dr. Tudjman then mentioned the Brioni declaration of 7 July, a memorandum of understanding, documents that enabled Croatia to complete the organization of its defense forces as effectively as possible. The mission of EC observers also slowed the aggression. In spite of this, demands were made from various sides in October and November for the declaration of a general mobilization and status of war and the initiation of a general offensive. Had we agreed, we could have taken a step toward catastrophy and defeat. Instead of this the Croatian army today possesses units of high battle morale, capable of offensive missions of a broad scope. The liberation of western Slavonija, Lika, parts of Dalmatia and Baranja proves this.

We Won the Trust of the World

The dream of many years about the international recognition of Croatia's sovereign and independent state has come true for the Croatian people. The striving to preserve one's own political and cultural identity has been paid for at a high cost as it has who knows how many times in history. The cruel war against Croatia has also had a significant effect on international relations and, it is not an exaggeration to say, on the outcome of the Soviet crisis. Dr. Tudjman believes that his war will remain a landmark in the future alteration of relations in all of Europe. The policy that has been carried out by Croatia has already been confirmed by many countries as a prerequisite for its international recognition. The patience and principle that we have shown are now showing their real results. Scores of countries have already made decisions on the diplomatic recognition of Croatia. Of particular importance is the fact that both the Vatican and Holy Father John Paul II, as the supreme spiritual and moral authority of today's world, have come out in favor of the recognition of Croatia. In order for this process of recognition to be completed successfully, it is of basic importance to preserve the world's trust in Croatia, pointed out the president of the Republic. In contrast with our successes in the diplomatic world, the aggressive policy of Serbia and the Yugo-communist army are clearly meeting with international isolation. All this is a reason for us to look back on the road traveled at the results achieved with pride and dignity. With the international recognition of Croatia, a new era is beginning in its history. The issue is primarily tasks in the basic areas of national life: political, cultural and economic.

Croatia must confirm all principles of modern multiparty and parliamentary democracy in the political area. It must be a supporter of the policy of peace, co-existence of peoples, and human and national freedoms, as well as an open political cooperation on behalf of the stability of international order. In the cultural area, Croatia must devote itself to the preservation of heretofore neglected and fading values of spiritual culture and the creativity of the Croatian people, giving impetus to the joining together and cooperation with the highest segments of European and world culture. In the economy, Croatia must become a land of open economic and market borders as soon as possible. An effective government administration must be created for respecting and protecting the interests and rights of individuals and society as a whole.

All these tasks that stand before all of us are not easy, emphasized Dr. Tudjman. The assembly has performed a tremendous amount of work in a year and a half, but the task has not been fully completed. We are required to hold elections according to the new election law and we will do that immediately after the end of the war. A series of new legal resolutions must be passed in accordance with the new political and economic era. A law on parishes must be passed, and a whole series of laws, taken from the old government organization, coordinated according to the measures and demands of our democratic and European orientation.

The Goal: Establishing a Lasting Peace

The joy of international recognition, continued Dr. Tudjman, is complicated, unfortunately, by the horrors of war and occupation of a part of Croatian national territory. It is up to us to prevent the occupying army, in its vengeful rampage and incomprehensibility, from continuing to destroy the material resources of the Croatian state. Thus our goal continues to be an absolute ceasefire and the establishment of a lasting peace. The Croatian army today is organized into a powerful defense force. I want to emphasize the high and honorable morale of our domestic defenders. The unity of the Croatian army, which the subversive attempts of some adventurists or exponents of others' policies and interests have threatened, has been preserved and consolidated. They have done this, at the very least, because of their own political profiteering. This war has aggravated international relations to the extreme and it is necessary to view them soberly as far as future contacts are concerned. History teaches us that we cannot view the Serbian and Montenegrin people forever as enemies of the Croatian people. In the same way, we hold that ending the war and the occupation of Croatian territories demands the urgent intervention of international peacekeeping forces under the protection of the UN or EC. It is unacceptable for Croatia that the price of possible democratic changes in Serbia or some preservation of influential spheres must be paid by the Croatian people with their lives and destroyed homes.

Today, concluded Dr. Tudjman, we must begin to act on the rebuilding and development of a ravaged Croatia. An office for reconstruction is being set up in the republic government. Its goal is to attain the political and spiritual ideals of a state of prosperity in the shortest possible time. Right in this tall building, the Croatian Assembly should do all that is in our power to provide the legislative and social prerequisites for the restructuring of the economy. This is not an everyday political slogan but a historically responsible and very difficult task. We are also faced with the complicated task of international negotiations, the establishment of relations with states arising from the former Yugoslavia. The legislation of the Republic must be adapted to its strategic goals. In the end, our obligation to establish a new Croatian Assembly according to the provisions of the Constitution is urgent.

National Bank Governor Discusses Foreign Debts

92BA0306B Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 19 Dec 91 p 6

["Interview" with Dr. Ante Cicin-Sain by REUTER; place and date not given: "Croatia Is Not Evading the Foreign Debt"]

[Text] Zagreb, 18 Dec (REUTER/HINA [Croatian News Agency])—The British News Agency REUTER reports that Croatia is ready to take over its share of Yugoslavia's foreign debt, which amounts to $16 billion, but will probably have to seek a postponement of payment, representatives of the Croatian government have said.

"In essence, Croatia is willing to service the total amount of its external obligations," said Dr. Ante Cicin-Sain, governor of the National Bank of Croatia.

The Croatian government, REUTER writes, is trying to make up a probable deficit in the republic budget for next year in the amount of $2.2 billion. The deficit has resulted from the recession and has been compounded by the war in Yugoslavia.

Cicin-Sain said that the portion of the external debt attributed to Croatian banks amounts to slightly more than $2 billion, 80 percent of which is covered by guarantees of federal authorities. "We are ready to take over the indebtedness and service it," said the governor of the National Bank of Croatia.

In addition, $500 million of the debt pertain to enterprises in Croatia who received those funds from banks headquartered in other parts of Yugoslavia.

Croatia does not wish to evade those debts, but it will insist that those banks fulfill their obligations toward their own Croatian customers as well, REUTER writes, stating that since fighting first broke out, after proclamation of the independence of Croatia and neighboring Slovenia this June, economic relations within Yugoslavia have been disrupted and that the property of enterprises from Croatia and Slovenia has been confiscated in other parts of the country.

Yugoslavia's external debts also include a portion borrowed directly by federal authorities. Cicin-Sain estimates that those debts amount to $3.1 billion. Croatia would accept a portion of those debts provided that it also gets a portion of Yugoslavia's foreign exchange reserves, Dr. Ante Cicin-Sain said, thereby repeating a precondition which Slovenia had also required. He said that he had written to the governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia and requested negotiations concerning the sharing of federal foreign exchange reserves back on 27 June, the date when Croatia and Slovenia were expelled from the Yugoslav monetary system.

On that date, the foreign exchange reserves amounted to $3.83 billion, having dropped from their highest level of $10 billion in August of 1990. By 11 September, foreign exchange reserves had dropped to $3.7 billion, as shown by the data of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, and foreign exchange reserves have continued to drop since that date.

If the value of gold is taken at the market price, the amount of reserves as of 27 June would have grown to $4.5 billion.

The servicing of the external debt of approximately $3 billion would not normally represent any problem for Croatia whatsoever, because in past years its exports of goods and services have amounted to between $5.1 and $6.6 billion, Cicin-Sain said.

Croatia has also requested from the IMF technical advice on how to separate from the disintegrating Yugoslav federation in order to become one of its members. However, Michel Camdessus, IMF director, replied that the Fund, if it wants to help Yugoslavia, must remain neutral and can help only if all the Yugoslav sides present a joint application. Cicin-Sain said that he cannot imagine that the National Bank of Yugoslavia would make such an application. "Thus foreign creditors will have to present such a demand to Yugoslavia," he said.

According to the assessments of the governor of the National Bank of Croatia, Croatia next year needs approximately $1 billion in grants or concession loans in order to help its economy, because exports will be much smaller because of the war.

Serbia

Milosevic Meets Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis

AU1401095492 Belgrade Radio Belgrade Network in Serbo-Croatian 0905 GMT 14 Jan 92

[Text] This is what Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Republic of Serbia, said this morning after his talks with Greek Prime Minister Konstandinos Mitsotakis in Belgrade this morning:

[Begin recording] [Milosevic] We are very pleased to have the opportunity to meet Mr. Mitsotakis, and I think that Greece—as our friend of many years and one proven through history, as well as our closest neighbor—understands very well the situation in Yugoslavia. I think that Mr. Mitsotakis' government and Mr. Mitsotakis personally understand this situation very well, and it seems to me, that is, I can say that I am almost certain that the policy that Greece is pursuing to solve the Yugoslav crisis helps the preservation of Yugoslavia's continuity. In the talks we held today, we also asserted this.

[Unidentified reporter] What is the future of Yugoslavia?

[Milosevic] Well, the future of Yugoslavia is to (?remain) the country of the republics and the peoples who want to live together, who have an interest in living together, and who, on the basis of this joint interest, can develop a successful, democratic, modern, and developed country. [end recording]

Foreign Ministry Denies Accepting EC Views

LD1301221292 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2116 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Belgrade, 13 Jan (TANJUG)—This evening the Foreign Ministry of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia categorically denied sensation-seeking reports that Serbia has departed from its position on the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis and accepted the views of the EC.

The AFP news agency cited Radio Veronica in the Netherlands as saying today that Serbia had allegedly accepted the transformation of Yugoslavia into a loose confederation of sovereign states as proposed by Lord Carrington, the president of the conference on Yugoslavia. The radio cited a statement by Serbian Deputy Foreign Minister Dobrosav Vejzovic. This report was carried by TANJUG, as well as several radio stations.

The Serbian Foreign Ministry said this evening that the statement by the ministry's representative had been freely interpreted in a sensation-seeking fashion. Asked what Serbia expected of the resumption of the conference on Yugoslavia, the ministry's representative said Serbia expects a peaceful solution, but only if the conference on Yugoslavia goes back to the principles it proceeded from. This implies that the EC render good services to the conference's participants, that they all receive equal treatment, and that decisions be made by consensus.

The Serbian Foreign Ministry said its representative had told Radio Veronica that Serbia insists on full equality of all options. He said Serbia will remain ready for talks if its option and that of Montenegro—that those who want can remain in a common state—is accepted and treated on an equal footing with all other options.

Only in that case, the ministry representative said, will Serbia remain ready for talks with those republics who want to establish other forms of links with the federation, i.e., republics which want to remain part of Yugoslavia. Such talks, Radio Veronica was also told, can commence after those republics which have opted out of Yugoslavia present their views and reach agreement on this.

Assembly Deputies Question Air Force Efficiency

LD1301153392 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1355 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Excerpt] Belgrade, 13 Jan (TANJUG)—A number of replies were given to questions at today's Serbian Assembly session, at which deputies were interested most in the involvement of the Yugoslav Peoples' Army (JNA).

Zoran Horvan, (Serbian Renaissance Movement) demanded an explanation about the Air Force's lack of action, since it is common knowledge that one aircraft is estimated to be as effective as 1,000 soldiers. In his reply, Defense Minister Colonel General Marko Negovanovic noted that this idea has not been confirmed in reality and added that the Yugoslav Air Force has so far carried out its required tasks efficiently.

If one refers to the use of the Air Force in Western Slavonia, then one should know that it is not responsible for the exodus of the Serbian people from that area. It was, rather, due to mass desertions from military emplacements and the spirit of defeat and misinformation that infiltrated the units there, the reply stressed.

As for the question of the need for a greater use of military technology, and not just infantry, the Defense

Ministry states that, some shortcomings notwithstanding, the Army has been using all its branches and specialities adequately, something that is borne out by its combat results. In this context, it also notes that the lack of infantry has been more pronounced than the insufficient use of powerful hardware, something that also requires manpower. [passage omitted]

Serbian National Renewal Supports Krajina's Babic

AU1301173892 Belgrade Radio Belgrade Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] The Serbian National Renewal [Srpska Narodna Obovna] supported Milan Babic, prime minister of the Serbian Krajina, in his current dispute with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, whom Babic had warned about the possible negative consequences if he did not change his attitude toward Babic's politics in the Knin Krajina.

At the news conference in the party headquarters, the commander of the Dusan Silni squad distanced himself to a degree from the Yugoslav Peoples' Army [JNA]. Nebojsa Spajic reports:

[Begin Spajic recording] At the beginning, the leaders of the Serbian National Renewal sent a sharp protest to Radio-Television Serbia, because it failed to carry the full text of Babic's reply to Milosevic. As a result of this, Dragoslav Bokan said, the public did not understand the real meaning and consequences of and the impression made by this letter. Statements in support of Babic then followed.

It was stated that the arrival of blue helmets in Krajina, which is in Croatia, would be equal to national treason. Some letters and telegrams from abroad supporting Babic were read. Among them was one from Chetnik war lord [vojvoda] Djujic, who said that Krajina does not need blue helmets, that blue helmets are not preventing the possibility of genocide, and who added that the historic borders of Serbian Krajina have not been reached yet.

After such statements, the proposal by the Serbian National Renewal that the government of Krajina should invite all Djujic's fighters and supporters, as well as refugees, to return to Krajina and defend it gained political weight. This culminated in a warning to Slobodan Milosevic reminding him that he came into prominence on the wings of Serbian nationalism, as Mirko Jovic [president of the party] said, and that abandoning Krajina and promoting leftist ideas can only lead to two political fates: that of Ceausescu, or that of Gorbachev, who had to resign from the political scene.

Milorad Bastaja, commander of the Dusan Silni volunteers' squad of this party, said that his fighters would not lay down arms unless the Serbian nation wanted this, adding that his squad will be joined by the fighters of other formations whose leaders have accepted Milosevic's letter. He specifically mentioned the volunteers of Vojislav Seselj and Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan. Bastaja also said that these fighters find it difficult to enter Krajina, because the JNA is stationed on its borders and because an information, economic, and political blockade of Krajina is in force.

When asked what would happen if the JNA tried to disarm the Dusan Silni Squad, no direct answer was given. The reply was made that if the Army lays down its arms and leaves, it cannot disarm anyone, and that the fighters of this squad will remain in Krajina for as long as the nation and the legal Krajina government want them to stay. This practically means that at least in one provision—the provision on laying down arms—the Dusan Silni squad will not listen even to the one it currently recognizes as its supreme commander — the JNA.

All these positions overshadowed the stance of Mirko Jovic, which was repeated several times, who considered Vuk Draskovic a traitor after Drackovic's appearance in Sarajevo yesterday. [end recording]

Socialist Party Supports Vance Peace Plan

LD1301223292 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1757 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Belgrade, 13 Jan (TANJUG)—The Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] supports the peace plan by Cyrus Vance, envoy of the UN secretary general, because it offers real possibilities for the cessation of the conflict and for the protection of the Serbian people from genocide. This plan is the result of long negotiations in which all interested parties took part, including the representatives of the Serbian people in Krajina. The plan has been accepted by the federal bodies and official representatives of the Republics of Serbia and Croatia, which also offers real possibilities for its realization. This is emphasized in the stands of the Socialist Party of Serbia in connection with the implementation of the United Nations peace plan that have been published today.

Observing that it has always and consistently strived for a peaceful, democratic, and political solution of the Yugoslav crisis, the Socialist Party of Serbia considers that the peace plan by Cyrus Vance is not a political solution but a precondition for finding such a solution. However, it enables the achievement of peace without bloodshed, until an agreement is reached for a final political solution. This plan offers maximum protection for those aims and interests that the Serbian people fought for in the war. The placing of the territory of Krajina under UN control represents the best possible political protection of the interests of the Serbian people and a guarantee that they will be respected, the statement by the Socialist Party of Serbia emphasizes.

As stated in the SPS views, the UN peace plan excludes any authority of the Croatian state—political, administrative, judicial and military—on the territory of Krajina. All administrative and judicial authority, as well as police protection, will be in the hands of the elected bodies in the borderlands. The arrival of the UN peace forces represents a defeat for the warlike and political aims of the Croatian secessionist authorities because all human and citizens' rights of the Serbian people are placed under UN protection.

Democratic Party: Draskovic Charges 'Political'

LD1401094192 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1750 GMT 13 Jan 91

[Text] Belgrade, Jan 13 (TANJUG)—The Democratic Party, the second strongest opposition party in the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia, today issued a statement protesting over the raising of charges against Vuk Draskovic, the leader of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO). The SPO is the leading opposition party in Serbia.

The office of the public prosecutor in Belgrade has charged Draskovic with being responsible for the death of two persons, serious injuries inflicted to six persons and minor injuries sustained by 93 persons, as well as for material damage' during a protest rally held in Belgrade on March 9 last year.

The Democratic Party maintains that the charges brought against Draskovic without a new inquiry indicate that "they have a political background." It also maintains that "the current Serbian authorities should have taken responsibility for the causes and consequences of the demonstrations."

The Democrats believe that the upcoming trial of Draskovic actually implies the republican authorities' resolve to "settle accounts with the opposition in Serbia, which can only mean a repetition of the mistake made on March 9, but this time with more serious political consequences."

The March 9 demonstrations were organized by Serbia's opposition parties.

A parliamentary inquiry into the circumstances in which two people were killed and several dozens injured established that the tragic event took place because the organizers of the rally disobeyed a ban imposed by the republican authorities and because police lost control over the events.

Ineffectiveness of Opposition Parties Discussed

92BA0292A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 20 Dec 91 pp 16-17

[Article by Milan Nikolic: "A Graveyard of Political Parties"]

[Text] Until two months ago, only impassioned politicophiles knew of the League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina and of its young leader Nenad Canak. Thanks to his television appearance (a duel with Seselj), and particularly since his arrest and forced mobilization, Nenad Canak has become such a media figure that on the program "Impression of the Week" over Studio B TV he even got the most votes for "Impression of the Month" in November.

A poetical interpreter of our political phenomenology would describe the "Canak case" as a metaphor of the opposition's present life outside parliament in Serbia. Since the beginning of the war, that scene seems to have lit up and become more lively, more dynamic and colorful. The media abound in reports and press releases on the activity of a great variety of opposition parties. This sudden output of the opposition in the mass media has affirmed still more certain opposition leaders who were already well known, some, on the other hand, it has dethroned, but it has brought onto the public stage many small, marginal parties and their leaders, and indeed even leaders without parties.

This is a gift from heaven for a professional questioner. Are we witnessing here an authentic birth of pluralism in Serbia? Or is this only a simulation of an opposition, its Potemkin village? Is the flood of marginal parties and leaders a sign of the richness of democratic parliamentarianism?

To the Left of Damascus

Prof. Vladimir Goati has said in a statement to NIN that parliamentary opposition in Serbia is so weak, and the three-fourths majority of the ruling party so merciless that people have the idea that the parliament consists only of the majority:

"The more arrogant the majority, the more the opposition will turn to civil society outside the parliament, and in a society with a low political culture like ours, those forms of activity outside the parliament carry inherent risks, as we saw in the month of March. But, although it has been mercilessly pushed aside, the opposition has not separated itself conceptually from the ruling party. When it comes to the key issues of war and peace, it stands in dangerous proximity to the ruling party, and this is where you see the absence of the political identity and profile of the democratic parties."

Dr. Nebojsa Popov is the president of a party (Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative [UJDI]), which does not even codify itself as a large party, but recently has been very much in evidence in the mass media. He believes it is difficult to speak empirically about an opposition outside parliament, because this recalls the biblical phrase "to the left of Damascus," when no one knows where parliament is and whether there is one at all in Serbia. Popov cites as grounds for this assertion the already well-known views of the opposition that the elections were irregular because of the media warfare and unfairness of the majority-oriented election law. The essential characteristic of parliamentarianism is recognition of the opposition as an institution, but in our case it has not been institutionalized, but merely tolerated by the regime. Because the essential prerequisites of parliamentarianism have yet to be won, Dr. Popov feels that various groups, parties, and trade unions outside parliament contribute most effectively to that, and here he singles out above all his own "peaceniks," the preparliament of Yugoslavia, and the round table of the government and opposition in Sarajevo.

Dr. Zoran Djindjic of the Democratic Party, which is among the strongest and most influential in Serbia, shares the opinion that the opposition has not become an integral part of the political system, a situation referred to with the phrase "a half-sincere parliamentarianization of Serbia." Thanks to the deliberate manipulation of the authorities, there is hardly even any domestic politics in Serbia. All of politics has been absorbed into the "external" events outside Serbia, so that the citizens are very little informed about what in a practical way is happening inside it. Given that situation, Djindjic believes, it is impossible to conduct any sort of parliamentary or extraparliamentary politics.

Generals Without an Army

If that is so, why, then, the virtual "invasion of the opposition" in the mass media, to such an extent that it has almost displaced even the ruling party? Is this only an imitation of opposition life, an image in a distorted mirror? Practically all those NIN talked to answered in the affirmative, succinctly stated by Jordan Aleksic, chairman of the Executive Board of New Democracy—Movement for Serbia: "Just as we have a simulation of pluralism, so we also have a simulation of an opposition." And Mr. Djindjic adds:

"The representatives of the opposition are in evidence in the media as individuals, but all the rest of the time belongs to the ruling party in the form of news programs, seemingly disinterested commentary, and the like. That presence is far more effective, because viewers often believe that this is a reporting of the truth and objective news, not dissemination of the interpretations of a party."

If all of this signifies simulation of opposition life outside parliament and then imitation of pluralism, what assessment are we then to give the more than evident "products" of that simulation and imitation? Thanks to the media marketing of the opposition, many small parties have suddenly come back from the dead when it was believed, as Professor Goati says, that they had the life of a dragonfly from one round of elections to the next. The party leaders took the best advantage of the opportunity offered them. Aside from the three opposition leaders most in evidence in the public—Micunovic, Draskovic, and Seselj—the public is becoming increasingly aware of Milan Paroski (People's Party), Dragan Veselinov (Peasant Party), Kosta Cavoski and Prof. Nikola Milosevic (Serbian Liberal Party), Nebojsa Popov (UJDI), but also of many other leaders previously unknown such as Nenad Canak.

It would take a deeper scientific survey to determine the extent to which they shape political public opinion with their views and appearances. However, their impact on democratic parliamentarianism is no greater than the impact of an imitation of an opposition on the democratic pluralization of society, because many of these leaders of small parties are generals without an army, and some are even leaders without parties. This is in fact demonstrated by a November survey of the Institute for Political Studies done on a sample of 1,100 respondents from all over Serbia, the same one which foresaw the results of last year's elections with an error of only 1.5 percent. If elections were held in Serbia now, the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] would take 29.8 percent of the electorate, Seselj's Radicals 15, the Democrats 12.5, while the SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement] would take 6.9 percent of the vote. Then come the SDA [Democratic Action Party] (4.8) and another five parties with very low percentages: the Reformists for Serbia (1.4), Milan Paroski's People's Party (1.2), the DMSZV [expansion not given] (0.3), the People's Peasant Party (0.9), and the SNO [Serbian National Renewal] (0.7). All the other opposition parties in Serbia would together get a total of 1.6 percent of the vote! On the list of the most popular figures, the first three places are taken by Captain Dragan, Karadzic, and Patriarch Pavle; among opposition leaders, Seselj gets seventh place, Micunovic eighth, and Paroski 11th, while Vuk Draskovic is in the company of the "negatives," Tudjman and Ante Markovic.

"It turned out," says Srbobran Brankovic, researcher from that institute, "that we have many marginal parties that do not constitute any kind of political force in Serbia. A great many generals without an army. It was a lack of caution on the part of the government that turned Canak into an important political figure, although objectively he is not. It has also turned out that the leaders are stronger than their parties. I am referring here above all to Professor Milosevic, Kosta Cavoski, Dragan Veselinov, but also Seselj. Were he to leave the Radicals, they would no longer be a serious party at all."

For Nebojsa Popov, the phenomenon of "generals without an army" is only yet another sign of the underdevelopment of civil society, because leaderism is typical of a peasant society and followers group around a leader and in critical moments shout the name of the military commander in order to direct the energy of the masses to bring down the other leader. Zoran Djindjic derives the phenomenon of many small impersonal parties, which with their aggressive leaders create the appearance of a richness of pluralism, from the thesis that the opposition has neither been legalized nor stabilized:

"Opposition parties are semiprivate organizations, just as they were before the December elections. Even then it was possible for certain parties to exist in the form of press releases which a handful of leaders 'stamp out' every day, requiring neither a party nor a membership. One gets the impression that the ruling party likes this chaos, because the media conscientiously publish all those press releases of fictitious parties, adding to the confusion in the minds of the citizenry."

Ferment Without Impact

We do not know exactly which parties Mr. Djindjic was thinking of, but a party that does not have a representative in parliament and often corresponds with the public and the authorities with numerous press releases and initiatives is New Democracy—Movement for Serbia. It is for that reason maliciously referred to as the "Press Release Party" or "New Democracy—The Movement for the SPS."

Mr. Jordan Aleksic, president of the executive board of two parties, says that they do not have an extraparliamentary complex, but that for a long time they were burdened with the "general without an army" syndrome and the suspicion that they were appendages of everyone except themselves. Because they have become convinced that they are a small, but stable party, one that is not suffering from attrition, they are disappointed with the coalition in which "Vuk's interpretation is that he is the owner rather than the co-owner of the coalition's ideas," so that they would not go into a deep freeze until the next elections, and in keeping with their thesis that politics should be generated, they began to flood the public and the government with various press releases and initiatives.

"Our strategy's point of departure," Aleksic says, "is that public opinion is the most open terrain for generating politics. That is where they have the least chance of smothering us. That is why we go directly to producers of the news, and we are understood by them. Our larger supply has given us more space and gained us new members. In order to break through the parliamentary blockade, we have been persistently and obstinately shaping initiatives and sending them to the government and the Assembly. So far, we have sent 18 such proposals. Three were adopted."

"Your party is not based on the charisma of a leader. Will that work in our case?"

"If we define the parties in material terms, then they are determined by three things: program, membership, and leadership. At present, we have only the latter, a pluralism of leaders, who have merely attached themselves to honorable and solid titleholders of the past. There are no autochthonous parties. The best example is the Radical Party. A reputable party from the past is today the most vulgar party. The parties have neither programs nor membership, but through street demonstrations they have created the false impression of large parties. They have not held a membership on a continuous basis, so that today we have many leaders without the backing of a membership. It is an irrefutable fact that the SPS based its victory on Milosevic's charisma and that that charisma is exhausted, just as it is an irrefutable fact that the voter of one party today is the voter of another party tomorrow."

The key question remains: Will all this "opposition ferment" of numerous parties and leaders, which are also getting an answering echo from the media, signify a step toward pluralism and democratic parliamentarianism? Professor Goati is skeptical:

"The rapid formation of strong and stable parties is a problem of all of East Europe and of Yugoslavia, and that is why these countries are a graveyard of political parties. Last year, in Yugoslavia there were about 200 parties, but barely some 20 percent were effective. In Serbia, there are only four or five parties left that mean anything. The rest are born, they emit a flash of light, and they are extinguished, but their leaders stay on. That is why we have more leaders than parties backing them up. There is no stable democracy without strong political parties, not dwarf parties or false parties, because their generals without an army cannot help to bring about a stable democracy. Strong and stable parties also signify a balance of power in the parliament, and today we do not have either one in Serbia."

Micunovic Discusses Republic's Status, Needs

92BA0304B Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 25 Dec 91 p 5

[Article by Dr. Dragoljub Micunovic, people's deputy and president of the Democratic Party: "What Is Serbia To Do?"—first paragraph is POLITIKA introduction]

[Text] Today we are publishing an article by Dr. Dragoljub Micunovic on the topic "What Is Serbia To Do?" The editors will gladly publish other opinions of the ruling majority and parliamentary opposition as well as other competent authors who want to take part in debating this topic.

Today, there is hardly a citizen of Serbia or member of the Serbian people who does not feel anxiety and fear. Do we have a roof over our head? Do we have a homeland, which is it, how large is it, and what kind is it? In which and what kind of a house will we live, that is, in what homeland will we be tomorrow?

Because of these questions, we need to begin the debate of the state of Serbia as soon as possible, of its governmental status and national interests, of its place and role following the disintegration of what has been called the "second Yugoslavia," of its internal political and economic system. All of those questions are closely related and require a broad debate involving both political institutions and the broad political public.

The Narrowing of Power

Those interests have unfortunately been determined up to now, in these fateful days, by a very small group of people, or, frequently perhaps, by President Slobodan Milosevic himself. The criticism of the present constitutional arrangements concerning the coordinated bodies of government—the parliament, the government, and the president of the republic, have proved to be justified. The tendency of power to become narrower was noted long ago in the classics of political thought, and it has been quickly manifested here. Rejecting the institution of "interpellation," the parliament voluntarily turned all political initiative over to the government, and the latter did not think for a moment of keeping it, but relinquished it to the president. In that way, interpretation of the interest of the state and the national interest has been left to a personal assessment, while institutions and the public were excluded.

Serbia today faces a test: Will it have the strength to define its international and domestic status? Serbia cannot afford to remain for a long time in that haze when now it seems that Yugoslavia exists and now it seems that it does not, in that provisory state, because then it exposes itself to all the dangers that accompany states which are undefined and amorphous. Serbia cannot wait in determining its status until all the peace conferences have been completed, until all the territorial arrangements have been arrived at and all the treaties concluded, so that it is the remainder of a state that has been torn to pieces, after everyone has satisfied his appetite and realized his own "historical ideals."

Serbia cannot afford to allow this "transitional period" to endure and cannot postpone resolution of domestic political problems, economic problems above all.

The astounding balance sheet of the one-year administration of the Socialist Party indicates most eloquently that something must be done—that waiting passively on what will happen while an ever more vigorous role is being played by others who are making decisions about us should be ended as soon as possible. The war and what goes with it cannot be an alibi for postponing the indispensable reforms.

It is time that Serbia clearly said what kind of arrangement of what previously was Yugoslav space it favors, and that so long as that arrangement endures, it will modernize, reform, and renew its own state—which is still called the Republic of Serbia. It should clearly state in this connection that the only principle which Serbia can accept as the basis for resolving the Yugoslav question is the principle of a completely free expression of the will of the Serbian population outside Serbia concerning the form of their governmental community. That means insisting on respect for the freely expressed will of the Serbs of the Krajina and Bosnia-Hercegovina, just as it means respecting the will of other nationalities who have appealed to the right of national self-determination in deciding on their own existence as a state.

Independence or "Remaining"

I think that they would have more chances of exercising their rights if they vote in favor of their own independence than some "remaining" in a Yugoslavia which has been or will be written off internationally. Their mechanical inclusion in Serbia has whipped up propaganda about creation of an expanded Serbia and of "annexation of the territory of other republics" and has been used in the campaign against Serbia.

However, all those who have reservations about an "expanded Serbia" or "truncated Yugoslavia" do not have persuasive arguments against the legitimate right of the Serbs to form their own state on their own ethnic territories, and that state could then voluntarily join a governmental community or alliance with other states, including, of course, Serbia.

Building the statehood of the present Republic of Serbia does not mean that Serbia should enter the competition for awarding statehood which the EC has organized. Serbia needs only to really achieve its sovereignty as a state, not merely as a matter of formal law. And to do that it must have a firm point of support within itself and then, proceeding on the basis that as the most numerous, largest, and oldest state in this region, it influences the development of events instead of waiting for events to work out themselves without its influence, because it is spellbound and obsessed with the idea of Yugoslav sovereignty.

We can no longer postpone the steps that liberate Serbia from excessive dependence on what was Yugoslavia and its "remnants." This applies equally to political as to economic institutions, and, of course, also to the basic attributes of the state, the Army above all.

The present Constitution of Serbia is a compromise between Yugoslavia as a federation and as a confederation, and it is not the constitution of a sovereign state. What is more, a political system based on presidential authority does not fit in the political tradition of Serbia nor does it suit the needs of the moment. It does not broaden the base of power, but narrows it, it minimizes the role of the parliament and of the free public—which has an adverse effect on the quality of decisions. We need a constitutional Assembly and a new constitution that will guarantee parliamentary democracy.

In the economic area, we need to "untie" Serbia as soon as possible from federal institutions which are the source of the crisis and will be so even more. In the domain of monetary policy, Serbia could experience a blow if Croatia and perhaps Macedonia abolished the dinar as a means of payment and if all the money from their banks goes to the other republics through some sort of channels. Serbia must also think about a program for introducing its own currency, while retaining the dinar as a means for economic communication with the other republics.

Legal Chaos in the Economy

"Dual legislation" creates legal chaos in the economy as well as in the state administration. That is why definition of the sovereignty of the state of Serbia with respect to the amorphous and unmeasurable federal sovereignty is an urgent need. In Serbia, at the moment there is no clear concept of an economic system. The consensus economy has been anathematized, and the market economy has been adopted only verbally, which is opening the way to "fishing in muddy waters" and large-scale embezzlement. This state of affairs can be ended by creating a modern and effective state administration and through accelerated transformation of ownership. "Social ownership" has been left to the mercy and abuse of the state administration, which is trying to survive by plundering the national wealth concentrated in the socialized sector of the economy. With a clear tendency to merge the ruling party and the state, and then the state and the economy, with the creation of large governmentalized systems which would be headed by commissars, ministers, and high officials of the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia], so that the uncontrolled squandering of public property is facilitated, because with the new Law on Enterprises the very last appearance of democracy disappeared.

Public property and the dramatically threatened standard of living of the citizens of Serbia can be protected only by vigorous measures in the form of laws. We cannot postpone the laws on denationalization, on protection of foreign exchange savers, who have been robbed, but also on specific and rapid protection of citizens whose social welfare is threatened.

Serbia should even now be thinking about the conditions and problems that will arise after the end of the war. We need to know what will happen to all our citizens who have suffered in various ways in this war. And finally, how are we to guarantee the security of citizens when there are so many weapons and so many warriors of various kinds? Serbia should encourage talks as soon as possible among representatives of the various ethnic groups so that all its citizens feel allegiance to the state community to which they belong and feel an equal security and enjoyment of the proclaimed rights of full legal and political equality.

Serbia has chances of finding its place among the progressive states if it finds the strength to regulate itself according to democratic political standards and effective and modern economic standards. We need to convince ourselves of this as soon as possible, and then the world will also believe us.

Vojvodina Assembly Criticizes Regional Press

92BA0230D Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
4 Dec 91 p 7

[Article by Z. Serences: "The Vojvodina Assembly on the Writing of the Region's Press: Criticisms of Nationality Newspapers"—first paragraph is BORBA headline]

[Text] MADJAR SO and HLAS LJUDU are being criticized for abstract pacifism, denigrating the efforts of Serbia to preserve Yugoslavia, and lagging behind events in Croatia. The chief editor of POLJOPRIVREDNIK is Obrad Lucic and that of the newspaper HET NAP is Mihalj Cordas. The editor in chief of HLAS LJUDU, Jurij Bartos, has been replaced.

Novi Sad—Delegates of the Council of United Work and the Council of Districts of the Assembly of Vojvodina have adopted the assessment of the Regional Secretariat for Information about the writing of Vojvodina newspapers and accepted the proposed "measures and activities" that included not only the election of directors on Vojvodina newspapers in a recent competition but also the abandonment of the election for the editor in chief of the newspaper MADJAR SO in competition—instead of which only an acting director was appointed—as well as the replacement of the previous editor in chief of the newspaper HLAS LJUDU, Juraj Bartos.

It was decided that the new editor in chief of the newspaper POLJOPRIVREDNIK would be Obrad Lucic, that of the newspaper HET NAP Dr. Mihalj Cordas, the general director of the "Forum" house Miklos Moroti, who was also appointed acting editor in chief of MADJAR SO.

The delegates directed most of their criticism at the writing in MADJAR SO and HLAS LJUDU. The basis for this was material on the realization of the program orientation of the newspapers which the Regional Secretariat for Information titled with an analysis that it would nevertheless be appointed to the report tomorrow, keeping in mind that it is involved exclusively in assessments of the writing of newspapers on the war and its consequences. The delegates sought a special analysis of the writing of newspapers within a period of one month, with an explanation of "how a complete and objective picture of the writing of newspapers could be achieved."

The basic criticism of the majority of newspapers in national languages, primarily MADJAR SO and HLAS LJUDU, is "abstract pacifism, denigration of the efforts of Serbia to preserve Yugoslavia, distracting from the lack of response to mobilization and desertion, calling the Presidency of the SFRJ defective and illegitimate, disregard and delay in setting forth the genesis of events in Croatia and in taking note of the genocide against the Serbian people"—this was sufficient for the majority of delegates to accept such a report as a sufficient basis for staffing decisions.

When Tudjman and Milosevic are equated in the text of individual newspapers, then a comment is indeed unnecessary—the assessment, for example, of delegate Dragan Vujacic of the Council of Districts, while VUR [Council of United Work] delegate Dragan Lukac warned that MADJAR SO was calling on citizens of Hungarian nationality not to go to the front and VUR delegate Danilo Pantovic warned that one should speak differently with such pacifists and their leaders.

There were, to be sure, several opposing statements, e.g., those of Rastislav Struhar (VUR) according to which no criticism can be made of support for peace if it does not have a counter-effect in the results of mobilization, whereby he quoted the statistic that in Backi Petrovac, for example, where HLAS LJUDU is primarily read, 95 percent of those mobilized responded to the callup.

Delegate Zoran Asanin expressed a public protest because of the proposal of a group of representatives of the National Assembly of Serbia, who sought a change in the name of the Autonomous Region of Vojvodina to Serbian Vojvodina.

[Box, p 7]

Dragan Radevic, Editor in Chief of DNEVNIK

The Assembly of Vojvodina, at yesterday's meeting, appointed Dragan Radevic, a POLITIKA journalist, to be editor in chief of the newspaper DNEVNIK.

Dragan Radevic was born on 26 May 1953 in Budimlja; he is a Serb by nationality. He graduated in journalism at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade. He began his professional newspaper career as a reporter for OMLADINSKIH NOVINA [YOUTH NEWS] in Krusevac, then went to the newspaper BORBA. He went from BORBA to the newspaper POLITIKA in 1988.

[Box, p 7]

Dismissals

Delegates of the Assembly of Vojvodina dismissed three members of the Executive Council of Vojvodina yesterday. They were Colonel Geza Parkos, secretary of national defense, who was assigned to other duties—chief of staff of the Territorial Defense; Dr. Djordj Nadrljanski, regional secretary for education and culture, who was dismissed at his own request; and Istvan Teher, member of the Provincial Executive Council of Farmers-minister without portfolio, who was dismissed at the request of president Radoman Bozovic "because he did not demonstrate interest in the work of the Executive Council."

[Box, p 7]

President of the Assembly—Mr. Damjan Radenkovic

After almost half a year with Vice President Damjan Radenkovic at the head of the Assembly of Vojvodina—after the resignation of President Verona Adam—the Assembly decided yesterday to hold an election for president nevertheless, the determining factor being primarily that the regional multiparty elections planned earlier were postponed. Mr. Damjan Radenkovic became president yesterday, and the opposition candidate for this post was Pavel Domonji. Of the 130 delegates who voted, Radenkovic received 94 votes and Domonji 31, while five ballot slips were invalid.

Pristina Editor Fined for Publishing Photo

AU1301193792 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Pristina Communal Magistrate's Court yesterday sentenced the editor of the Pristina biweekly magazine KOSOVARJA to a fine of 6,000 dinars. The court of the occupying Serbian state accused him of allowing the publication of a photograph of Jusuf Gervalla [Albanian rights activist murdered in Stuttgart in 1982] and an article entitled, *A Bitter Peace in Kosovo*, published on 12 December 1991.

Bosnia-Hercegovina

Army Recruits Told to Ignore Draft Notices

LD1301182692 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1716 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Sarajevo, 13 Jan (TANJUG)—The Bosnia-Hercegovina Ministry of National Defense issued a statement today saying that all draft notices sent to Yugoslav People's Army recruits are illegal. The statement says that "army bodies have been intensively issuing notices this month drafting recruits to begin their military service between 15 and 20 January this year, which has caused additional anxiety and resentment among the citizens."

The Ministry stresses that, "according to a decision of the Bosnia-Hercegovina government dated 23 August 1991, the army bodies are not authorized to discharge duties relating to military service and mobilization and, therefore, they may not draft recruits from Bosnia-Hercegovina to do their military service."

"Bearing in mind that the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency's decision not to draft recruits is still in force, we are informing the public that recruits are not obliged to heed the draft notices sent to them by army bodies," the Ministry says in the statement, stressing that against them "proceedings cannot be instituted because there is no legal basis for it."

SDS Demands Army Deployment to Bosanski Brod

LD1301212392 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Sarajevo, 13 Jan (TANJUG)—Following the report by the Ministry of Interior of Bosnia-Hercegovina about armed paramilitary formations in the area of Bosanski Brod and the municipality of Derventa, the municipal committee of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) in Bosanski Brod today issued a statement demanding that the competent republic and federal bodies send military units to that area as a matter of urgency "in order to protect all citizens."

The statement emphasizes that unless action is taken within 48 hours to disarm the illegal and parallel formations in Bosanski Brod municipality, the SDS municipal committee "will issue a proclamation calling on the Serbian people and all other Yugoslav-orientated citizens to carry out a mobilization; that is, a self-organization of the people and the arming of all Yugoslav-orientated citizens for defense against the Ustasha-like policy of the Croatian Democratic Community."

Visegrad Serbs Opt to Form Autonomous Regions

LD1301140392 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1259 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] Visegrad, 13 Jan (TANJUG)—Citizens of Serbian nationality in Visegrad have decided to incorporate all the districts inhabitated by the majority Serbian population on the right bank of the Drina River into the Serbian Autonomous Region (SAO) of Hercegovina and those on the left bank into the SAO of Romania, TANJUG learned in Visegrad today.

A 25-strong Serbian assembly has been formed, including Serbian Democratic Party [Srpska Demokratska Stranka] deputies to the Municipal Assembly and Serbian deputies from opposition parties, as well as the presidents of Serbian Democratic Party local branches.

The Serbian Municipal Assembly has decided to adopt all federal, republic, and municipal regulations that correspond to federal legislation. It has decided that existing officials, directors of funds, organizations and institutions, and the adminstrative workers of Serbian nationality will retain their status until the final settlement.

Branimir Savovic, chairman of the Serbian Democratic Party municipal branch, was elected president of the Serbian Assembly of Visegrad and Jelisavka Petrovic, vice president of the Visegrad Municipal Assembly, was elected vice president.

Objections to Republic's Recognition Viewed

92BA0309D Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 25 Dec 91 p 18

[Article by Muharem Duric: "Bosnia Is Ingratiating Itself With Europe"]

[Text] Sarajevo, 24 Dec—The political crisis in the central republic is continuing and getting deeper and broader. The situation can be described rather eloquently in just one sentence (contained in the press release of the Negotiating Committee of the Assembly of the Serbian People of Bosnia-Hercegovina [B-H]), which reads: "Peace is threatened in Bosnia and Hercegovina!"

Except that in the last two or three days of extreme crisis most of the news has been coming from abroad (since Izetbegovic issued statements for the Turkish and French press), today certain additional reports are also coming from the building in Sarajevo which houses the Presidency of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The public, that is, has with good reason expressed interest in the document with which Bosnia is "competing" for recognition of independence by the European Community. But the Presidency seems to have "cut itself off," so that all that remains is to guess about the kind of arguments Bosnia is presenting to Europe.

An Incomplete Application

Today, when a letter which supposedly has mysteriously gone off to Europe is made public, it is evident that it is incomplete, but also that it is inaccurate. As they ingratiate themselves with Europe, certain Bosnian leaders are thrusting the entire republic out in front of themselves, which is actually only partially true. After all, in its application to Europe for recognition of independence, Bosnia states that the Presidency of SR [Socialist Republic] B-H and the republic government adopted those decisions. Not a word to the effect that those decisions are in dispute and that they are opposed, to say the least, by one entire people—the Serbian people in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Judging by the text sent from Sarajevo, it turns out that Bosnia is literally begging the European Community to recognize it.

To be sure, in one paragraph of the Sarajevo letter to Europe it states that three equal peoples live in Bosnia-Hercegovina, which according to the 1991 Census had the following shares in the population: Croats 17.27 percent, Muslims 43.74 percent, and Serbs 31.33 percent.

The Serbs are "enumerated" in the list, but nowhere is it mentioned that this is being done against their will.

All that there is to indicate that the application is incomplete is that there are only two signatures; the third is missing.

The application, that is, was signed by the Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic, as president of the Presidency of SR B-H, and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] leader Jure Pelivan, as republic prime minister. And no one else. The representatives of the Serbian people, who have been against from the beginning, are automatically excluded. One hears that even Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the Assembly of SR Bosnia-Hercegovina, did not see this notorious text of the demand for recognition of the independence of Bosnia and Hercegovina that was secretly sent to the European Community.

Thus, Bosnian disagreements cannot be concealed even from the European public. They are merely being intensified still more; they are not dying out.

And the disagreements in Bosnia and Hercegovina being expressed ever more strongly are completely normal reactions to what one group decides, while a second or third party proclaims it unlawful. For that matter, that is how it has been since the memorandum, including the application for independence, the desire to create a Croat Herceg-Bosnia, and the Serbian plebiscite, all the way to the decision to form the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

How To Prevent Bloodshed

What is being expressed in public, however, is only a part of what is boiling within the political parties, both in the HDZ and Muslim party and also, without a doubt, in the

Serbian Democratic Party of B-H. In practical terms, the extremists are already quite prepared for war in Bosnia.

Both Alija Izetbegovic and Stjepan Kljuic probably must pinion the hawks, as Radovan Karadzic has also had to do. There are many reasons, then, to believe that certain leaders would rather leave their positions of leadership and the political scene than to bow under to pressure. In spite of this assurance, there is a fear that the loaded dam might give way at some point, and then Bosnia would find itself under a torrent of war.

Bloodshed must be prevented in a practical way, because verbally it has already been stated on several occasions and from various positions that war is the worst alternative.

Because the political-security situation in the central republic, as stated by the Negotiating Committee of the Assembly of the Serbian People of Bosnia-Hercegovina, has been strained to the maximum by the unconstitutional demand of a portion of the Presidency and a portion of the government to alter the republic's government status, peace can be preserved only by dialogue.

That is the reason for insistence on intensification of the conference of the three ethnic communities concerning Bosnia and Hercegovina.

A great deal more goodwill must also be shown. The Negotiating Committee of the Assembly of the Serbian People of Bosnia-Hercegovina is today summoning legitimate representatives of the Muslim and Croat peoples to continue the conference on Bosnia the day after tomorrow, publicly, urgently, in the presence of newsmen.

It is essential to preserve peace in Bosnia at any price and prevent bloodshed.

"At this point, we need peace more than ever, we are doing everything to preserve it," Alija Izetbegovic said in expressing greetings on the occasion of the Catholic Christmas, the "holiday of peace."

Leaders Agree to Dissolve Paramilitary Formations

92BA0306D Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 26 Dec 91 p 7

[Article by Muharem Duric]

[Text] Sarajevo, 25 Dec—Following yesterday's discussion between the top military leadership and the leaders of Bosnia-Hercegovina [B-H], first place is taken up by the agreement that all paramilitary formations are to be dissolved. It has been two entire summers and the second winter is coming, and now Dr. Radovan Karadzic, speaking on behalf of the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS], is warning of the existence of paramilitary units in Bosnia-Hercegovina. In recent days, terrorist actions have been causing unrest, especially in Hercegovina. Finally, even Mile "Hawk" Dedakovic, after leaving prison, has said that the large transports of weapons cannot detour around Bosnian roads. He was even more precise in saying that the aid in the form of weapons intended for Vukovar had gone to the valley of the Neretva....

And although the existence of paramilitary formations in Bosnia and Hercegovina has been reliably ascertained, most of it was nevertheless cloaked in secrecy. POLITIKA has learned interesting details about a topic on which very little is known.

First, it was reported "from the field" that the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] in B-H was establishing its own organization "Croatian Falcon," and then two others: "Shield" and "Kordun." They are all distinctly militant and will be used for operations "in the rear." Of Serbian lands, of course, as was stated in the confidential report.

It has been proven, it is also alleged, that there is very close collaboration with the Italian, Hungarian, German, and Belgian intelligence services.

The Hercegovinian Connection

According to early reports, which for that matter have been confirmed, Italy and Hungary will be providing direct aid to Croatia—material assistance and weapons. All emigre firms are involved in purchasing special equipment for Croatian assault troops. In addition to weapons, mention is also made of various optical devices, all the way to a squadron of helicopters and light airplanes. The helicopters, it is stated, are equipped with rotary cannons and light missiles and full electronic equipment.

Judging by the information that has reached Sarajevo, quite a few Croatian officers have been "bought" and recruited in the Coastal and 5th Military Districts, as have Croatian generals in Belgrade. Zdravko Mustac (security chief) is working for them and establishing all contacts. Zdravko Mustac put the HDZ in touch with Franjo Vodles, retired official of the SDB [State Security Service], who brought from outside the country, from southern Africa, Rade Covdovic, known as "Cento," and Miroslav Malek, who was in the police in South Africa. Both were hired immediately by Perica Juric, Croatian internal affairs minister. Their main job is to smuggle arms through the firm "Malek-Commerce," which is headquartered in the Esplanade Hotel in Zagreb.

Perica Juric, incidentally, our source goes on to say, is the nephew of Andrija Juric, who during the war cut the throats of 1,200 children in Jasenovac. His brother Jurica gave 2-3 million German marks [DM] to the HDZ. That is how he was appointed minister of the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. There is a constant connection with Bosnia and Hercegovina: All the Juric's are from Livno.

Through Zeljko Marinc, who owns a sports complex in Zagreb, contacts were established between the HDZ and foreign consuls and intelligence services of the West. Mention is also made of Ratko Djokic, who was deported from Sweden as a suspected accomplice in Palme's assassination. He was assigned to organize the Croatian underground to work for the HDZ.

The datum about Stipe and Zoran Mazareli, owners of amusement parks in Zagreb and Ljubljana, indicates how far involvement in purchasing of weapons went. They have been buying weapons for Zdravko Mamic, who has stores in Zagreb. His duty is to arm the HDZ-ites in Hercegovina.

The kind of connections that were made is also indicated by the datum that one of the main chiefs of the shock group "Croatian Falcon" that has been formed is Mladen Mustac, representative of "Elan" in Austria, who is a relative of Zdravko Mustac, chief of the Yugoslav SDB.

Something else has been noted and later confirmed—that all the Croatian ambassadors outside the country were working for Croatia and were speaking against Yugoslavia in everything they said and had the worst things to say about Serbia.

The training of HDZ units—from Bugojno to Metkovic—has been completed. The organizational formations are known, and there are lists for liquidation. A secret document has been signed between all the HDZ opstinas in Bosnia and Hercegovina to proclaim unification with Croatia. They are waiting, it has been reported, for the right moment.

They will supposedly be covered from the rear by the Muslims.

Use of the Muslims

By all appearances, the idea is to use the Muslims in the dirty way familiar from the last war, when the Ustashi rushed into Serbian villages in disguise, wearing fezes and shouting to one another: Haso, Mujo.... After the Ustasha attack, the survivors testified that they had been attacked by Muslims, and that is how bad blood was perfidiously created between the Serbs and Muslims even then. All the allegations from confidential reports from the field have been confirmed.

The reports also mention Alija Izetbegovic, Stjepan Kljuic, and Jure Pelivan, leaders of the SDA [Democratic Action Party] and the HDZ. The statements they have made in rallies are now being zealously confirmed in political practice, as shown by the most recent political crisis in the central republic. They have advanced their own invention—outvoting, to make the inhabitants anxious in places where the Serbian population is in the majority.

Outright appeal for war against the Serbian population and threats from various leaders of the SDA and HDZ indicate that they have a disliking not only for preservation of the cultural identity of the Serbian people, but even life in community with them in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Much of what is alleged by the secret reports unfortunately is already well known and has already been witnessed both on the political scene and also on the battlefields of the war. Perhaps the language of the analysts in the field is dry, but it is the essence that is important.

Macedonia

Ethnic Albanian Referendum Ends; Deemed 'Fiasco'

AU1301202592 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] The referendum among Albanians on political and territorial autonomy in Macedonia has ended. It is not known when the official results will be announced. Here is our correspondent Branka Nanevska, who explains other details of this act:

[Nanevska] The loudly heralded referendum among Albanians for political and territorial autonomy in Macedonia has been a case of deja vu and the most frequent comment today from citizens in this republic is that there was much ado about nothing. It is being said that the turnout was more than poor and totally disappointed the organizers. Whatever happened, the referendum fortunately ended peacefully without any interethnic incidents and everyone now feels relieved.

Despite every effort, we did not manage to find out the results of what the government and parliament of Macedonia have called an illegal and unlawful vote among Albanians. There is silence today from the organizers, leaders of the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] and NDP [People's Democratic Party], who in the last two days have been exceptionally amenable and prepared to give information about the course of the voting and percentages of those who went to the polls.

Those in the headquarters of the (?body) for organizing the referendum say that the ballot papers are now being counted and that when this has been done, the results will be officially announced.

Republican media correspondents have been reporting that the referendum has actually been a veritable fiasco. A large number of Albanians from Tetovo, Gostivar, Debar, Kicevo, Ohrid, and other places boycotted it, as did Macedonian Muslims, Turks, and Romanies, who were also asked to vote by the organizers. They are bitter because the leaders of the PDP and NDP are conducting their own policy in collusion with separatists from Kosovo.

Here are a few specific examples. In Ohrid, for example, 8,000 ballot papers were issued for 3,700 registered

Albanians, while a total of 800 people went to the polls. Out of the 11,000 Albanian citizens in Bitola, 7,000 are legal adults but around 5,000 voted in the referendum. In Kicevo, only 17 percent of Albanians voted and in Kumanovo 91 percent of the 30,000 Albanians that are claimed to be there. However, the truth of the figures is openly doubted because it is being said that it is impossible for the population to have tripled in a matter of a few years. Do not let me go on.

It is quite clear that the referendum among Albanians in Macedonia for political and territorial autonomy was [word indistinct] farce. As former United States Congressman Joseph Diogardi, who had been asked by the International Foundation for Human Rights to monitor the referendum, said at a news conference in Skopje last night, this was primarily a survey of their mood without any kind of legal basis that would bind the republican government or international human rights organizations. As Diogardi said—according to the NOVA MAKEDONIJA reporter, since your correspondent was unfortunately not invited to this conference—this was because we are convinced that the Albanians in Macedonia are not threatened and that the Macedonian leadership is ready to gradually eliminate some mistakes in practice and improve their position.

It will soon be seen how the referendum will effect interethnic relations in Macedonia.

Tirana Reports 95.8% Turnout

AU1301153192 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 13 Jan 92

[Text] As reported by the Central Commission for the Referendum of Albanians in Macedonia, about 400,000 voters or more than 95.8 percent of the electorate voted in the 18 Albanian-inhabited communes of Macedonia. The Central Commission has also received the results of the voting of Albanians from Macedonia who are temporarily working in Europe and in other parts of former Yugoslavia.

A U.S. delegation headed by Joseph Dioguardi also observed the referendum. At his meetings with representatives of the Albanian political parties, he emphasized among other things that he would do his utmost to make the democratic world aware of the real situation of the Albanians in this area.

Skopje Reports Boycott 'En Masse'

AU1301155192 Skopje Radio Macedonia Network in Macedonian 2100 GMT 12 Jan 92

[Text] The referendum on political and territorial autonomy of Albanians in Macedonia should have continued today as well, but nevertheless ended yesterday. The main characteristic was that Turks and Macedonian Muslims have boycotted the referendum en masse.

In some ethnically pure places in the (?Kicevo) commune, the referendum was a failure. It was registered that the majority of members of the Albanian nationality have failed to turn out. After ballot material was taken away in Debar yesterday, the referendum was held today in secret, (?mainly) in private houses. Our correspondent from Ohrid reports that today [words indistinct] is not being held, so it is assumed that it was concluded yesterday or perhaps even earlier. There is the assumption that voting was held a few days earlier [words indistinct].

The president of the so-called committee for holding the referendum in Bitola, [name indistinct], has told journalists that 75 percent of Albanians in Bitola have allegedly voted in favor of the so-called autonomy.

According to the Titov Veles Internal Affairs Administration, in this entire commune, only several citizens of the village of Gorno Jabolciste voted. No violations of public peace and order were registered.

In Tetovo, the referendum was boycotted en masse today as well. In [word indistinct] local communes, orders, pressures, and threats on Albanians to take part in referendum have been registered. The Communal Secretariat for Internal Affairs has confiscated ballot material and ballot boxes at 23 polling stations. The incident [words indistinct].

Authorities Deny Use of Repression

AU1301154892 Skopje Radio Macedonia Network in Macedonian 2100 GMT 12 Jan 92

[Text] Regarding the claim that organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have allegedly taken repressive measures against members of the Albanian nationality in connection with the unlawful referendum on creating political and territorial autonomy for Albanians in Macedonia, the Ministry for Information has been authorized to announce the following:

In order to protect public law and order and prevent possible attempts to cause interethnic clashes and other incidents that could threaten the security of citizens, the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs—in conformity with their legal authority and responsibilities and without taking repressive measures [words indistinct] (?causing) reaction among citizens—have ensured (?full monitoring) of the conditions under which the referendum organized by the Party for Democratic Prosperity and the National Democratic Party was held. In doing so, no means of coercion were used and no citizens were taken to the police station or detained.

Besides, there are no grounds for the claim that the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have taken repressive measures in connection with the referendum and one can (?clearly say) that the point of this disinformation is an attempt to explain and justify the insufficient turnout and failure of the expected massive response of citizens to [words indistinct] the referendum in (?some populated) places, particularly in towns and places where Turkish and Macedonian Muslims live.

Tupurkovski Working on Recognition in U.S.

*LD1301133892 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1241 GMT 13 Jan 92*

[Text] Skoplje, Jan 13 (TANJUG)—The Macedonian president's special envoy to Washington Vasil Tupurkovski announced today that in the U.S. and Canada he will work on the recognition of the independence of this presently Yugoslav republic. In a statement to the daily NOVA MAKEDONIJA, Tupurkovski underscored that he will work on "ensuring a financial injection for survival in conditions of independence."

Tupurkovski until last Friday was a member of the Yugoslav state Presidency. As a member of the body he was bound by oath to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.

Asked how long he will stay in Washington, Tupurkovski replied that his mission will be completed as soon as concrete tasks which he has been assigned are accomplished. He did not offer any details about the tasks.

Greek Authorities Close Border to Macedonians

*LD1301212292 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2009 GMT 13 Jan 91*

[Text] Belgrade, January 13 (TANJUG)—All Macedonians from the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia who tried to enter Greece on Monday were sent back from the Greek border although they had Greek visas on them, TANJUG's correspondent reported from the border town of Djevdjelija.

Macedonian Radio reported that the Greek border authorities have closed the border for all Macedonians from Yugoslavia without any announcement or earlier decision. The Greek border authorities cancelled without any explanation the visas of the Macedonian visitors from Yugoslavia, reported the radio. Official Greek sources, however, denied the news to TANJUG's correspondent in Athens today.

"Such reports are completely untrue and unfounded," said the sources who asked not to be identified. The relations between Macedonia and Greece have been tense over Macedonia's request to be granted international recognition. Greece has asked that this Yugoslav republic should first change its name, which, in its opinion, suggests "territorial claims" to Aegean Macedonia, which is a part of Greece.

Macedonia has strongly rejected the demand.

Tupurkovski Advocates Simultaneous Recognition

*92BA0328A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
22 Dec 91 p 6*

[Interview with Dr. Vasil Tupurkovski, SFRY Presidency member for Macedonia, by Dragan Djuric in Skopje; date not given: "Macedonia Does Not Threaten Anyone"—first paragraph is VJESNIK introduction]

[Text] International pressure for a peaceful resolution of the Yugoslav crisis is increasing. Europe and the world do not recognize what is left of the SFRY Presidency, which has seized rights and functions to which it is not entitled. For the time being, the Army is leaving Macedonia without clashes and incidents.

We spoke with Dr. Vasil Tupurkovski, who is still a member of the SFRY Presidency although he has not attended its meetings for months now, following the adoption of the Brussels declarations and immediately before the session of the Macedonian parliament at which the Declaration on International Recognition of Macedonia as a Sovereign and Independent State was adopted. He himself was present in Brussels when the ministers of the European countries adopted the key document, and the Macedonian media even called him one of the "key figures" at that European Community meeting.

[Djuric] What was your role at the latest meeting of the Council of Ministers of the European Community?

[Tupurkovski] In Brussels I spoke on behalf of Macedonia in meetings with key figures, ministers of the European Community. The discussion centered on the activity of the Republic of Macedonia, including our concrete commitment to the UN Security Council resolution, meaning the establishment of a unified policy towards the Yugoslav crisis. Although we presented arguments on behalf of Macedonia, in so doing we did not infringe on the interests of a single republic. During those 12 dramatic hours, I had the opportunity to speak with all the ministers, and with some of them several times.

Against Individual Recognition

[Djuric] But your commitment is also interpreted as an effort to prevent the accelerated recognition of Slovenia and Croatia?

[Tupurkovski] First of all, it is completely untrue that we have opposed Croatian and Slovenian international recognition. We have always supported all republics and all nations that demand independence and international recognition on the basis of self-determination. That position has been utterly beyond dispute.

However, we have realized that there must be changes in the general and current policy of the European Community with which we have joined the process of resolving the Yugoslav crisis—a move from selective recognition of republics and general sanctions towards general recognition and selective sanctions. This was also sensed in the results of the Brussels meeting. We have now seen acceptance of the formula of general recognition of republics, normally, based on objective criteria, while sanctions have been made selective, which has yet to strike a corresponding chord among the public. The European Community has now completely regulated its attitude towards the republics. Macedonia, for example, is excepted from all sanctions. Moreover, we will receive compensation for that period during which sanctions applied to all the republics in Yugoslavia.

Furthermore, the unilateral recognition of republics would mean an escalation of the war and the crisis in Yugoslavia. In this way, harmonization has been established among the key factors in the international community through a unified policy. I am thinking here about the United States, the United Nations, and the European Community.

[Djuric] In the past you have stated that you can predict in detail an escalation of the conflict if there is, as you said, "selective recognition of individual republics." Would you like to clarify that statement?

[Tupurkovski] Given the lack of a definitive political solution to the Yugoslav crisis, the factors of war on both the Croatian and the Serbian side were unable to consider a halt to the war and an effective cease-fire. At the time, they were unable to project what the final outcome will be, which is definitively determined by their mutual relations and by overall relations in Yugoslavia.

German Step Away

[Djuric] You think that that is possible now?

[Tupurkovski] International pressure is even greater now. In the beginning, we were so irrational that we rejected any sort of internationalization of the crisis. However, we have arrived at a situation where we are seeking a very dramatic form of internationalization—the presence of international peacekeeping forces on our soil.

This international pressure is creating the framework for approaching our problems realistically. Anyway, recognition of republics alone would not mean anything new at the theaters of operations in a real sense. We can achieve a turnaround only through the persistent negotiations in which the international factor is now actively incorporated. I think that in the coming period there will be an intensified Conference on Yugoslavia, which will insist on this projection, which will simultaneously make it possible to achieve a cease-fire.

Conversely, without this definitive solution, where international recognition would be a category that is completely unacceptable to one of the sides in the conflict, it would promote an escalation of the war. This was not only the view held in Macedonia, but was also the prevailing analysis in most of the international community.

[Djuric] But Germany has nevertheless already formally recognized Slovenia and Croatia, which part of the political public is interpreting as a step away from a common European policy.

[Tupurkovski] I do not believe that. Every state has a discretionary right to express its political will towards other, newly emerged members of the international community. As far as international law is concerned, Slovenia and Croatia are states, and the question of recognition is really the discretionary right of the existing members. In that regard, Germany can do this.

Germany is not disrupting common European policy, because it has frozen its decision until 15 January, and the procedure provides for a reaction and the adoption of a decision by the European Council of Ministers based on the opinion of the Arbitration Commission. If—and I am speaking theoretically here—the Arbitration Commission were to have a negative position towards recognition of these two republics, then I think Germany would respect this.

Controversial Name

[Djuric] The position that was incorporated into the Brussels declaration at the insistence of Greece could prove to be limiting as far as international recognition of Macedonia is concerned. I am thinking here about the insistence by Greece that in order for Macedonia to gain international legitimacy, it must renounce its name.

[Tupurkovski] I do not see it that way. I do not wish to comment on Greece's position, because that is her right. As far as the newly launched policy of the European Community is concerned, I am completely confident that Macedonia will meet the established criteria. It is fulfilling them through its constitutional-legal and political process and providing guarantees that it will respect them in its own interest.

I believe that the European principles and criteria will even promote certain relations in the republic. I am convinced that no one can block the process of full emancipation of the Republic of Macedonia under international law.

[Djuric] And will it be recognized under its name?

[Tupurkovski] I would rather not go into that issue, because it is impossible to prove that the name Macedonia could be a threat to anyone's interest, and even less that it defines the character of the Macedonian state as a state of aggression, or as a state with territorial aspirations.

[Djuric] Do you expect Macedonia to be recognized internationally in a package deal with Slovenia and Croatia?

[Tupurkovski] In my estimation, no republic will be recognized automatically on the basis of European decisions. The process of diplomatic work is one that still lies ahead of us. It must be objectified, and this will be influenced by the assessment of the Arbitration Commission as well. Thus, although there will not be automatic recognition of the republics, I believe that the process of rounding out the international status of those republics who desire it is unstoppable. Moreover, it has become a rapid process, and there is no end to it.

In Agreement With the Army

[Djuric] To a considerable extent, the army is withdrawing from Macedonia. Do you expect this to be completed according to the Slovenian model? Previously, when you voted in favor of the army withdrawal from Slovenia in the SFRY Presidency, you made your vote conditional on application of the same principle to Macedonia as well. Do you think that this is what is really happening in the case of Macedonia?

[Tupurkovski] There are certain specific features of the army withdrawal from Macedonia compared to the Slovenian situation. There have been no clashes with the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] in Macedonia. I hope that there will not be any either. The issue here is the political ability, especially in the political will of the subjects in Macedonia and the JNA, to regulate our mutual relations through agreements and without any ambition to threaten one another. I think this will be completed in this way. It is a fact that the majority of JNA members have left Macedonia.

[Djuric] How many?

[Tupurkovski] I cannot answer you with precise figures, although it is maintained that we are closely monitoring what the army is doing. We do not have accurate data. We hope that we will succeed in ensuring a painless withdrawal of the army from Macedonia through agreements and negotiations with the army leadership.

However, as far as protecting the borders is concerned, this should not be a problem for Macedonian policy. In any case, Macedonia will optimally organize the defense of the integrity of its territory.

Professor Again?

[Djuric] You have announced your resignation as a member of the SFRY Presidency. However, you have said that you are putting off a final decision, because it could still be necessary for you to participate in the decision-making of that body. What does this mean?

[Tupurkovski] There is an idea in the United Nations, based on information from the secretary-general's special envoy Mr. Vance, that it is possible that some sort of decision by the SFRY Presidency will be needed during the phase of a definitive peaceful outcome. Most likely this would be linked to the army.

One must be realistic. There is a possibility that at a certain moment it will be necessary for the Presidency, as the supreme commander, to perform important tasks in relation to the army leadership in a legitimate and legal manner. This could even be demanded by the army leadership itself.

But after all the consultation, I see no major reason to remain in that body. There is less and less will in Europe to accept any sort of role by the Presidency, especially after the usurping of authority by four of its members.

[Djuric] What next? What are your ambitions?

[Tupurkovski] Even while I was a member of the Presidency I remained a professor at the School of Law in Skopje.

[Djuric] So you will be returning there?

[Tupurkovski] For now I am not considering anything else.